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Abstract
This thesis seeks to establish that the relationship between Naomi and Ruth in the 
book of ‘Ruth’ is one best interpreted - for feminist purposes - as one of ‘ideal’ 
friendship, I will show that Naomi and Ruth’s friendship is the context within which 
their agency is expressed and their full humanity illuminated. In order to provide the 
theoretical criteria for such an interpetation I will be bringing into my reading
f fAristotle’s model of rsXeia (piXia (perfect/ideal friendship) which he develops in 
books eight and nine of his Nichomachean Ethics. The resulting dialogue will provide 
a revision of both Aristotelian theory and modern biblical exegesis of ‘Ruth’.
The book of ‘Ruth’ has been inteipreted in ways that emphasise extra-textual 
considerations such as genealogy or divine providence despite the centrality of the 
women's role in the story. Furthermore, most feminist readings often project modern 
ideals of womanhood onto the text which equally obscure the subversive potential of 
the story as one in which female bonding determines plot development. On the other 
hand, theories of friendship have equally excluded women despite the equally strong 
presence of such ties in reality and in fiction. Starting with Aristotle and continuing 
with the Roman and Humanist tradition, I will show that the history of writing on 
‘ideal’friendship compromises this ideal on tlii'ee levels. First, the overt exclusion of a 
female presence as such and with it, any hint of femininity - as traditionally defined 
and established as a set of'essential' traits - have produced theories which emphasise a 
disembodied, rational ideal. Last, the belief in self-sufficiency further marginalises 
women and compromises the potential of ‘ideal’ friendship as a basis for an 
egalitarian society. Both discourses - biblical exegesis and philosophy - will be 
shown to suffer from androcentric biases which have colluded in preventing an 
interpretation of Naomi and Ruth's relationship in terms of friendship. My reading 
will illustrate why the model of friendship these women project re-deflnes existing 
androcentric models and provides a more inclusive theory and practice of friendship 
on which community may be modeled.
By shifting the focus of the relationship from kinship to friendship textual 
nuances take on meanings which support a gynocentric reading and give way to a 
feminist literary interpretation of the nanative. The interpretative framework 
throughout the thesis supports a redefining of concepts such as 'virtue', 'good', 'self, 
'identity', 'duty', 'freedom', and 'difference', so that they are compatible with a feminist 
viewpoint and produce a revisionist reading of the book of Ruth in which a utopian 
vision of community is projected. If Naomi and Ruth's actions are seen to proceed 
from feminist model of friendship - in its 'ideal' form, non-hierarchical, mutually 
bénéficient and responding to emotional need as well as intellectual engagement - 
they become alternative models of community not only for women but as a goal for 
all humanity.
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Nor is it right for me to enjoy pleasures, I decided, while he who shared things with me 
is absent from me.
Terence, Eautontimorumenos
Can I see another’s woe 
And not be in sorrow too? 
Can I see another’s grief 
And not seek for kind relief?
William Blake
Birth, and the Growth of the Soul; 
The Soul, in the body established,
In the ever - new beauty of childhood 
In the wonder of opening power.
Still learning, improving, achieving, 
In hope, new Imowledge, and light, 
Sure faith the world's fresh Spring, 
Together we live, we grow,
On the earth that we love and Imow 
Birth, and the Growth of the Soul.
‘His Religion and Hers’
Charlotte Perkins Gilman
Introduction
My thesis will develop an interpretation of the book of Ruth from the point of view of 
friendship and in turn this interpretation will re-define the theories of friendship I will 
be using. Thus, I will be conducting a revisionist reading of both the concept of 'ideal' 
friendship and this biblical text within a feminist literary framework. My re­
interpretation of the book of Ruth will take issue with existing interpretations (both 
feminist and non-feminist) and the concepts I will be subjecting to a feminist critique 
include 'the good', 'the self, 'selfish', 'equality', and 'community'.
In the first chapter I will be looking at the Aristotelian tradition of writing on 
friendship which I will be calling 'ideal' friendship because it encompasses ideas 
which are important for the development of my thesis, such as equality, goodness, a 
common life and as an alternative model for community. Other modern translations' 
use supplementary words which are insufficiently descriptive or fail to encompass 
what I see Aiistotle suggesting as the utopian character of 'ideal' friendships The 
tradition will include writers heavily influenced by Aiistotle (Cicero, Bacon, 
Montaigne, Kant and C. S. Lewis) who do not pass critique on his writing in any 
fundamental way and as I will show, share in his androcentrism. Despite the temporal 
and geographical differences these writers share a common aversion - some explicitly, 
others implicitly - to including women, or anything related to the 'feminine' in their 
theories of friendship. Moreover, they share a belief in self-sufficiency which I will
Uhese are: perfect, character, complete, primary, virtue, end, and companion. There is no 
consensus since Philia encompasses a broader range of attributes than its modem equivalent 
'friendship' but all of these touch on important facets of this term and refer to friendship of the highest 
virtue. See Neera Kapur Badhwar, Introduction, in Friendship: A Philosophical Reader (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1993), p.4
 ^I will be using the term ‘utopian’ to refer to tire vision or desire for a better society as 
represented in the example of ‘ideal’ friendship. For a contemporaiy discussion of femmist revisions 
o f the utopian ideal see Lucy Sargisson, Contemporary Feminist Utopianism (London: Routledge, 
1996)
argue is fundamentally opposed to an ideal of friendship. Thus, they compromise the 
‘ideal’ they set out to argue in favour of through a series of exclusions. So although 
there is much to be salvaged in the Aristotelian model of ideal friendship this can only 
be done if  first, the androcentric biases are foregrounded and then re-interpreted 
within a feminist framework which emphasises inclusion.
In the second chapter I will utilise Aristotle's ideas on friendship to interpret 
the book of Ruth focusing on the point of view that the determining factor in their 
relationship is best characterised as 'ideal friendship'. This will first entail a 
discussion of how Naomi and Ruth are 'good' both as people and to each other since it 
is only the most virtuous who are capable of such friendship according to Aristotle. 
And while I would agree that showing that Naomi and Ruth are good friends is not 
sufficient to establish whether they are also good to all, I will need to re-examine the 
idea of goodness which will be shown to proceed from double standards based on 
gender difference. Furthermore, the ideal of friendship which is promoted exludes the 
female and the feminine by its very definition so that even if the same standards were 
applied women would fall short of the ideal. This will lead to a conclusion that reveals 
how concepts of morality are bound up in conceptions of the self in relationship 
which are fundamentally opposed to ones developed in the patriarchal tradition. For 
example, though Ruth and Naomi pass the 'test' of moral excellence required in 
friendship, I will show that it is not the kind of excellence that the patriarchal value 
system promotes for women.
I will then go on to a textual analysis of the book which will focus on the tlmee 
'requirements' of'ideal' friendship: mutual beneficence, equality and a common life. I 
will show that the events which take place and the verbal exchanges between Naomi 
and Ruth not only exemplify all of the above characteristics but also posit an 
inclusive/feminist model of ideal friendship which challenges Aristotle's exclusive 
male/masculinist model. Thus, just as Aristotle’s theory of friendship illuminates a 
dimension of Naomi’s and Ruth’s relationship hitherto unexplored^ the relationship
itself challenges the theory in its androcentric bias. The result is a feminist revision o f 
both theory and story in which both parties benefit by the interaction.
Other issues implicated in ideal friendship which I will be looking at include 
Aiistotle’s statement of 'the friend as another self. Here the concept of 'se lf is again 
under scrutiny and the points that need to be examined are the similarities between the 
two women which in Aristotle's scheme would make this statement valid. There will 
also be a need to re-defme this phrase from a feminist point of view which will allow 
a greater inclusion of differences in friendship than Aristotle's ethics permit. For in 
Aristotle, the rational part of oneself is the ‘essential’ part ~ the one with which friends 
identify. I will argue that identification at this level is not sufficient nor desireable as 
it omits the range of characteristics that constitute identity beyond the merely rational. 
The 'differences' which proceed from these characteristics need to be assessed in 
relation to the women's friendship to ascertain not only whether they are 
insurmountable but also whether they entail a total sacrifice on Ruth's part. I will 
argue that this kind of sacrifice is unnecessary and incompatible with 'ideal' friendship 
and that it is possible for Ruth and Naomi to retain their distinct identities but also 
remain 'other selves'.
It is not only the concept o f 'self which will be redefined in view o f  Naomi 
and Ruth's relationship but also the concepts of duty and freedom in friendship. First 
I will argue that 'ideal' friendship is the only relationship where the conflict between 
duty and desire is non-existent because of its emphasis on mutual goodwill which 
stems from moral goodness. I will then examine whether the conflicting loyalties to 
the community and to one's friend can be resolved favourably on the part o f 'ideal' 
friendship. For Aristotle there is no conflict between the demands of the state and the 
'demands' o f friendship but he does not involve the case of women where the dilemma 
lies in obeying both the rule o f the state and the rules of men - thus leaving the
 ^The only exception is the short exegesis by C.Jf. Smith in The Interpreter’s  B ible  vol. II. 
(New York Abingdon: Cokesbury Press 1953), pp. 834-844. The friendship between Naoma and Ruth 
is assumed but not developed. Unfortunately, it is undemiined in the very same section by James T. 
Cleland’s exposition, see especially pp. 835-838.
‘demands’ of friendship to one another last. What ensues is the suppression of 
women's friendship as a priority. I will argue that in the case of demands made by 
society which would sever ties of friendship it is the friendship which should not be 
sacrificed and that such a demand is indicative of a dystopic/patriarchal society which 
camiot/will not revere the significance of women’s sustained relationship. This will 
bring me to the utopian potential of friendship to act as a model of relationship 
opposed to oppressive stmctures of hierarchy and alienation. In the example of Ruth 
and Naomi, this subversive potential of their relationship acts as a model of 
community unparalleled in the Hebrew Bible.
ii
The sub-title of this thesis: 'Friendship and the Book of Ruth' and in particular the 
conjunction 'and' points to the initial difficulty of establishing an argument which 
would support my original title 'Friendship in the Book of Ruth', that is, my view that 
what is going on in this text, between these two women, fits easily with my idea not 
only of women's friendship but also ideal friendship. The difficulty lies in the usual - 
for the Bible - lack of data on character motivation and intention^ Though it seemed 
obvious to me that Naomi and Ruth did not want to part because no good friends do, I 
soon discovered that this was not at all obvious to most other interpreters - including 
feminist biblical interpreters like myself. To support my position my only clues lay in 
the text itself: the abundant dialogue available, the detailed report of these women's 
often clandestine actions and the suspicion that this stoiy was unique in the Hebrew 
Bible in its portrayal of women's relationships.
Wliat ensued was the problem of reconciling my own finn belief in the 
validity of such a reading with two disparate tendencies in the interpretations of this 
text which I found to be on the extreme two ends of my own position. On the one
"Robert, Alter, The Art o f  Biblical Narrative (London and Sydney: George Allen and Unwin, 
1981): "The biblical narrative is often silent where later modes of fiction will choose to be loquacious, 
it is selectively silent in a pmposeful way", p .l 15
hand was the traditional, mostly male readings which included both historical-critical 
and more modern, literary approaches which also completely ignored the nature of the 
women's relationship as a salient point in the story but assumed and celebrated it as an 
amicable one defined by kinship. On the other hand were the mostly feminist 
approaches which, though innovative and thought provoking, more often than not 
criticise the women for failing to confront patriarchal power or for desiring anything 
other than the usual security of marriagek
In dealing with these distinct tendencies in Section two, I will bring to the text 
Aristotle's classic - and classical - theory of friendship. The analysis which will 
follow I hope will illustrate how neither of these approaches successfully deals with 
the 'excess' of emotion expressed by Ruth since kinship relationships - especially ones 
involving women and their mother-in-laws - are not typically represented in biblical 
literature with such manifestations of loyalty. By explaining the women's behaviour 
with reference to friendship I will show how such an exceptional case in the Bible can 
be read in a positive light for feminist critics and at the same time, Naomi and Ruth's 
particular friendship may yield an equally positive re-interpretation of friendship.
Utilising Aiistotle's theory, however, raises questions of methodology in teiins 
of the applicability not only of a Greek classical text to a Judaic biblical one, but also 
of a male/masculine theory to female relationships. This is why I have chosen the 
conjunction and - in order to focus on the nature of the dialogue between classical 
Greek masculinist theories of friendship and a masculinist/Hebraic inscription of 
women's relationships. I would like to examine the results such a dialogue will yield 
and especially whether there is anything worth salvaging from a modern feminist 
viewpoint^ Finally, if I am approaching the Bible as a literary text, what do I mean
agree with Mieke Bal who points out that "...in spite of major differences in the 
imiumerable readings in the Bible there has been...a continuous line toward a dominant reading...this 
does not imply that all female characters are seen as negative; quite the contrary. It does imply that 
any positive view of a female character has to be reevaluated for its recuperation within male 
interests," p. 2 in Lethal Love: Feminist Literary Readings o f Biblical Love Stories (Indianapolis and 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987)
by literary and how do I deal with the question of theology in a text which makes little 
mention o f God?
The first problem is that of employing a Greek 4th B.C.E century text to 
approach a much older, Hebrew text. It is necessary here to clarify the present 
reader's position vis-à-vis the Judaeo-Clrristian inheritance of the past three thousand 
years. There are two parts to this answer: first, as a Westerner, my understanding o f 
the Hebrew Bible is informed by concepts which have long evolved and interacted in 
a common geographical space and therefore, even as a reader without a theological 
agenda, it would be impossible to separate a history of interpretation which has 
evolved with mutual influence’. Secondly, as a feminist reader, the equally long 
inlieritance o f male centred interpretations has shown itself to be quite similai* - at 
least in some of its assumptions on women - in spite o f evolution. For example, the 
lack o f belief in women's potential for ideal friendships by the classicists goes hand in 
hand in my opinion with the lack of mention of such a possibility in Hebrew 
interpretations o f the book o f Ruth. Or is this only due to cultural differences I am not 
aware of? My answer is no, because of the fact that where the 'wrong' questions are 
asked® - in this case none concerning the nature o f Naomi and Ruth's relationship - 
then it would be impossible to expect the kind of'answers' I am looking for.
My position as a feminist in the latter half o f the 20th century will inevitably
owe this idea of dialogue between theory and biblical text to Mieke Bal, 
‘Dealing/With/Women: Daughters in tlie Book o f Judges’, pp. 16-39, in Regina Schwartz, (ed.). The 
Book and the Text: The Bible and Literary Theoty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990). Bal utilises 'and' to 
produce a reading in which theory and text stand as equals “speaking and listening to each other”. She 
uses narrative theory which will then be “challenged on its own terms and the text, in respornse to that 
challenge will challenge the theory, point out its limits and force it to go beyond itse lf’, p. 17. This is 
akin to my own project except here, the content o f my thesis mirrors the content of my methodology, 
i.e. the equality which defines friendship is mirrored in the equal and dialogic nature of my 
interdisciplinary thesis - and both 'parties' are transformed as a result.
’As Luce Irigaray states: "We are all involved with the many Greek, Latin, O rien tal Jewish 
and Christian traditions at least, through the art, philosophy and myths we live by, exchange, and • 
perpetuate, often without our realising. The passage from one era to the next cannot be made simply 
by negating what already exists," p. 23 in Alison Martin, (tr.), Je, Tu, Nous, Toward a Culture o f  
Difference (London and New York: Routledge, 1993, orig. published 1990)
®See for example, D. R. G. Beattie, Jewish Exegesis o f  The Book o f  Ruth (Sheffield: Journal 
for the Study o f the Old Testament Supplement Series, vol. 2, 1977) for the kind o f questiocas ancient 
and medieval Jewish exegetes were interested in.
influence the kinds of expectations I bring to the ancient texts I read but as in reading 
any literature, I do not expect it to confonn to my idea of what 'proper' feminist 
concerns should be. In my desire to allow the text to speak for itself I will focus on 
the biblical textual evidence in supporting my argument. In order to deal with the 
many modem interpretations I will also examine extra-textual infoiination which will 
allow me to find equally positive meaning for the present without forcing the past to 
conform to this present. In other words, reading the Bible as literature means that I do 
not believe there is only one ‘tme’ message in the text but that this approach opens the 
way for a reading that has great relevance for feminist biblical exegesis today. That 
is, Ruth can remain a book which will continue to be read and inteipreted as a positive 
illustration of women's agency in the past without necessitating recourse to historical 
or theological Imowledge.
By reading the Bible as literature I do not mean as Robert Alter does, a study 
of “the manifold varieties of minutely discriminating attention to the artful use of 
language, to the shifting play of ideas, conventions and imagery, syntax, narrative 
viewpoint, compositional units”" which he then uses to support a theological 
interpretation. The textual nuances are important for what they reveal of the plot and 
characters themselves and for what at the same time is left out of the narrative. Nor 
as Northrop Frye asserts, am I interested in “presenting a unified stmcture of narrative 
and imagery” '®. Wlrat I aim to do is consider the thematic interest of the book as one 
would first read any story, without a theological agenda in mind, although clearly, my 
feminist viewpoint will colour my reading. Wliat theological issues may arise will 
then be grounded in the literary reading which preceeded. The issue of structure is an 
interesting one but it will be discussed only briefly at the end of the thesis in relation 
to the possible correspondence between fonn and content. My hope is that the unique
"Alter, p. 12
t o .Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (Routledge and Regan Paul: 
London, 1982) p. xili, Inti'oduction. Strangely enough, Frye decides to omit the book o f Ruth 
completely from his discussion even though it has “a particularly obvious literary reference”, p. xxii. 
Why then does he not justify this omission?
content of the book of Ruth is reflected in its stmcture and not vice versa". That is, I 
aim to show how the hamiony and balance which characterises friendship is reflected 
in the literary 'perfection' of this short story".
iii
Writing about women's stories or stories about women in the Bible is not necessarily 
in itself a feminist endeavour - although it does serve the purpose of making women 
visible in the context of a male-centred culture defined by female suppression and 
oppression". Recognising however that a reading of the Bible that will take into 
consideration the “social, institutional and personal power relations between the 
sexes”''* is a paid of the feminist project. But in the case of the book of Ruth which is 
already quite visible in the context of the Hebrew Bible a feminist reading would 
entail an exploration of the issue of female agency in a world where options for 
women without spouses are precarious and even dangerous. Within this context, the 
theme of friendship serves as a potentially subversive force which undennines 
patriarchal power by placing same sex relationships as a priority to which male mle 
must respect and ultimately, accommodate. But it must not be assumed or expected 
that this is done via some direct or violent confrontation with male power. It must be 
understood within the context of a past whose ideological climate was not conducive
"See Phyllis Trible, 'A Human Comedy’, God and The Rhetoric o f  Sexuality (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1978), p. 166-199, for a feminist interpretation of content and structure in the book of 
Ruth which altliough not explicitly stated is, in my opinion, utopian.
'^Many have commented on the special literary attributes of the book of Ruth. See for 
example, Edward F. Campbell, Ruth: The Anchor Bible, A New Translation with Introduction, Notes 
and Commentary (New York: Doubleday, 1975)
'r io r il  Moi, 'Feminist, Female, Feminine', p. 129 , in Catherine Belsey and Jane Moore, 
(eds.), The Feminist Reader, Essays in Gender and the Politics o f  Literary Criticism (London: 
Macmillan, 1989). See especially the section on 'female criticism and feminine theory' for a lucid 
discussion, pp. 120-132.
"Ibid., p. 118
to open and direct action by women whose desires did not suit or defer to the status 
quo".
This is an even more difficult enterprise when considering the temporal 
distance of this Hebrew text from today. And though my own reading is not 
concerned with the means by which the book of Ruth in its present form became part 
of the canon, I am concerned with interpreters who rely on such data for the task of 
inteipretation. For example, the question of whether the genealogy at the end of the 
stoiy was a latter addition and how this influences the ‘message’ of the text though 
interesting in its own right, does not help the assumptions with which I am working 
i.e. those of a student of literature who reads the Bible while assuming the unity of the 
final foim of each text. The problem of dealing with such interpretations will be dealt 
with in the second chapter, but I would like to introduce here some of my own reasons 
for taking issue with most of these (feminist or non-feminist) interpretations".
As with any literature of the past - and especially the depiction of women's 
lives in the past due to biased masculinist inscriptions in literature and history" - there 
is a danger of “colonising the text with our meanings from the viewpoint of the 
present” '®. As Gillian Beer points out, this is a fallacious enterprise since it assumes a 
stable, fixed and unyielding present subject - to which all else must assume relevance 
or be discarded'". To be sure, some interest in the likeness of past women's lives to
'^Mieke Bal also finds Naomi and Ruth's actions subversive, though not for the same reasons 
as my own, see pp. 85-87, passim, in Lethal Love
'®Amy-Jill Levine, in Carol, A. Newsom and Sharon, H. Ringe (eds.), The Women's Bible 
Commentary (London: Jolni Knox Press, 1992), p. 78. Levine expects Ruth's actions to offer a 
“prescription for changing the circumstances in which women find themselves impoverished and 
without financial independence”. She is not alone in these expectations, but I will show how they 
prove to be unjust not only to past texts but also to their own aims in the act of reading.
'’Elizabeth Schussler Fiorenza, argues that: "Flistorical sources on women are not descriptive 
but prescriptive...ideas of men about women, therefore, do not reflect women's historical reality", 
'Remembering the Past in Creating the Future: Historical-Critical Scholarship and Feminist Biblical 
Interpretation,' pp. 43-63, in Adela Yarbro Collins (ed.). Feminist Perspectives on Biblical Scholarship 
(Cal., U.S.A.: Scholars Press, 1985), p.57
'®Gillian Beer, 'Representing Women: Re-presenting the Past', pp. 63-80, in Belsey and 
Moore, p. 69
'"Ibid., p. 67
10
our own is a matter of importance but this does not involve a stretch of the 
imagination - it would be naive to assume that we are not experiencing some of the 
same oppression under patriarchy’®. For example, the constraints on women’s 
freedom for self-determination are still very much present today. On the other hand, 
in the case of Naomi and Ruth, this “presentist mode of argument’” ' has lead many 
feminist commentators to forget about our differences from women of the past, 
subjecting them consequently to ideals that have only attained significance in the past 
thirty years, forgetting also that the ideals themselves are subject to shifts in meaning 
over time” .
Equally, in the case of friendship, though some characteristics still hold true 
today, there is no 'essential' or 'universal' notion of 'ideal' friendship which one can 
refer to” . The point is that if such words can change meanings then, as Mieke Bal 
says” , patriarchy can change also since there is a “relation between fiction and reality 
which is more fundamental than a simplistic theory of fiction”. My point is that the 
mutual influence of theories of friendship with a biblical example of women's 
relationships has implications beyond (but including) the assessment o f whether they 
are compatible or whether either is irretrievable from a modem perspective.
’®Fiorenza, p. 58 in Collins. Fiorenza states; “Women's experience of solidarity and unity as a 
social group is...based ....on their conuiion historical experiences as an oppressed group struggling to 
become full historical subjects, such a theoretical framework allows women to locate their strength, 
historical agency, pain and struggle within their common historical experiences as women in 
patriarchal society and family. It is also theoretically able to account for the variations of social status, 
class differences and cultural identity”. 1 would like to emphasise that the latter is equally important in 
the act o f reading.
’ ‘Beer, p. 67
” ln  any case, as Tor il Moi points out: “there is n o t , unfortunately, such a thing as an 
intrinsically feminist text: given the right historical and social context, all texts can be recuperated by 
the ruling powers - or appropriated by the feminist opposition”, p. 132
’’The saiue holds true for other kinds of'friendship' or even 'love' which is another word for 
friendship. See Victor Luftig, Seeing Together: Friendship Between the Sexes in English Writing from  
Mill to IFooy(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1993). Cf. Gottfied Quell and Ethelbert 
Stauffer, Love, Bible Key Words (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1949), for a history of ancient 
meanings of 'love' in the Hellenic and Hebraic world.
’"Bal, ‘The Bible as Literature: A Critical Escape’, p. 79, m Diacritics, winter 1989, vol. 16, 
no. 4, pp. 71-79. She goes on to say “that gender is poetically relevant, and that fiction is socially 
relevant, as two indissociable aspects of the one problematic of the place of texts in society.”
11
Since the Bible has influenced both people's lives and imagination for much 
longer than any other text in western culture it would be useful I thinlc - again as with 
any literature and theory - to allow ourselves, as Gillian Beer concludes, to be 
engaged in an activity of reading which “tests and de-natures our assumptions in the 
light of the strange languages and desires of past writings”” . It would not be ‘radical’ 
to subject past (male) inscriptions of women’s lives, actions and relationships to 
expectations distinctly modern but instead to allow ourselves to be equally influenced, 
and this, I agree with Gillian Beer, is radical reading. If readers are open to the 
possibility of reading with an emphasis on the women’s perspective perhaps they too 
will re-assess their biases and ‘see’ in this ancient Hebraic text, a powerful 
representation of women’s friendship. In turn, perhaps their assumptions on 
friendship may be tested and re-defmed. My aim is that this thesis will open the way 
towards this different approach to inteipreting both ideal friendship and the book of 
Ruth.
” Beer, p. 80
Chapter One
' I am not speaking here of erotic/friendship as discussed in Lillian Faderman's Surpassing the Love o f  Men 
Love and Romantic Friendship Between Women from the Rennaissance to the Present (London: Women's Press, 
1985) or 'ordinary' friendship as in for example, Janet Todd's Women's Friendship in Literature (Columbia 
University Press: New York 1980). Unfortunately, Todd does not discuss 'ideal' friendship but a much broader 
range of relationships between women as illustrated in the 18h century novel, including 'manipulative' friendships. 
See her intr oduction for a description of the five categories, (sentimental, erotic, manipulative, political, and social) 
p. 1-6.
’ Genevieve Lloyd, The Man o f  Reason 'Male and Female' in Western Philosophy (Routledge: London, 
1993, first published in 1984 by Methuen). According to Lloyd it is not so much that women are considered 
incapable of reasoning but that the development of ideas on 'reason' have been based on characteristics that are 
associated metaphorically with the inclusion of the masculine and an exclusion of the feminine whose definition 
subsequently has developed based on this exclusion
Some (male) theories of (female) exclusion from ideal friendship 
Although male friendship has been a celebrated topic since ancient times both in 
literature and in philosophy female friendship has not been the focus of much attention 
until quite recently^ Its absence from literature may be attributed to an equivalent lack 
of female writers but in philosophy this exclusion takes on more complex ramifications 
which incorporate concepts directly and indirectly related to that of ‘ideal’ friendship.
Since the concern was to define not only ‘ideal friendship’ but also what kind of 
attributes were necessary in people to attain such a relationship it soon becomes clear 1
that the assumptions male philosophers have been working with - ones concerning 
reason and moral virtue for example - necessarily exclude any consideration of female 
friendship. The ability to 'reason' well has traditionally (in the western, male, Judaeo- 
Christian context) been attributed to men,^ and this I see as contributing to the 
development of a discourse of exclusion for women from ideal friendship. Wlrat I am
Î
interested in doing is 'rescuing' the notion of ideal friendship from such androcentric 
restrictions not only so that women's friendships are not subject to such criteria but also
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so that the delineation of ideal friendship itself is influenced and redefined fiom a 
feminist perspective which emphasises inclusion and does justice to the ‘ideal’.
By foregrounding the levels on which women and the feminine are excluded 1 
will show how these writers are compromising the very ideal they are honouring. The 
diaclu'onic trajectory I will follow will show that male discourses on ideal friendship 
function on assumptions that preclude actual women from partaking in ideal friendship 
as well as barring characteristics - such as emotion and need - traditionally associated 
with women. Thus, they are compomising this ideal on another level beyond the 
simple exclusion of women. The feminist ideal I will be supporting will value not only 
the inclusion of women but also the necessity of emotion and inter-dependence as 
determining factors in developing such a relationship.
I will then be using the term friendship to signify ‘ideal’ friendship (from the 
Greek xsA,sia - perfect/end/ideal) in order to designate the kind of relationship I am 
interested in - one stemming from equal moral goodness and beneficience. It is also 
one that is continually negotiated and not static and frxed\ one which involves the 
possibility of realisation in the present but also of dissolution and most importantly, one 
which differs at key points from classical definitions but retains its potential for a new 
vision of society which is non-hierarchical but also non-exclusive. The 'ideal' 
friendship I will describe shares in some of the characteristics classical writers included 
while at the same time testing them against modem concerns especially with regard to
 ^ Although Aristotle calls this friendship a 'state' his description is a dynamic one, p. 267, The Ethics o f  
Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, (tr.) J.A.K. Thomson, (London: Penguin^ 1955)
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gender issues since their 'ideal' was constmcted without this consideration^ At the 
same time, “friendship can be used as a test itself...of the adequacy of rival moral and 
political conceptions”^ There is much to be salvaged from Aristotle's model of ideal 
friendship but always from within the feminist critical viewpoint.
Feminist readers/inteipreters are faced with the problem of deciding which 
ideas on friendship to reject/overloolc/replace and which to utilise. Unfortunately, the 
problem is not limited to explicit references to the female sex or even to the feminine. 
More significantly, as I will discuss in the third section - 'The Other' - there are also 
masculinist assumptions on the concept of 'inter-dependency' which must be dealt with 
for their reliance on essentialist ideas of the ‘nature’ of relationship and autonomy. By 
exposing these assumptions and foregrounding their contradictions® my puipose is to 
demonstrate how women are ‘naturally’ excluded from such a discussion not only
" I disagree with Amelie O. Rorty, that "Aristotle's account of philia...is hardly recognisable as die ancestor 
of our notion o f loving friendship" on the basis of tlie different role of friendship due to closer familial ties. Rorty 
does not make clear if this is meant for both men and women or is he assuming male friendship? In either case I 
believe there is much relevance not only because of women's entr ance into the public sphere but also because of 
common eüiical requirements of tliis kind of relationship. Wlrat I can agree with is the questioning of then emphasis 
e.g. on the question of whether it is better to love tlian to receive love (p. 83). See "The Historicity of Psychological 
Attitudes: Love Is Not Love Which Alters Not When It Alteration Finds" pp. 73-88, in Badhwar
 ^ Badhwar, Introduction, p. 36. Badhwar is bringing together the polarization of views on morality as 
either an inhumental means to well-being or as an end in itself, and therefore unrelated to well-being. Friendship 
becomes the space where this polarity is challenged. I would add only that gender difference, i.e. as exhibited in 
women’s friendship, is a decisive factor in the merging of these two extremes.
® As Michel Le Doeuff points out:"...when plrilosophers talk about women then discourse unfolds without 
the usual theoretical requirements," p. 68., see Hipparchia's Choice: An Essay Concerning Women, Philosophy, 
etc. (tr.), Trista Selous, (Oxford and Carubridge, Ma.: Blackwell, first published 1989 as L'Etude et le Rouet by Les 
Editions du Seuil). This will become evident in tlie examples I have chosen.
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because of practical considerations (status in society, education etc.) but also because of 
theoretical presuppositions.
Finally, I would like to discuss how friendship, because of its voluntary nature, 
is the ideal topos for the expression and development of a different kind of 'self,' one 
that is in many ways at odds with the - self-sufficient, independent - 'self these 
Aristotelian influenced theories have been supporting/praising. This individualistic 
'self is in direct contradiction to the kind of friendship their own theories propose i.e 
friendship as constitutive of the good life. This is because the possibility of autonomy 
which they celebrate is only compatible with a different notion of friendship - one 
which is only an instrument of the good life. On the other hand, the development of a 
relational 'self,’ is at the same time not the communal 'self opposed to the western ideal 
of individualism but purposefully between the two extremes. It is one in which reason 
alone is not adequate as the defining cornerstone of the self in friendship hut care for 
the other and responsibility towards their emotional needs is equally important®. And it 
is one which not only suits the feminist project but also one which embodies a utopian 
vision for both men and women, their relationships to each other and to the world they 
inhabit®. By imagining an alternative self on the small scale of friendship, 1 will show
’ I will be drawing on Carol Gilligan's work on moral development in relation to my argument on the 
'relational self in friendship, especially from her In a Different Voice: Psychological Theoty attd Women's 
Development (Cambridge, Ma. and London: Harvard University Press, 1993 first published 1982), hereafter IDV.
® I am not dien ahmng to re-define reason itself or to judge its useflihiess - that would be beyond tlie scope r
of this thesis - only to emphasise that it must be in constant dialogue with other factors, such as desires, emotions 
and needs.
® Tliis last point is an important one and will be discussed more fully in chapters four and five. It is a pomt 
raised in Aristotle but also central to a feminist vision of society since, as Karen Green points out: “this relational
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in chapter five how one can set the foundations of an alternative model life on the larger 
scale of community. Thus both the individual and the community may function on the 
basis of a ‘reason’ complemented by emotion and the awareness that interdependency 
is not only assumed but also necessaiy for the fulfillment of such an ideal in h iendship.
The Female
The first point I would like to make clear is on what grounds women are 
unambiguously disqualified from partaking in ‘perfect/ideal’ friendship since it is this 
term which is employed even when the tone of these texts and subject matter often 
suggest more accessible models. In other words, 'perfect' friendship is considered a 
demanding condition to aspire to but not altogether umealisable which is why other 
lesser friendships are discussed. Women, as we will see, are found lacking in both 
practical and theoretical spheres and therefore can only form friendships of the latter 
kind.
Both Graeco-Roman writers and the Renaissance Humanists whom they 
influenced accept the importance of discussing the ideal as the desirable goal. Before 
speaking of the present I will present a survey of examples by Aristotle, Cicero, 
Montaigne and Bacon, as well as Rousseau who did not speak of friendship as such but 
whose writings align themselves with those of his predecessors in his discussion of
self embodies a new ethic of care which attempts to bring about the good of women as well as the good of men”, 
pp. 150-1 in The Woman o f Reason: Feminism, Humanism and Political Thought (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995)
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women’s roles and abilities. Reference to C.S. Lewis’® as an example of a twentieth 
century writer familiar with and similarly influenced by the classical tradition will help 
to illustrate how despite the allowances he maices for women’s inclusion in the public 
sphere, Lewis’s own theory still suffers from the same biases concerning women and 
the feminine. By focusing on this survey of writing on friendship, I aim to show that 
although these writers purpote to be describing perfect friendship they actually fall 
short of this ideal on the basis of their own logic of exclusion. Therefore this camiot 
simply be rectified by including women uncritically into their model.
It is Aristotle who has had the greatest influence in the later discourses on 
friendship as his Nichomachean Ethics (NE) proposes an analytical and systematic 
exposition of multifarious facets pertaining to this kind of relationship. Thi'oughout the 
text, the discussion refers to men only with no hint of a non-generic use except when 
referring explicitly to other individuals. For example, Aristotle makes it clear how 
women or other groups of people deviate fr om the standard male norm. In the eighth 
book, his first reference to women occurs when the point is stressed that ideal 
friendship can exist only between equal persons and the husband-wife union is 
compared to that of an aristocracy of ‘separate roles for separate spheres’” :
But there is another kind of friendship, which involves superiority: i.e...of a husband 
for a wife, and of every person in authority for his subordinates...For each of these 
persons has a different excellence and function, and different reasons for feelmg love; 
and therefore their loves and affections are different too. It follows then, that the
His well-known misogynism notwithstanding, C.S. Lewis departs from some of his 'predecessors' 
contentions in The Four Loves (Glasgow: Collins, 1963, orig. published 1960)
' ' Aristotle, pp. 269-270 and p. 276
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parties do not, and should not expect to, receive the same benefits each from the 
other.
The man rules by virtue of merit, and in the sphere that is his by right; but he hands 
over to his wife such matters as are suitable for her...the husband (as superior) 
receiving the greater good, and each party what is appropriate.
The notion of equality will be discussed at a later point but suffice to say that it 
involves a whole spectrum of practical and theoretical considerations. At least, 
Aristotle allows the possibility of a lasting friendship between such individuals 
provided certain obligations are fulfilled in terms of mutual affection and care. 
However, this kind of ‘friendship’ is less than ideal when compared to the one between 
free men/citizens of high status and when the possibility for role changes is mled out 
children are seen as the main eommon interest between men and women: “for the 
children are an asset common to them both and common possession is cohesive...which 
is why childless marriages break up more quickly”” . Since friendship between women 
is not mentioned explicitly, and if  men and women are of different merit, it then follows 
that women will foiin friendships with each other which are of lower value since the 
ideal is realised only in the male. Yet it is not enough simply to include women in his 
theory of friendship since, as I will discuss in the next section, there are other levels at 
which women's relationships could not conform to this theory.
Aristotle's influence continues to be strong in the Roman period when Cicero 
employs many of his ideas in his dialogue, On Friendship {Laelius de Amicitia). 
Cicero also relies on ‘nature’ to justify his conclusions and like Aristotle, stresses the
”  Ibid., p. 281
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importance of “common interests, wishes, and opinions” and virtue” . But since from 
the veiy start he lists only men from history or mythology commonly believed to have 
achieved such a relationship” and there is no mention of women at all, hints as to his 
non-generic use of ‘man’ come from other sources. One of his main concerns is the 
difficulty of maintaining friendships where politics are involved and when the demands 
of political office are imposed on men, then friendship becomes impossible. It is clear 
from this extract that women are not a part of Cicero’s argument since women were not 
a political force:”
Human nature is at its weakest when it comes to refusing power; and those who 
achieve power at the expense of friendship tliink the fact will go umioticed, because 
they had a good reason for their neglect of friendship’s duties.
Thus, although he is in the midst of praising friendship as the highest virture, 
he undermines his argument both by admitting friendship’s vulnerability to power and 
by assuming it is an obstacle only men will encounter. Since women do not have this 
access to power then it is not a factor in their friendships in the way that it presents 
itself as a conflict of interest in male friendships. It does however become a factor to 
consider when the power of men over women force the latter to make choices 
concerning their priorities. The result is more often than not obedience to patriarchal 
power " whether it is one's husband, father or the state - over one's friendship to another
”  Cicero, On Friendship and the Dream ofScipio, Edited witli Introduction, Translation and Commentary 
by J.G.F. Powell, (Warminster, England: Aris and Phillips Ltd., 1990), p. 35
”  Ibid., for example, Paulus, Cato, Gains, Acipio and Philus, p. 39
”  Ibid., p.57
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woman. Although the intricacies of this dilemma will be discussed more thoroughly in 
the third section suffice to say here that the dilemma for these male philosophers lies in 
the conflict between their own access to power and their ties to others. For women who 
are doubly excluded from power this would mean alienation which is absent from male 
friendships and is associated with their peripheral position in relation to public centres 
of decision making. At the basic level then of female exclusion from friendship, Cicero 
is in agreement with Aristotle. This conflict of power however, cannot be solved merely 
by including women into the realm of political power, it is also necessary to critique the 
societal forces that produce such a conflict” for how ‘perfect’ can the friendship be 
when it is assumed to break under the pressure of power?
The influence of Cicero (and through him Aristotle) in the Renaissance was 
considerable and with reference to friendship quite clear in the Humanists of the time” . 
Michel de Montaigne is aware of both but is less concerned with justifying his views 
and simply agrees with his predecessors when he asserts that it is the wealaaess and 
untrustworthiness of women that make them” :
”  The societal dimension of this conflict will be examined in the following chapters.
”  Lorna Hutson de-mythologises the influence of the idealism of the writers in the early modem period 
by arguing that tire saturation of the literature of 16tli century England witli De Amiticia formulae is only ostensibly 
about the age’s commitment to an ideal of male friendship and more about a new kind of system of credit replacing 
the ties fostered by the old feudal society. See chapter two, pp. 52-85 in The Usurer’s Daughter: Male Friendship 
and Fictions o f  Women in Sixteenth Century England (Routledge: London and New York, 1994)
”  Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, (ti .) M.A. Screech, (London and New York: Penguin, 1993, 
originally published, 1580), pp. 205-219
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...not normally capable of responding to such familiarity and mutual confidence as 
sustain that holy bond of friendship, nor do their souls seem firm enough to 
withstand the clasp of a knot so lasting and so tightly drawn...There is no example 
yet of a woman attaining it and by the common agreement of the ancient schools of 
philosophy she is excluded from it.
Montaigne's use of language such as 'holy bond' shows that he too is concerned 
with ideal friendship and like the others raises it above the ranks of those tied to the 
earthly. The fault here again is due to women’s nature and the language of ‘the soul’ re­
affirms that it is a permanent deficiency - women’s proximity to the ‘material, physical 
world’ that prevents them from forming such bonds. He does not make clear why they 
are incapable of long lasting ties unless he is implying it is because they are 
unreasonable and therefore unstable. While Montaigne denies his earthly status using 
the vocabulary of the heavenly he accepts the heavenly as part of the earthly because of 
his belief in ideal friendship as something to be cultivated in this life” . Women then 
are denied this special space on earth since it is, as other spaces, already ‘occupied’ by 
men. For Montaigne then, friendship can only be ideal when developed by men 
because of their ‘spiritual strength’ - without nevertheless describing what this strength 
comprises so that female exclusion may be argued against.
His contemporary, Francis Bacon, is not as explicit but he does emphasise that 
men need friends that are male and of equal status because they cannot communicate 
with the same ease with their wives (or lesser males): “(princes)...that had wives, sons,
”  Jacques Derrida attributes this quality of immanence, as well as an added “heterology, transcendence, 
and infinity” (which breaks and supplements the Greco-Roman model of reciprocity) to the influence of Judaeo- 
Christianity, in “The Politics of Friendship”, pp. 353-91, in American Imago, Fall 1993, vol. 50, no. 3, (tr.) Gabriel 
Motzkin and Michael Syrotiiiski with Thomas Keenan, p. 358
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nephews: and they all could not supply the comfort of friendship” ®^. When women are 
categorised and grouped together with men of a permanently lower status, the 
implication is that they too, may never aspire to such a privilege. Thus, there is a 
hierarchy (of ideal friendship) within a hierarchy (of lesser forms of friendship) which 
goes against the basic tenet of ideal friendship - that of equality of moral excellence^’. 
But a feminist revision of friendship would not stop at simply including women within 
this scheme of things. It would have these hierarchies broken down so that the equality 
(of virtue, benevolence and beneficience) characteristic on a personal level would also 
function on a societal level. When one is excluded from friendship on the basis of 
gender, class or race the ideal of friendship cannot be realised beyond the narrow scope 
of ‘a few good men’. For a model of friendship to be inclusive, it must first accept 
women on equal standing with men. It can then proceed to breakdown other baniers 
which compromise the ideals of equality, virtue and beneficience.
When the ideal of friendship is set up with a series of requirements which are 
unambiguously male/masculine within a context of socio-economic inequality between 
the sexes, it seems a foregone conclusion that women are both quantitatively and 
qualitatively second rate. So although women camiot have friendships with men for 
reasons both intrinsic and extrinsic to their status, the friendships they can, or are 
'capable' of, having are decidedly of poorer quality. That women's friendships were 
defined in different tenus is understandable in light of the separation of the public and
Francis Bacon, “On Friendship” pp. 138-144, in The Essays (London: Penguin Books, 1985, originally 
published 1597, final form in 1625), p. 141
Aristotle p. 263
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private spliere both groups operated within. What is not justifiable is the equation of 
women’s second-rate citizenship with equally second-rate friendships. It is because of 
this equation that the deeper assumptions concerning ideal friendship must be examined 
since the simple inclusion of women in the public sphere will not automatically include 
them in relationships of this calibre^^.
To summarise this rhetoric of exclusion, it is precisely because the ‘male ideal’ 
is being discussed that women fall short of the requirements. In an effort to explain 
such differences resulting from the public/private sphere demarcation, the general 
tendency has been to render the descriptive, i.e. what was seen as ‘natural’, as 
prescriptive, i.e. what is ‘right’ or ‘proper’, (Aristotle uses the word ‘just’). The 
argument they depend on however is self-fulfilling, i.e. since women lack reason, there 
is no need to include them - therefore their exclusion on the basis o f their perceived 
'irrationality' is perpetuated.
It has only been since the previous century that even some of these assumptions 
have been challenged. In writing about The Four Loves, C.S. Lewis, in a chapter on 
‘Philia’ makes concessions to some women provided they share a common education or 
profession which will lead to common interests; “Where men are educated and women 
are not, where one sex works and the other is idle, or where they do totally different
According to Rosemary Radford Ruether: "The chain of being, God-spirits-male-female-inliuman- 
nature-matter, is at the same time tire chain of command. The directon of salvation follows the trajectory of 
alienation of mind from its own support system, objectified as body' and 'matter,'" in Sexism and God-Talk, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1983), p. 79
C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (Glasgow: Collins, 1963), p. 68
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work, they will usually have nothing to be friends about”^\ The lack o f equality in this 
area at least is not projected as a lack in women’s nature but in their dissimilar 
upbringing.
But Lewis is familiar with both Aristotle’s 'Philia' and Cicero’s 'Amicitia' and 
attempts, like them, to delineate the attributes of ideal friendship - with some 
interesting differences. Like them he often mentions the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ and 
uses them interchangeably, and though for him they carry a more theological character, 
they remain intellectual concepts central to the discussion of ideal friendship. Lewis 
speaks of Friendship (sic) as: “that luminous, tranquil, rational world of relationships 
freely chosen - this alone, of all the loves, seemed to raise you to the level of gods or 
angels” '^’. He even offers an explanation/re-interpretation of what the ancients were 
motivated by when they too exalted this ‘spiritual quality’ in friendship. Like them, he 
accepts the higher value of the spiritual over the physicaE^
The deepest and most pennanent thought of those sages was ascetic and world- 
renouncing. Nature and emotion and the body were feared as dangers to our souls, 
or despised as degradations of our human status. Inevitably that sort of love was 
most prized which seemed most independent or even defiant, of mere nature.
The concept of ‘spirit’ though was a concept linlced to reason and reason 
(defined traditionally as male) was an essential ingredient in the discourses on ideal 
friendship. And although the concept of reason, like all concepts, has evolved (since 
the sixth century B.C. at least) from an idea associated with maleness to one that is
^Hbid.,p. 56 
”  Ibid., p. 56
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'neutral' - or more specifically 'male-neutral' ”  Lewis remains faithful to the old masters 
by insisting on the mind/body split^ .^ As long as this split remains and women are 
paired with the second, 'weaker' term their exclusion from friendship is a given from the 
androcentric point of view. For Lewis then too, the ideal is compromised because of 
his emphasis on an disembodied image of a being lacking in excessive emotions and 
passions, as if  these would tlireaten the bond of friendship rather than strengthen it.
This brings us to the more theoretical problem of what constitutes the ‘nature’ 
of friendship itself i.e. which characteristics are absolutely necessary on an intellectual 
level for the potential of ideal friendship to materialise. This is where the crux of the 
matter lies for if it were only dependent on socio-economic factors that needed 
changing for women then it would be veiy easy to omit such considerations when 
applying them to any text, whether past or present. It is in the discussions of ‘essential’ 
requirements that women do not qualify, since if women are automatically deficient by 
nature (not ‘spiritual’ enough) then there is no reason to consider the possibility of such 
a relationship for them.
So, if ideal friendship seems unfeasible between men and women, at least, what 
of women amongst themselves? According to Aiistotle's argument their friendship 
would simply be qualitatively of a lesser calibre but the point here is not to try and test
Pamela Anderson, 'Mytli, Mimesis and Multiple Identities: Feminist Tools for Transfonniiig Tlieology', 
in Literature and Theology, Volume 10, No. 2 June, 1996. Anderson defines the male-neutral as the “disembodied 
objectivity of the male point of view with only the pretence of neutmlity and objectivity”, p. 113.
For a review of femininity and Greek tlieories of laiowledge and ideals of reason from the sixth century 
B.C. to tire present see Lloyd, p. 2-9 passim. Lloyd finds a continuum of androcentiicism in which nature and the 
feminine is a force that needs to be dominated and transcended by rational laiowledge.
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women's relationships against male standards but to question the nature of the standards 
themselves and the criteria by which they were established. The next section then will 
focus on the theoretical criteria of 'ideal' friendship rather than the explicit exclusion of 
women from the discussion since viewed within a historical context it is unlikely that 
these writers would concede equal status to women in any sphere. By looking at the 
criterion of reason as the basis of ideal friendship I will expose how these male theorists 
are compromising this ideal not only in terms of excluding women themselves (and 
other categories of people) but more importantly in terms of their assumptions on the 
‘nature’ of reason.
The Feminine
At the very start I would like to make clear that by ‘the feminine’ I mean patterns of 
sexuality and behaviour imposed and expected of women by patriarchal culture and 
social norms - patterns which include characteristics such as modesty, sweetness and 
subservience^^ These characteristics are, of course, opposed to the constructed 
masculine ones of strength, rationality, and dominance. As Helene Cixous has pointed 
out, the opposition between masculine/male and feminine/female cannot be separated 
from the central hierarchical opposition between activity/passivity^^^. This is nowhere
Toril Moi, ‘Feminist, Female, Feminine’, p. 117-132 in Belsey and Moore, pp. 122-3
Helene Cixous, ‘Sorties’, in Belsey and Moore, pp .101-116. Cixous lists some of the binary 
oppositions which follow from this primary one and shows how they extend to all aspects of culture, pp. 101-2
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clearer than in male authoiired texts on friendship where it is assumed that friendship 
must be an extension of the masculine qualities mentioned above.
I will illustrate that the language utilised in these instances imderlines the 
premises these writers are departing from, mainly, a series of binary oppositions which 
clearly align the female/feminine to the subordinate, derivative second half. It follows 
that where man is a rational being woman is irrational, or at least, constituted more by 
the latter than the former. J.J. Rousseau stated “women observe, men reason” He 
allowed them a kind of reason, but one that is qualitatively inferior to that of man; 
“Reason in women is a practical reason, capacitating them artfully to discover the 
means of attaining a Imown end but which would never enable them to discover that 
end itself’®’. The cause of this inadequacy lies obviously in their natures though this 
does not mean that women are incapable of being rational - only that women are as 
rational and good as they can be. The argument on reason is important for the 
discussion on friendship because Rousseau is only repeating another classical idea that 
reason and the ‘good’ are linked in such a vital way that the ‘rational’ person is ‘good’ 
or in other words “the virtuous person is one who uses his rational faculty well or who 
lives in accordance with his nature”®®. If women are less rational then they are also less 
good and thus disqualified from ideal friendship.
®®J. J. Rousseau, ‘Emilius’, in (ed.), Martha Lee Osborne, Women In Western Thought, (New York: 
Random House, 1979) p. 120
®‘ Ibid., p. 117
®® Ibid., p. 45
®® Aristotle in Allen, p. 34
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There is a continuum here following Aristotle’s argument that reason (as a 
faculty of the soul) is to “guide one’s actions and to contemplate the truth”®® and that in 
both these functions a woman’s soul is present to a lesser degree, specifically, her soul 
is without ‘authority’®'*. By this Aristotle means that the ability to regulate one’s 
actions is inoperative in a woman®®. Since reason is a requirement of friendships, 
deficient reason in women consititutes them inadequate for the ideal form of friendship. 
So the potential for friendship is there but of a less noble kind because if women are not 
capable o f acting on their decisions (the practical application of reason) how could they 
possibly cope with the demands of ideal friendship?
By positing reason as the determining factor in friendship they are 
impoverishing not only this relationship but also the emotional development of those 
who strive to focus only on the rational requirements whether they are men or women. 
On yet another level the exclusion of women to the detriment of the ideal is perpetuated 
in these writers. Consequently, a feminist standpoint would critique (male) friendship 
which does not equally stress the emotional aspect as falling short of the ideal because it 
does not encompass the whole of human experience.
Cicero follows suit by beginning the conversation in Laelius with the pre­
requisite o f friendship which is virtue: “virtue itself both produces and maintains 
friendship, nor can friendship exist by any means without virtue”®®. This is an echo of
®'* Ibid, p. 43
®® Ibid., p. 35
®® Cicero, p. 37
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Aristotle’s idea of virtue being responsible for good action: “Only the friendship of 
those who are good and similar in their goodness, is perfect"®®. And if moral action is 
dependent on moral excellence then the references Cicero makes to good men are 
limited to them only. Though these conclusions are not surprising the contradiction lies 
in texts which allow for the possibility of women’s participation in the realm of 
relationships which are not defined by either predetermined modes (such as kinship) or 
unequal structures (such as inamage), in both of which choice and will are a priori not 
relevant. So if proof were provided that both choice and will are utilised to their fullest 
in order to bring about a common good then perhaps women could be allowed into the 
rallies of rational, virtuous people.
Since friendship is determinedly a possibility only between people of equal 
virtue then the need to define this term is necessaiy before continuing. In its simplest 
description, virtue is contingent upon reason, and all actions derive from the ability to 
reason. This is not only seen as the characteristic which differentiates humans from 
animals, but men from each other and from other groups such as women, slaves, and 
children. The difference here is of quantity and the binaiy opposition of mind/body, 
reason/emotion is the one on which all other dualisms depends. Within this value 
system women fall short of the required ‘reason’ (and therefore ‘virtue’) in order to 
form friendships in the male image. So even if their status or education improves or 
equals that of men, they will still - ‘by nature’ - fail to reach the full human potential
®® Aristotle, p. 263
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required for the most valued of all relationships®®. We are left then with the task of 
further editing these texts so that the dualisms collapse into a common ground from 
which female participation may follow. The question remains: Is this process adequate 
for the subsequent application of these (masculinist) theories to women’s experience? 
Or is there yet another reevaluative process necessary?
Again, it is necessary to enquire into textual pre-suppositions and premises 
which belie unity of thought or lack of contradiction.®® Specifically, it is not only the 
discourses on reason or friendship which ultimately exclude the female that should 
concern us, it is also the underlying problematic of the feminine which leads into a cul- 
de-sac. These writers insist on the primacy of reason over emotion to such a degree in 
themselves that they camiot allow emotion to enter the discussion on ideal friendship 
for fear of ‘polluting’ it. As Genevieve Lloyd writes: “if there is a 'reason' genuinely 
common to all, it is to be achieved in the future, not celebrated in the present...the 
confident affirmation that reason 'knows no sex' is only an idea”'*® which masks real 
inequalities. For the present - one with many real inequalities - I would prefer to 
espouse the idea of ‘substantive reason' i.e. “embodied thinldng which remains attached 
to the substance of desire and bodily life”'**. Since hiendship, like all close
®® Cicero, p. 37
®® This is a Deriidiaii concept, in Jacques Derrida's 'The Politics of Friendship' 'm. American Imago, 50, no. 
3, Fall 1993 (tr.) Gabriel Motzkin and Michael Syrotinski. The central phallogocentiism in Aristotle's NE  is 
discussed in relation to the law and community.
'*® Lloyd, p. 107
Anderson, p. 116
31
relationships, engages both the mind and the emotions, it would seem more constructive 
to reject as exclusivist the mind/body dualism which is characterised by power 
inequality since inequality is another concept alien to ideal friendship.
Tlnoughout the arguments presented in praise of ‘ideal’ friendship there is a 
conspicuous restriction on the vocabulary of emotion though at the same time the 
linguistic style is clearly emotional. By emotion and emotional I mean both the 
vocabulary of love and affection and also a stylistic tone that is impassioned. It is as if 
the ruling principle of ‘reason’ precludes any emotional supplementing yet there is a 
continual mention of ‘love’ if  only a very intellectual one. It seems puzzling that there 
should be such a contradiction at the level of style and vocabulary yet a ‘solution’ is 
found in these writers that sufficiently ‘protects’ them from any relation to the 
feminine. It is as if any concession to emotion would render them equally feminine and 
thus compromise their status as rational subjects.
Aristotle first speaks out against ‘excess’ emotion when the discussion turns to 
the sharing of grief over misfortunes. He states that the ‘manly’ thing to do is not to 
share sad news unless the situation is extreme: “But womenfolk and men who are like 
them, enjoy having others to sham their moanings and love them as friends and 
sympathizers'"^^ Evidently, it is the ‘strong, silent type' which is the human ideal in 
Aristotle’s world though why he sees the communicating of grief as somewhat
Aristotle, p. 309. Evidently we ought in all circumstances to take the better man for our model.
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unsuitable is not evident - unless he is hinting at a polarization of reason and emotion 
Avhereby the latter must ideally be surpressed by the former.
At the same time since friendship is a kind of love he points out that an 
important characteristic of friendship lies “more in loving, than in being loved and if 
people are commended for loving their friends it seems that loving is the distinctive 
virtue of friends”'*®. But he goes on to qualify this by stating that this active loving 
should only be in proportion to the loved one’s worth so that a lasting friendship 
depends on this rational monitoring of emotion. Aristotle had already made it clear that 
everyone has a different merit or virtue (by nature) so the implication is again that 
groups of lesser potential need not be over-indulged where friendship is concerned. In 
relation to women, their act of loving should be more in proportion to the loving 
received, which means that there cannot be an equal exhange between men and women. 
Thus, the concept of ‘equality’ in friendship is compromised on the basis of Aristotle’s 
own reasoning. Though I will be dealing with this issue extensively in the next chapter, 
suffice to say here that if ‘equality’ is bound up with (an avoidance of excess ) emotion 
then women can never be ‘equal’ to men since they are by definition more ‘emotional’.
Here again is an example of bias against emotion in favour of rational 
behaviour at all times. Even if we accept that the ’ideal’ is being discussed there is 
something very problematic in supporting the holding back of emotion as if  it were also 
'ideal' that eveiyone should want to separate their emotions from their thinking
‘*® Ibid., p. 272
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faculties. Unless there is a different conception of rationality which involves the 
emotions then this line of reasoning is not of much use for feminist theorists'*'*. At the 
same time, it goes against the insistence of ideal friendship as the most valued of 
relationships when half the human psyche must be circumscribed for its full realisation. 
For the purposes of ‘ideal’ friendship what I am interested in de-centering is the 
emphasis on reason alone as the central feature of one’s self. In any case, reason alone 
(and its identification with maleness) is not sufficient to account for the complexity of 
friendship.
Cicero on the other hand does not seem so concerned with this kind of balance 
(though in other instances he is more idealistic than Aristotle), and rationalises the 
importance of friendship by comparing people from different social backgrounds and 
concluding that none could live without the company of friends even though they would 
disagree on all other issues'*®. Even those who desire solitude could not fully enjoy this 
state without communicating it to anyone (!)‘'U
Would not solitude steal away from him all enjoyment of his pleasures?...if anyone 
were to ascend into the heavens, and see the beauty of the stars and the universe as it 
really was his amazement at it would cause him no pleasure, though it would be most 
enjoyable if he had someone to tell about it.
'*'* Green sets out to “provide a genealogy of feminist rationality...that is much more embodied and tied to 
the emotions than that characteristic of male philosophical texts” p. 23. See her first chapter, ‘Against Feminist Anti- 
Humanism’, pp. 10-26
*^® Cicero, p. 67
Ibid., p. 67
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However, when Cicero becomes more specific and begins to describe his 
friendship with Scipio (in the persona of Laelius) the examples focus on intellectual 
pursuits such as advice on private affairs or agreement on public matters. The problem 
that is foregrounded is not so much the intensity of emotion attributed to friendship but 
the whole problematic of the justification of the pleasure of friendship. For Cicero this 
conflict cannot be reconciled because of the inlierent nature of this kind of affection 
which is not physical as such but not altogether cerebral either. For example, this lack 
o f pleasure is implicit in the painful loss of his good friend Scipio when he later 
consoles himself by saying that in his own death he will not have to suffer the death of 
his friend much longer. This is a comment I find blurring the line between the physical 
and the spiritual® since the lack of earthly pleasure he now laments (as personified in 
his friendship) cannot be restricted to the intellectual sphere only. But Cicero attempts 
to explain the very physical pain which he experiences as a result of Scipio’s death by 
referring to the cerebral realm of common intellectual pursuits they can no longer share.
It is in Montaigne that the most emotional language of friendship between men
is cloaked in the vocabulary of the ‘spirit’'*®:
Our souls are yoked together in such unity, and contemplated each other with so 
ardent an affection, and wish the same affection revealed each to each other right 
down to the very entrails, that not only did I know his mind as well as I knew my 
own but I would have entmsted myself to him with greater assurance than to myself.
'*® Ibid., p. 73
'*® Montaigne, p. 213
Lloyd, p. xi
®® Bacon, p. 139
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When Montaigne utilises the language of passion to express a specifically man to man 
relationship he ensures that he purifies it by stressing it is a union of two ‘souls’. Here 
the emotional is neutralised by bringing in the cerebral/ heavenly world ~ thus not only >
de-feminizing it but also sanitising it from the corporal influence of the female body.
“I:
But as Genevieve Loyd points out “this sexlessness...is a covert way of privileging #
maleness. The idea of the sexless soul co-exists with the maleness of reason, despite the 
appearance of tension...The sexless soul thus takes on a shadowy maleness in opposition 
to female sex difference”'*®. The affection referred to here is characterised by an activity 
of the mind and soul in order to differentiate it - and oneself - from the kind of affection 
expessed by women. Yet, despite this emphasis on the non-earthly, ideal friendship 
remains a relationship to be experienced only by men on earth. By separating the two 
realms, and establishing male domination on both, friendship also becomes the 
monopoly of the ruling male class on both planes, thus leaving women spaceless.
Women are at the same time too earthly to partake in friendship yet powerless to redress 
the balance in the earthly sphere.
Only Bacon, otheiwise restrained emotionally, sites the sharing of grief and joy
as one of the three main 'fi'uits' of friendship and his tone is consistently emotionally
charged: "A principal fruit of friendship is the ease and discharge of the fullness and 
swellings of the heart, which passions of all kinds do cause and induce"®®. Yet when he
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states that the second fruit of friendship is ‘faithful counsel’ he goes on to mention only 
two kinds - one concerning manners (morals) the other concerning business: “The light 
a man receiveth by counsel from another is drier and purer than that which cometh from 
his own understanding and judgement...”®* The reason of course that it is ‘purer’ is 
because it is not clouded by emotion. According to Bacon, the emotional turbulence one 
feels is to be clarified by friendship itself: “...Wliosoever hath his mind frought with 
many thoughts, his wits and understanding do clarify and break up, in the 
communicating and discourse with another”®®. Wliat is going on here is a separation of 
emotions and intellect so that they serve different functions. Thus Bacon is contributing 
to the same biases concerning the reason/emotion opposition as his predecessors despite 
his impassioned defence of the fruits of friendship ®®.
As to the motivations of these Renaissance thinkers to re-instate the importance 
of ideal friendship Hutson has written that this may have as much to do with their 
discovery of the classics as with the changing social and economic conditions of the 
time.®'* Either way neither consideration is gender neutral or unequivocally motivated
®* Ibid., p. 142
®® Ibid., p. 142
®® According to Lloyd, it is Bacon who equates laiowledge witli power and since it is in his philosophy that 
the gap between form and matter was united, it follows that nature is not only female but also knowable. The task 
of the new science is to exercise the right khid of male domination over ‘her’, p. 10-11 passim. In this way, he does 
not differ from the Greek’s idea of the relationship between the mind and nature as one of master and slave. See 
also p. 5 and 6-17
®'* Hutson shows that Renaissance humanists’ ‘ideal’ friendship was not so ideal since amicitia (an 
affective bond) was inextricably linked with oikonomia - the managing of people and situations and ecomomic 
dependency, p. 87
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by altruistic considerations. The fact remains that the same androcentric biases were 
taken on uncritically with the result that there was no 'Rennaissance of friendship' for 
women in quite the same way there was for men®®. How then can this remain an ideal 
when the permitted emotions must be kept under (male) control even within their own 
friendships? Furthermore, the implication of this domination of nature and subsequently 
of women is that friendship involves beings who are ‘more equal’ than others. But this 
lies in contradiction to the main tenant of friendship which envisions equality on a 
societal level®
Still Bacon remains a kind of exception, even compared to C.S. Lewis in the 
twentieth century. In an effort to combine the spiritual with the secular, he clearly sides 
with his predecessors in his description of ideal friendship. He already states at the 
begimiing of his chapter that friendship is the least natural (my italics) of relationships. 
He later adds that "it raises us almost above humanity...This love, free from instinct...is 
eminently spiritual...It is the sort of love one can imagine between angels"®®.
Lewis's stress on the spiritual never abandons its effusive tone and like the 
others, places this relationship (its ideal form) at the top of the hierarchy of 
relationships by utilising language decidedly emotional and equally unaware of its
®® "Women, symbolically, indispensable to the conception of friendship as gift-exchange become caught 
up in friendship’s new economy of representation in ways that achially narrow the scope for positive representation 
of their agency”, p. 11 in Hutson.
®^ Aristotle draws the analogy between friendship and democracy, p. 275-6 passim.
®® Lewis, pp. 56-57
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contradictory function. Lewis unabashedly disapproves of any excess emotion and 
relegates it to the sheer of the natural world®®. He then concludes that friendship is:
...the least natural of loves, the least instinctive, organic, biological, gregarious, and 
necessary. It has the least commerce with our nerves; there is nothing throaty about 
it; nothing that quickens the pulse or hirns you red and pale. It is also the least 
necessary.
The best of relationships then in his view is so valued because it is most 
independent of nature i.e of our needs and passions. So although love is accepted as an 
essential part of friendship, it is more important to align it closer to the idea of agape 
than eros (which is characterised by physicality). This then sets up a hierarchy of 
emotions where some are more ‘manly’ and therefore worthy of contemplation (this is 
why he dislikes the Romantics' excessive emotion). Also like the others, Lewis brings 
up the subject of need but unlike them assures the reader that friendship is the only 
relationship that we have no need for®®. In this way, he is contributing to the tradition 
o f writing on friendship which juxtaposes the ideal of the self-sufficient male against 
the human need to form close relationships. A feminist re-appropriation of 'ideal' 
friendship would emphasise the necessity of dissolving the opposition between the 
dualism of reason/emotion in the context of friendship which - as in any intimate 
relationship - does not solely involve one's intellectual faculties, though these writers 
would have us believe so.
®® Ibid., p. 56
®® Ibid., “The species biologically has no need for it”, p. 56
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Yet the argument does not rest here because these writers are still anxious that 
there should even be a ‘need’ for such a relationship since part of the description of an 
ideal/happy human being is that he should be self-sufficient. It is this issue that most 
problemitises women’s potential for ideal friendships. How these writers attempt to 
resolve this apparent contradiction and how a feminist perspective contributes to this 
debate is the subject of the next section of this chapter.
The Other
The problem of reconciling the desire for self-sufficiency and the need for friendship 
created a particular problem for ancient writings on ethics.^® In their effort to find a 
satisfactoiy solution they lead themselves into further contradictions which 
problematise women's inclusion in these models. The concepts which consistently re­
surface are those of use, profit (benefit), pleasure and need. At the outset Aristotle 
'solves' the issue by accepting that self-sufficiency is a realisable state and then 
proceeds to argue why even those who need nothing at all could still benefit from 
having friends (since independence creates happiness)®*. But Aristotle reminds us that 
only good friends are necessary since the self-sufficient man won’t have need of the 
lesser kind (those based on profit or pleasure). Since Aristotle believes in the positive 
value of things 'in themselves' (i.e. as autonomous entities) he concludes that self-
Cicero, p.4
®* Aristotle, “It is maintained tliat the supremely happy who are self-sufficient have no need of friends 
because they have their good things; therefore being self-sufficient they need nothing further”, p. 303
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sufficient men should have good friends because they are desirable for their own sake, 
and that a good life would be lacking without good friends:®®
Life is a desirable thing, especially for the good, because for them 
existence is good and pleasant...If, then, to the tmly happy man his own 
existence is desirable in itself, as being by nature good and pleasant, and 
if the existence of his friend is scarcely less so, then his friend must also 
be a thing desirable thing. But what is desirable for him he must have, 
or else fall short o f happiness in that respect. Therefore to be happy a 
man will need virtuous friends.
In Other words, Aristotle accepts self-sufficiency as a pre-requisite for 
happiness then contradicts this by saying one cannot be fully happy without friends - 
therefore, one isn't really self-sufficient. Attempts have been made to show that the 
need for friends and the idea/belief in self-sufficiency are not at odds with each other 
but are in fact complementary. Suzanne Stern-Gillet argues that for Aihstotle virtuous 
friendship fosters rather than jeopardises human self-sufficiency because of his 
conception of human beings as essentially social beings®®. Although it is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to examine the whole of Ai'isotle's Ethics it is worthwhile to note 
just how these two ideas can be reconciled since any notion of the self in relationship 
will also have repercussions at a societal level and vice versa. I will defend the position 
that by definition self-sufficiency camiot involve anyone other than one's self and as 
such it is inimical to the theory and practise of friendship®'*.
®® Ibid., p. 305-7
®® Gillet,p. 132
®'* Gillet is not alone in believing this. Cf. Lawrence Thomas below.
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Gillet points out two strains in Aristotle's Ethics that support a haimonious co­
existence of these two tenns. One has to do with friendship as a necessary component 
of happiness (eudaimonia) i.e. that friends are a sine qua non of the unconditionally 
pleasurable life^\ Though I would agree with this last statement (even if by 
'pleasurable life' Aristotle is focusing on the contemplative'^^) the fact that Gillet brings 
in another ambiguous statement - concerning self-lmowledge - to support this is 
problematic: "We are better able to observe our neighbours than ourselves, and their 
actions than our own"^\ If self-lmowledge is not direct or immediate, the argument 
goes, then the 'use' of a friend is so that he/she functions as a kind of miiTor by which to 
measure ourselves. Yet since that would debase perfect friendship to one characterised 
by utility what remains to be min'ored is one's moral excellence, i.e. the contemplation 
of excellent actions'^^ For iimnediately afterwards Aristotle points out that “the actions 
of good men who are friends are pleasant to the good man because they are pleasant 
both in themselves and because they are familiar (oikeiai)”^^ . Gillet’s effort is geared 
towards reconciling the need for fiiendship with some form of self-sufficiency without 
considering the term itself as suspect.
Ibid., p. 133. The defence of tliis part of her argument is from pp. 133-137 
See Barnes’s Introduction in NE  for an explanation of contemplation, pp. 37-38 
Aristotle, p. 304 
Gillet, pp. 134-5
Aristotle, p. 263
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Aristotle’s argument is at its weakest, when he falls back on the meaning of 
'living together' which is neither based on pleasure nor profit but on “rational 
discom'se”^ ”. In this world, women's dependency on men places them outside the circle 
of independent men coming together for the mere purpose of intellectual stimulation, a 
kind of narcissistic reflection of what they perceive as their own moral and mental 
superiority. And what then of the realm of emotions and lived experience? It seems 
that again these are peripheral to the 'self-sufficient' man because what matters most is 
intellectual bonding in the context of a rational dialogue^’. Since women are dependent 
on other men, they camiot aspire to the intellectual sef-sufficiency Aiistotle envisions 
for men within ideal friendship. Men’s dependency on women for their basic, daily 
needs does not come into consideration since the focus always remains intellectual. 
Thus, though women are excluded because of their dependent ‘nature’ it is because of 
this inter-dependency that men may enjoy the highest form of friendship. This self - 
delusion of autonomy is another level of which the discourse on ideal friendship suffers 
because it is only an autonomy fr'om women and ‘lesser’ citizens that is being 
proclaimed.
This leaves us with Gillet's second argument in support of Aristotle in which 
friendship is found to lead to self-actualisation, i.e. “humans are so constituted that they 
require others to actually become what they essentially are, and virtuous agents are
Gillet does not find this problematic, p. 141
Lawrence Thomas in ‘Friendship and Other Loves’ pp. 48-64 in Badhwar, p. 58. He defines self- 
sufficiency merely as a lack of material help but 1 disagree witli this because it is clearly not the sense in which 
Aristotle Is employing the term. It would be convenient if this were the case.
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those who succeed in actualising their nature to the fullest extenf’^ L Win le this implies 
a deepened moral understanding of and a regard for others in and for themselves, it 
also, at the same time, defines these selves as fundamentally the same. And while it is 
not in itself problematic that identification takes place on an intellectual level, what is 
problematic is the exclusive identification with the quality of rational thought. In the 
process, individual differences, especially race, class and gender are disregarded.
But if  the simple conclusion she supports is that self-sufficiency is defined by 
participation in primary friendship then perhaps it would be useful to reject the term 
self-sufficiency altogether. To even attempt to edify the term points to its inadequacy 
to represent lived experienced^ But I would suggest omitting it altogether in any context 
since it perpetuates the spurious belief in complete self-determinancy. Acceptance of 
need for others and more specifically the need for friendship both at the practical level 
and the emotional level is a more realistic option. It is also more inclusive of difference 
since a variety of other factors - beyond the sameness of the rationaf'^ is accepted as 
necessary for such a relationship.
Gillet, p. 141
1.0. Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988). In a similar attempt to reconcile self- 
sufficiency with friendship he argues that the Aristotelian man of virtue is self-sufficient only materially and in 
terms of his mam occupation - which is tire life o f contemplation. But since “contemplation is not the whole of tire 
good life thus he also needs friends”, pp. 116-7
Iris Marion Young, Tmpartiality and the Civic Public: Some Implications of Feminist Critiques of 
Moral aird Political Theory’, pp. 57-76, hr (eds.), Seyla Beirlrabib and Dmcilla Cornell, Feminism as Critique 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), p. 62
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This belief in desiring (unselfishly) things for their own sake surfaces in D e  
Amicitia as welf^ but here Cicero resolves the dilemma between pleasure/profit and 
need by arguing that if  friendship were based on need, then only the weak would create 
ideal friendships and clearly this is not the case^ *^ :
If  anyone tliinks that this (goodwill) derives from weakness, and from the necessity 
for each other to acquire from the other what he himself lacks, certainly they leave 
friendship with a mean origin and so to speak, with no aristocratic lineage, since they 
wish us to believe it born of Need and Insufficiency. If this were so, those fittest for 
friendship would be those with least confidence in themselves; but the facts are quite 
otherwise. In fact an individual excels most in the acquisition and preservation of 
friendships according as he is fortified with good qualities and wisdom in himself 
and stands least in need of another, regarding everything that concerns him as within 
his own control (my italics).
Cicero, like Aristotle, accepts the benefits of friendship only as a symptom, or 
manifestation of such a relationship and not its cause which he places in 'nature’ (which 
for Cicero is the opposite of 'need'^^). Since they both accept some fonn of 
need/profit/pleasure as part of friendship it is disturbing that they should place all of 
these as attributes which follow from fiiendship rather than produce it. By identifying 
need as a kind of wealoiess these writers expose a deluded belief in man's power of self- 
determination and at the same time a (paranoid) fear of dependence on others. In this 
light, the ideal of friendship surfaces as one which is threatened by excessive need.
It is not so surprising then that accompanying the evasion of the feminine is an 
equal aversion to the idea of dependency and an interest in its opposite, self-sufficiency.
Cicero, p. 63
Ibid., p. 43
Ibid., p. 41
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It is only the female/feminine which is assumed dependent whereas the male/masculine 
is seen as desirably autonomous and self-sufficient. The degree to which the discussion 
focuses around the question of whether friendship is a relationship pursued out of need 
or for its own sake I see as a further entrenchment of the demarcation between 
masculine and feminine traits in which women inevitably end up at the bottom of the 
hierarchy where they are identified with matter and men at the top of the hierarchy 
where they are placed beside ‘spirit’. According to this value system the ‘pleasure’ of 
friendship can only be a spiritual one and the emotional need for such a relationship is 
divorced from any a priori utilitarian puipose. In other words, one needs to develop 
friendships but not primarily for their potential ‘use’ (though once achieved this ‘use’ 
may follow) nor solely for one’s enjoyment (though the accompanying pleasure is taken 
for granted).
By setting out with the belief in the possibility of self-sufficiency, and by 
bestowing upon it a positive value, these writers develop a dileimna which will always 
lead to an unsatisfactoiy result not only for women, but for themselves and their 
theories. To shun the primacy of inter-dependency or to relegate and limit it to practical 
matters (financial in particular) is again to deceive oneself with delusions of complete 
power and control wherein only ‘the weak’ are subject to the influence of their 
emotional worlds. In fact, it is male elites who remain in power because of their 
dependency on others, i.e women and slaves, thus creating a ‘culture of deceit’ ®^ where
Rosemary Radford Ruether explains this ‘culture of deceit’ as one where male elites justify their 
exploitation of the lives of those they use by negating their value and denying their own dependence on them, see 
Gaia and God: An Ecofeminist Theology o f  Earth Healing (London: SCM Press, 1989), p. 200
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accordingly, ideal friendship could not exist. This paranoid feai- of dependency most 
effectively maintains women’s ejection from the ‘male’ space of friendship - as if male 
friendship depended on the silencing of female friendship - and perpetuates the denial 
o f a more holistic view of existence, where terms such as strong/weak, 
spiritual/emotional, and self-sufficiency/need are not mutually exclusive. By breaking 
down these dualisms altogether the value and power of the first over the second 
becomes neutralised and a new set of values may emerge which are inclusive of 
women/the feminine/others.
In bringing to the debate on friendship women's distinctive experiences of this 
relationship, I am not only foregrounding a tradition of women-defined ideal friendship 
parallel to that of the male tradition. I am also re-defining ideal friendship which is 
based on a conception of the self and of moral action as both rational and thoroughly 
emotionari® . It is this foimulation, I will argue, which in turn re-defines friendship. 
Furthermore, the terms themselves need to be re-defined, i.e. 'weakness' is not the 
expression of emotion, instead, emotional sensitivity can be seen as a strength 
conducive to the flourishing of relationship®” .
Green also argues for a tradition of feminist humanists whose conception of the ‘se lf intersects and 
differs from that o f the male tradition in that it is not a disembodied rational being, pp. 10-26, esp. p. 23
Unlike Kant who believes that affection and intimicy must be conholled lest one loses respect for the 
other. See Paton in Badhwar, p. 150
Gilligan, ‘Remapping tlie Moral Domain’ pp. 237-252, in (eds.), Thomas, C. Heller, Morton Sosna, and 
David E. Wellberg, Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality and the S e lf in Western Thought, 
(Standford, Ca.; Standford University Press, 1986). Hereafter, ‘RMD’, p. 19
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If the emphasis is on relationship rather than the individual then a shift takes 
place in the conception of self which emphasises the other's needs and one's 
responsibility towards them®' This morality of caie and responsibility would define a 
virtuous/good person not only in temis of his/her rational excellence (expressed in a 
void) but their ability to respond and care for the others as each 'real' situation arises. 
When this care is reciprocated the inter-dependence which defines the web of 
relationships in society becomes a positive value, one that must be upheld, not avoided.
If we accept that within the context of friendship the demarcation of the rational 
world from the emotional one is a false division and an affirmation of absolute self- 
sufficiency is not only spurious but also undesirable then we are free to proceed with 
the task of re- interpreting these texts in light of more egalitarian and inclusive systems. 
To say that inter-dependency is a given but also a desirable and necessary given opens 
the way to the interpretation of texts without the need to jettison all masculinist theories 
of relationship. By changing the premise on which these arguments are based the 
solution to the problem of feminist appropriation of masculinist theories to women’s 
stories unravels much more harmoniously and without the pressure of accepting either 
one extreme or the other. Furthermore, the discourse on ideal friendship may be re­
defined not only on the theoretical level which promotes inclusion of emotion and the 
value of inter-dependence but also on a practical level in the example of such a 
friendship between women. This will be the subject of my next chapter.
Friends then Family: The Story of Naomi and Ruth
Introduction
In this chapter I will interpret the book of Ruth within the theoretical framework of a 
feminist model of ideal friendship as delineated in the previous chapter and on the 
basis of Aristotle’s NE. I will show that Naomi and Ruth’s relationship represents an 
example of ideal friendship which not only re-interprets the Aristotelian ideal but 
more importantly does justice to this ideal. It is tlnough their example of women’s 
friendship that I will base my answers to questions concerning feminist biblical 
interpreters as to the extent these women offer a positive example of women's agency 
in ancient times. This will entail an examination of the constituent parts of fr iendship 
in its highest form since the ‘requirements’ in this case are distinct from any other 
form of voluntary relationship. The concept which will first be re-defined is that of 
moral goodness since this is the premise on which ideal friendship functions. It is 
also an important consideration in replying to the question of how Naomi and Ruth 
are positive examples of women’s agency because my criteria are based on their 
desire to remain together as opposed to the traditional emphasis on goodness as piety 
and obedience. In this process of re-interpretation, the breaking down of the 
opposition between reason/emotion and autonomy/dependence will become evident 
on a practical level where Naomi and Ruth will be shown to frmction on grounds 
which value inter-dependency and on action where reason is complemented by 
emotion.
The book of Ruth holds a significant place in the Jewish canon not only in that 
it is one of only two books named after a woman (the other one is Esther) but also 
because it is a book read during Shabu 'ot - the Jewish feast of weeks. It is also 
associated with the giving of the Torah to Moses and as such read as a example of an 
ideal proselyte - a reading which I will show continues to influences interpretations 
even today. My reading is not concerned with establishing such a theological agenda 
but - via a close literary reading - bringing out aspects of the women’s characters and
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relationship which have hitherto been neglected at least partly due to a greater interest 
in the book’s theological ‘message’.
The book consists of four chapters, and the time period it encompasses is 
roughly five weeks - starting just before the beginning of the barley harvest. In the 
first chapter, Naomi, a widow and her two widowed daughters-in-law, the 
Moabitesses, Ruth and Orpah, set out for Judah where they have heard the famine is 
over. On the way, Naomi asks the other two to return to their own homes but both 
beg her not to part with them. Finally, Orpah discontinues the journey but Ruth, with 
a moving oath, succeeds in accompanying Naomi to Bethlehem. Once there, Naomi 
expresses to the choras of women her bitterness at having lost her husband and two 
sons and attributes the blame to God. Subsequently, Ruth goes to work in the field 
belonging to Boaz who is also kin to Naomi and impresses him with her loyalty to her 
mother-in-law. In the third chapter, Ruth visits Boaz on the threshing floor during the 
night and he once again praises her and resolves to many her. Last, Boaz publicly 
claims Ruth for a wife and when their first child is born, the chorus of women once 
again appear to praise Ruth and God for producing a son which will become a 
'restorer' of life for Naomi.
It is this stoiy for which in 1895, Elizabeth Cady Stanton stated in The 
Woman's Bible that Naomi and Ruth's relationship is "one of steadfast friendship" - 
one in which for Ruth "Naomi has a peculiar, magnetic charm, one stronger than 
kindred, country or ease'". She remains one of the few to describe it as such since the 
defining characteristic of their relationship is commonly assumed to be a familial one 
- although most commentators agree that these two women share a special closeness. 
I, too, like Stanton, would like to posit that the uniqueness of this closeness cannot be 
contained or easily explained by the tie of daughter-in-law to mother-in-law and that 
the most appropriate characterisation of it would be that of an "ideal friendship" as 
defined in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics - though between women.
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, The Woman's Bible (Boston: North-Eastern University Press, 1985),
p. 39
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The main points made in the chapters on friendship are three: that a ‘perfect 
friendship’ must first involve good people who desire the common good, that the 
relationship must be characterised by equality in eveiy way and last, that it must 
involve living a common life. All other points made stem from these tlmee principles. 
By using these principles as criteria in passages where the two women interact I will 
produce a literaiy reading which will shift the focus from the unequal relationship of 
mother-in-law to daughter-in-law to the equal one of friendship. Also, since the text 
is a biblical one, I will propose that this kind of reading produces an empowering 
image of women in the Hebrew Bible. Finally, I would like to uncover the ways in 
which this text which for me also holds ‘a peculiar, magnetic charm’, says something 
more than just what traditional inteipretations want it to say.
Wlren discussing the book of Ruth most traditional commentators^ tend to 
bypass the relationship and go on to discuss its (extra-textual) 'purpose'. They go to 
lengths to explain customs of the times or the book's relation to other passages on the 
Hebrew Bible. For example in one Bible coimnentary the author insists that a "cmcial 
question"^ is whether the law concerning levirate marriages is linked to the laws in 
Deuteronomy 25:3-5'* and goes on to conclude that "the Book is concerned with the 
well-being of the family and the obligations which have to be met to secure this end"h 
Even recent revisionist interpretations tend either to ignore the possibility of a
^Roland E. Murphy, Wisdom Literature (Grand Rapids, Michigan; William B. Eerdmans 
Publish Co. 1981), on p. 87 there is a summary of the views of the meaning of Ruth proposed in the 
19th and 20th centuries. Nineteenth century: 1) A recommendation of the levirate marriage 2) A 
justification for the Davidic succession 3) The ‘power of love’ 4) The pious and virtuous ancestors of 
David are pictured 5) A protest against the vigorous measures taken by Ezra and Nehemiah against 
mixed marriages. Twentieth century: 1) Relationship to fertility cult 2) As a consolation for the 
Israelites that returned home from exile 3) A portrayal o f the providence of the God of Israel 4) For the 
preservation of the name of the family and the work is written to the glory of David 5) The 
incorporation of Ruth into a Jewish family. Most o f these ignore the centrality of the women’s 
relationship in the narrative.
^William McKane, Tracts fo r  the Times, Ruth, Esther, Lamentations, Ecclesistes, Song o f  
Songs Bible Guides, no. 12 (London: Lutterworth, 1965), p. 11
'*The Bible Revised Standard Version (New York: WM. Collins Sons & Co. Ltd), p. 235-238
^Mckane, p. 24. Mieke Bal also discusses these two issues, though with very different results. 
Cf. Lethal Love, pp. 80-81
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relationship that goes beyond this ’artificial bond' or resort to interpretations that rely 
on the traditional theological emphasis. Cynthia Ozick for example, accepts that 
Ruth's love for Naomi is more than is usually exhibited within the limits of the 
familial but goes on to explain this as an indication of Ruth's prophetic ability to see 
the ‘God of Israel’ as the ‘One Creator of the Universe’f  The ‘nature’ of the women’s 
relationship is taken at face value i.e. nothing that warrants special attention. Yet by 
tiying to make sense of this text the perceived ‘excess’ in the women’s relationship is 
not explained, only aclmowledged.
So to return to Stanton's choice of words, there does seem to be a bond 
involved that is "stronger than countiy, kinship and ease". In order to examine the 
‘natine’ of this bond I will first need to explore the character of each of the women 
since according to Aiistotle, a ‘perfect’ friendship can only involve good people who 
resemble one another in goodness because goodness is the lasting thing on which a 
friendship's longevity depends’. My aim is to reclaim the story of Naomi and Ruth as 
an example of perfect friendship between women in which the character, and actions 
characteristic of such a relationship are unique in biblical literature. As such, its 
function within the text will also be shown as exemplary by feminist standards since 
Naomi and Ruth are each other's priority to which the demands of patriarchal order 
are either secondary or irrelevant.
‘’Cynthia Ozick, ‘Ruth’, p .191-214 in Athalya Brenner (ed.), A Feminist Companion to Ruth 
(Sheffield: Sheffield Press, 1993), p. 210
’Aristotle, p. 363. Many ancient writers agree with this idea, see Cicero, p. 37 and 50; 
Xenophone, Memorabilia and Oeconomicus, (tr.), B.C. Marchant, (London: Heinemann, 1923), p. 135 
and 137; Plato, Lysis, (h.), W.R. Lamb, (London: Heinemann, 1925), p. 43
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Chapter 2
On Being Good
When speaking about the requirements of virtue in the development of ideal 
friendship I agree with Aristotle that the individuals involved must already be 
characterised by goodness, Otheiivise, it would not be the intrinsically moral 
phenomenon - in the same tradition of Aristotle, Cicero and Montaigne - I take it to 
be \ Consequentially, it could not embody the utopian potential I will show it 
envisions. To say that two people are good friends - only to each other - but not good 
people with regard to anyone else - is fundamentally to change the character of this 
relationship. Also, while two good friends can conceivably be good people - though in 
my (and Aristotle’s) definition not capable of ideal friendship - it is impossible for 
two good people not to be capable of ideal friendship^ And while the parties involved 
may not be aware if this requirement is realised at the outset, they will always, 
through intimacy, come to recognise its presence through their shared life'”. It is 
important therefore that I discuss Naomi and Ruth's relationship not only in terms of 
how they are good to each other but also if this is possible a priori. In the book of 
Ruth, we do not have much textual evidence for either consideration but what does 
manifest itself, I will argue, illuminates how these two women could be described as
®See the Inti'oduction, in Badhwar, esp. p. 12-16 for a suinniary of how a friendship differs 
depending on whether its status is considered to be inhinsically, moral, immoral or nonmoral. For 
example Lewis here departs from the Aristotelian tradition when he allows for exclusivity and 
viciousness in the character of friendship. Wliere 'good friends' are otherwise engaged in immoral acts 
towards others, my opinion is that the concept of 'goodness' is an entirely different one, and outside the 
scope of this thesis. On Badhwar's conclusion I agree that: a. friendship necessarily involves some 
moral goodness between friends and b. the recognition of the nature of friendship entails, if we are 
rational, a recognition of what morality in general requires, see pp. 14-5
”Aristotle explams this on the basis o f the inner conflict that “bad people” constantly 
experience, p. 295
Because as Aristotle states,: “(friendships) need time and intimacy...until each has proved to 
the other that he is woitliy of love, and so won his trust”, p. 264
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both good people and good friends - though not necessarily 'good' in the way that has 
traditionally been ascribed to them.
i A Shadow over Naomi
Beginning with how Naomi and Ruth could be characterised as good I will first focus 
on Naomi's character since my discussion of Ruth will focus on re-inteipreting her 
generally acknowledged goodness in the light of feminist ethics. Naomi, usually less 
the centre of attention, has recently come under attack for what has been characterised 
as self-centredness and self-interest". I will attempt to show, using Freud's work in 
'Mourning and Melancholia"’ that there is valid justification for Naomi's actions and 
statements which, not only show her progression from despair, distress and 
hopelessness to hope and joy and ar e, as such, a manifestation of this goodness, I will 
show that Fewell and Gumi's argument criticises Naomi because it is presupposed 
that the two women act independently of each other's interests - thus reducing the 
story to a simple description of female antagonism. It further ignores the 
psychological factors that contribute to plot development and character motivation.
By analysing their actions in the light of the emotional context and based on 
the textual evidence that the source of their ethical choices derive from a notion of self 
‘in relation’ I will show that it is precisely because Naomi is a caring person and 
friend that she behaves in the way she does. Naomi’s goodness cannot be established 
without an examination of the effect the severing of all relationships she is bound to 
by love (her husband, two sons, and God) have on her psyche and her ability to 
continue to function as a caring, giving person. All her actions and speech (or lack of)
"Dana Nolan Fewell and David E. Gunn, 'A Son is Bom to Naomi! : Literary Allusions and 
Interpretation in the Book of Ruth', p. 99-108, Journal fo r  the Study o f  the Old Testament, 40 (1988), 
hereafter, JSOT
' ’Sigmund Freud, 'Mourning and Melancholia', p. 251-268 in On Metapsychology: The 
Theory o f  Psychoanalysis, volume 11, (tx.) James Stachey, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1984, orig. published 
1957 by London: Hogarth Press). I am not attempting to force modern, complex, psychoanalytic 
categories on an ancient biblical text, merely to show that it would be hasty to draw conclusions for 
reactions to such extreme situations as presented to the women witliout taking into consideration some 
basic emotional motivations in such circumstances.
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will be shown to be intimately related and dependent on the notion of goodness 
which is spuriously self-sacrificial, i.e. based on the assumption of self-sufficiency 
that neglects the care of the self in favour of the care of the other. It is tlirough the 
realisation of the inadequacy of action carried out solely on the basis of reason and the 
assumption of self-sufficiency that Naomi surfaces from her ‘false consciousness’ and 
realises that her desire not to hurt others is dependent on her responsibility towards 
not hurting her own self. This is facilitated with the help of Ruth - understandable 
since her pain is less - and via the liberating power of anger towards the perpetrator of 
this unjust suffering - God.
Fewell and Gunn have highlighted five instances where the silences in the text 
support a negative characterisation of Naomi. But these silences are not, in my 
opinion, qualitatively equal. The first, second, and third silence, (on the existence of 
Boaz), refer to Naomi, whereas the fourth to Ruth (on her part in the scene on the 
tlireshing floor), and the fifth, (at Obed’s birth) refer to the last two chapters by which 
time many changes have taken place in the women's lives and five weeks have passed 
since their amval. The first silence (1:18) they point out is after Ruth's oath when 
Naomi accepts Ruth's determined will to follow her. The second is upon their arrival 
in Bethlehem, (1:19-22), and the third when Naomi fails to inform Ruth of the 
presence of her kinsman, Boaz'h The time factor is an important one because as in 
any traumatic event - here three deaths in Naomi's family - it camiot be omitted from 
an evaluation of her responses. It is my contention that Naomi is still suffering the 
effects of this loss, and this determines her behaviour in the first two chapters.
Wliether Naomi is simply still in mourning or worse, suffering from 
melancholia is a difficult distinction to make since the symptoms for each are exactly 
the same except for the one related to melancholia - the loss of se lf regard"*. Even if
’’Fewell and Gunn, p. 100-102 passim
’'’Freud, p. 252, the common syptoms are: profound painful dejection, cessation of interest in 
the outside world, loss of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity. Moreover, Freud sites the same 
external causes which give rise to these symtpons, i.e. the loss of a loved person, or the loss of some
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her relationship to Ruth weren't a doge one it would seem very unlikely that the 
deaths of her husband and later, her two sons would not have a profound effect on her. 
In fact, she says as much herself when the women of Bethlehem meet her upon their 
arrival: "I went away full and the Lord has brought me back empty" (1: 21). If  she 
does not refer to Ruth at this moment in time it is because Ruth lies outside the 
comparison Naomi is making between past and present, i.e. when the women last saw 
her, she had a husband and two sons, now, all three are gone. It is this ‘emptiness’ she 
is refening to and not to a negation of Ruth’s presence'^
But even at the scene o f departure from Moab, Naomi emphasises her 
loneliness: “ ...for it is exceedingly bitter to me for your sake that the hand o f  the Lord 
has gone forth against me” (1:13). Here Naomi links her deprivation to the fate o f the 
other two women should they stay with her. To define oneself in terms o f 
relationship,’” means that the loss o f three close relationships cannot but affect those 
close to them and create a gulf in the psyche that cannot easily be overcome. Naomi's 
repetition o f her inability to provide yet more for her daughters-in-law, leads to her 
final verbal withdrawal from the other two. Physically, emotionally and linguistically 
she is 'empty' - what better way to illustrate this than with silence? The extremity o f 
her pain is not easily represented but here an attempt is made which is not lost on 
Ruth. In my reading, it is because she is/has been so giving that she is now bereft o f 
resources, and thus indicating that the self is not an endless source o f beneficience 
which does not need replenishing.
abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an ideal and so om. See 
also p. 266 for additional causes related to melancholia.
This is what Fewell and Gunn support, p. 104. Yet N aom i’s lack o f reference to Ruth 
serves another function, that o f radical collusion, which I will discuss in the fifth chapter.
’”Gilligan, ‘Remapping the Moral Domain’, pp. 237-252, in (eds.), Thomas, C. Heller, 
Morton Sosna, and David E. Wellberg, ‘RM D’, p. 239: “The identification of attachment or 
interdependence as a primary dimension of human experience ties the psychology o f love to die 
representation of moral growth and to identity formation”. In other words, if  Naomi did not diink o f  
herself in relation to the other women this would have lead to significant differences in the w ay she 
responded in this context.
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What we have here is a woman who expresses concern and care for other 
women close to her and who would, if she could, go to any ends to procure happiness 
and a secure future for them: “...even if I should have a husband this night and should 
bear sons, would you therefore wait till they were grown?” (1:12-13). Her desire to 
further help her daughters-in-law is unrealisable and this is her motivation behind the 
repetition of the words: “Go, return...”, (1:8), “Turn back...”, (1:11 & 12). I will later 
show how in this respect, Ruth is equally willing to act for Naomi's happiness, only in 
her case, what is ‘reqiured’ of her is actually realisable. In the context of friendship 
what is required of each is what is possible to be realised" and here Naomi camiot be 
held at fault since she is beyond her childbearing years. To use this type of 
conditional signifies the impossiblity of its fulfillment at any future time.
Though this may be a rhetorical question the fact that she decides that they 
must part (significantly after they have already set off together) is one based on 
reason. For if she herself camiot help them, then they should seek a solution elsewhere 
and what is more rational than to return to a familiar place - Moab?: “Go, return each 
of you to her mother’s house...the Lord grant that you may find a home, each of you 
in the house of her husband!”(1: 8-9). On the one hand, this points to a bond of 
genuine concern, where one wishes another well for their own sake'®. But on the other 
hand, it does not take into account the emotional crisis the women find themselves in.
For Naomi, by relying exclusively on reason in order to reach the ‘best’ 
solution to this probem, she is neglecting her own need for companionship at a time of 
most intense need. The conflict here between acute emotional distress and ‘impartial’ 
reason inevitably results in the severing of yet more ties for it is her privileging of 
reason over emotion that leads Naomi to make the wrong decision. Her concern that 
her daughters-in-law should re-maiTy in conjunction with her own distress lead her to 
believe, on the basis of simple reason, that there is no viable option for the others if
"Aristotle; “Friendship asks only for what is practicable”, p. 285
'®For Aristotle, this is most characteristic however, o f friendship based on virtue, p. 300
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they were to remain with her. Thus, by ignoring her own emotional needs, she is also
shown - in Orpah’s and especially Ruth’s response - to disregard the needs of the
others, thus failing in her own desire to care for their needs: (1: 9-10, 14) “Then she
kissed them, and they lifted up their voices and wept. And they said to her, “No, we
will return with you to your people”...Then they lifted up their voices and wept again;
and Oipah kissed her mother-in-law, but Ruth clung to her.” It is clear from this
example that Naomi’s daughters-in-law have no desire to leave her (despite their lack
of husbands!). That Ruth convinces Naomi of the erroneousness of her judgement by I
I
supplying their common emotions as factors to take into consideration as well as the |
necessity of relying on each other will be discussed in the next chapter but suffice to !
say that Naomi is convinced, and the decision is shown to be the connct one for the 
well-being of all concerned.
To Fewell and Gumi's puzzled question “why should the altruism of Ruth 
reduce an altruistic Naomi to silent withdrawal?”", we can answer: because a non- 
altruistic Naomi would not have concerned herself with the impossible task of 
providing yet more care in her current state. In fact, she would have been capable 
and willing to continue the homeward journey unaffected and untroubled by the triple 
loss. It is the selfish individual who neither has need for  others nor concerns
4 :
him/herself with the needs o f  others. It is logical then, that Naomi would (despite her 
distress) attempt to provide Ruth and Orpah with an enviromnent that would care for 
their needs in a way she no longer can, thus forgoing her own emotional needs for the 
sake of the others' well-being. Again, if she were 'selfish' she would have insisted on 
the company of two women who would have further lightened her load by travelling 
with her to a land she had not lived in for at least ten years (1:13). All her words 
revolve around her distress at not being able to help them anymore. ,
"Fewell and Gunn, p. 100
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But there is another aspect to Naomi's silence in this first chapter and it 
concerns her decision to leave. Though the narrative proposes the change of 
circumstance in Judah as N aom i's motive for leaving Moab, (1:1, 1:13, 1:20-1) her 
words both in chapter one (1:13) and upon arrival (1:20-21) point to another, more 
personal incentive. The text does not say that there was, at the same time, a famine in 
Moab so there was no urgent need to leave (1:6). But it was in Moab that the deaths 
occuiTed and in the hope of distancing herself from memories of loss, she attempts to 
break from all that reminds her of her sonow in order to heal herself in the process of 
separatioiT”. Since it is unclear whether the passage of time from her sons’ deaths has 
been short or long, (whereas the death of her husband clearly preceeded in 1:3) I 
believe her grieving reaction supports the fonner possibility’'. If we combine the lack 
of famine in Moab and her absence from public in Judah (2-4:15) we find 
contradiction - if she wanted to return why are her first words (1:20-21) so negative? 
Because her attempt to distance herself from the place of sadness fails and in 
Bethlehem she continues to suffer from this loss in private.
But her desire for emotional recovery is complicated hy the fact that her 
husband and sons were not the only people she cared for and to distance herself from 
all loved ones would be self-destructive since her sense of self depends on retaining 
ties to others (signalled in 1:20-21 by her use of the word ‘empty’ and her desire to 
change her name to Mara - Bitter). When she says (1:20) that her name should change, 
she is pointing to the only negative change in her life which was the loss of her kin. 
So the severence of ties to the ones close to her produces an identity crisis which 
leaves her feeling helpless to respond to the needs of others, i.e. Orpah and Ruth.
’”Freud, in the case of simple mourning, stresses the intense opposition to letting go of the 
feelings towards the 'object' lost, even if there is a 'subsitiition' already present smce this process can 
only be carried out gradually, “at great expense of time and ... energy, and in the meantime the 
existence of the lost object is psychically prolonged”, p. 253
’‘See Sasson, p. 21 for a discussion of the different possibilities.
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In opposition to Freud's stipulation on the ability to love after loss, stands 
another possibility which better suits the fabric of human relationships. Ruth is part 
of “the story of love that must be told not so that it can be forgotten but so that it can 
continue into the present”” . Because she is part of their common past, she embodies 
all the positive memories which constitute their common (his)story which, in turn, can 
continue to flourish in the present if only it is not abandoned. In her pledge, Ruth 
reminds Naomi “how attaclnnents located in time and arising from mutual 
engagement are by definition irreplaceable”” . Her “Entreat me not to leave you...” 
(1:16-17) makes sense in the context of their common loss and ten year co-habitation 
in Moab. That is why Naomi is silent - because she can but only agree.
Yet this desire to sever her ties with the past points rather to the possibility of 
her suffering from melancholy rather than mere mourning. Upon anival in Judah, she 
effectively retreats from the public space/world after making laiown her 
disillusionment towards another object of love - God. My stipulation that Naomi 
defines herself 'in relation' and not 'in isolation' is further exemplified hy the affect 
these deaths have on her relationship to God. Her unconcealed accusation towards 
YHWH as the perpetrator of her emotional poverty is articulated in a phrase that 
signals the kind of self-denigration symptomatic of melancholia - since her ‘self is 
also dependent on all ties bound by love: "Why call me Naomi when the Lord has 
afflicted me and the Almighty has brought calamity upon me?" (1:21). It is clear here 
that although she is not the one who has died, she nevertheless perceives the tlnee 
deaths as somehow her own punisliment, for it is she who has had to suffer this loss 
most.
In every statement Naomi utters in this Erst chapter she ends by referring to 
God, signalling therefore another loss. In this case it is not an actual physical loss but 
a more ideal kind, where what is lost is not the object of love itself (God still 'exists'.
”  Gilligan, ‘RMD’, p. 245
’Tbid., p. 245
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insofar as one's faith continues in Him), but the loss in one's love in this object’'*. In 
an attempt to reconcile her belief in her innocence with her doubt in the love of God, 
Naomi suffers - because of this loss - an identification which displaces her 
disappointment in God with a disappointment in herself”. The pattern in the first 
chapter progresses from God's indirect effect: "It is exceedingly bitter to me for your 
sake that the hand of the Lord has gone forth against me"(l : 13), to God's direct action: 
"...the Almighty has dealt very bitterly with me”(l:20) and finally to personal 
identification with the act: "Do not call me Naomi call me Mara (bitter)” (1:21). The 
linguistic trajectory moves from adjective to adverb to noun - from a modifier to an 
act, to total identification. For what she is asking is how it is that she has failed to 
respond to the ideal of goodness and what more she could have done.
The internalisation of the damage done to her is illustrated in the ambivalence 
of her feelings toward God - “someone she loves, or has loved, or should love”” and 
traces her struggle to come to tenns not only with her mourning for the loss of the 
others but also her inner conflict of how to continue to have faith in God when the 
good are punished. When she questions the appropriateness of her name she is 
signifying a crisis in her identity which involves her moral stature as well. For she 
does not believe that she has failed in goodness in a way which warrants God’s 
punisliment - her expression of estrangement would have been unecessary if this were 
the case.
Her ambivalence is further exemplified by the fact that although she continues 
to have faith in God's power to care and provide, it is in relation to her own
’‘'Freud, pp. 253-4, there is also the possibility of one not being conscious of what it is that 
has been lost, i.e. s/he does not know what (quality) s/he has lost in the object of love. This is in 
contradistinction to the psychology of mourning where tliere is nothing about the loss that is 
unconscious.
” lbid., p. 258. It is here that Freud states “the shadow of the object fell upon the ego”.
“ ibid., p. 257, “The reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted 
away from it” to the individual him/herself. 1 am using this in relation to Naomi’s faith because God is 
the only one Naomi addresses with ambivalent feelings. On pages 257-8 Freud explains tins 
displacement in detail.
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predicament that she suffers a conflict of loyalties. When she bids her daughters-in- 
law good-bye she evokes the Lord's name in a positive way only for their sake: "May 
the Lord deal kindly with you...The Lord grant that you may find a home..."(l: 8-9). 
Despite the fact that Orpah and Ruth are not Israelites, Naomi extends God's care in 
their interest even though, ironically, she herself experiences a personal abandonment. 
Since there is no textual evidence for Ruth and Orpah to have already converted to 
Judaism” , this ambivalence could only signify internal conflict in Naomi between a 
continual faith in God's benevolence and evidence to the contrary. In the first chapter 
she refers to God three times negatively, (1:3, 1:19, and 1:21) and only once 
positively (1:9). It is only in the second chapter that she unequivically makes a 
positive statement (2:20) and this is further emphasised by the inclusiveness of her 
utterance: “Blessed be he by the LORD, whose kindness has not forsaken the living or 
the dead!” (3: 20). Is this not another piece of textual evidence of her goodness when, 
despite her spiritual and emotional alienation, she continues to care for the well-being 
of the women close to her?
That Naomi is somehow implicated in the deaths of her family (or feels that 
she is) is an issue that points to her relational sense of identity - in the parting scene it 
is in her connection to the people close to her, and here in connection to God. For this 
reason she does not need to refer to Ruth when she answers the women of Judah” : 
"...the LORD has brought me back empty” (1:21). Furthermore, if punishment was 
due to her husband and sons (for marrying Moabitesses or any other reason) then why 
is she also the subject of such suffering? From Naomi's point of view this deprivation 
can be explained in two ways: first, as an unjust betrayal of God's love because in 
punishing the tliree men God is also inadvertently punishing her for wrongdoings she
” This is what one anonymous Rabbi believed in order to explain the expression “has gone 
back” (1:15) p. 118, in D.R.G. Beattie, Jewish Exegesis o f  the Book o f Ruth (Sheffield: JSOT, 1977). 
Most Midrashic writers see this scene as the proselytism of Ruth, see p. 3-31 for a comparison of 1: 16 
amongst writers.
’®Fewell and Gurm see this omission as “proof of Naomi's withdrawal from Ruth”, p. 100
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has not committed” , and second, because if  she is also meant to be the object of such 
a 'sentence' she has no recourse in reality for understanding why. In both cases, the 
implication is that she herself has not committed any crime worthy of such a reaction 
and the indignation/lamentation she repeatedly expresses stems from the laiowledge 
of her own goodness. Her ciy then is one of iimocence and of disillusionment in the 
faith which she has placed in God” .
Yet her loss of self-regard is not something that needs to be interpreted as 
stemming from actual guilt. In fact, as Freud points out, “there is no correspondence 
between the degree of self-abasement and its real justification” - a good woman will 
speak in an equally negative mamier about herself. Furthermore, it is in such cases 
that one does not shy from speaking of what ails them, quite the contrary, “there is an 
insistent communicativeness which finds satisfaction in self-exposure”” . In Naomi's 
case, both to her daughters-in-law and to the women of Judah she makes clear with 
whom her complaint lies as well as her inability to answer the question 'why?'. And 
unlike the men in the Old Testament who have also brought suit against God 
(Jeremiah, Job, Jonah)” she is alone in her societal powerlessness. Consequently, it 
is fitting that she addresses these complaints only to women, who, in their shared 
powerlessness ai'e in a position to empathise. Naomi is able to be assertive because 
she is in the safe enviromnent of familiar women and Ruth. It becomes now evident
’''Edward Campbell Jr. points out that the language Naomi uses is that of someone who 
“portrays herself as a defendent in a legal action, in which she has been deemed guily, in which 
punisliment has already been meted out. Worst o f all, her antagonist is God.” p. 83. Also, her use of 
Shadday (in 1:20-21) supports this, since Shadday “seems to have had a special connection to judging 
and to conferring of deliverance or punislniient, blessing or curse.” p. 77 in Ruth: A New Translation 
with Introduction. Notes and Commentary (New York: Doubleday and Co. 1975)
^Campbell points out that this is “a profound affirmation of faith”, because it assumes faith in 
the covenant, p. 32. On tlie other hand, Naomi's outcry has also been judged as disloyalty and 
foolislmess: "Naomi allows events to control her instead of bringing her inner self to control them...she 
was self- inflicted with ...a maudlin self-centeredness”, James T. Cleland in The Interpreter's Bible, p. 
838. I am suggesting that both her faith and her sense of self are disturbed only temporarily.
"Freud, p. 255
’’Ibid., p. 255
’’Campbell discusses the other instances of these 'legal cases' brought against God, p. 83
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how the inital bitterness had to do with feelings of abandonment by God as well as 
the loss of her ties.
In being the only woman who takes this stand she is not only proving her 
unconventionality” , she is also voicing the anger and anguish of the countless 
innocent women usually 'silent' but profoundly affected by the ‘violence of 
separation’ they have had to suffer. By being rendered incapable of caring for those 
close to her, (and to receive care from them) she has lost what constitutes for her the 
fundamental meaning in life. Naomi embodies the consequences of this injustice in 
one's own psyche, in the sphere of human relationships, and towards the divine. And 
her refusal to remain silent is especially important in view of her status as widow in a 
society in which selfhood is defined corporately”
In condemning this injustice, her distinctly female voice stands as a subversive 
element not only in the book of Ruth but in the whole Hebrew Bible where women are 
either silent/silenced (the levite’s concubine in Judges 19-20), compliant/treacherous 
(Delilah in Judges 16), or uncaring for the plight of other women (Sarah and Hagar in 
Genesis 16: 1-16; 21: 9-21). The liberating power of her expressed anger enables 
Naomi to re-claim her self-esteem and re-build her sense of identity” thus opening the 
way to dissociation from masculinist ideologies of autonomy and self-sufficiency and 
re-association with loved ones. Naomi's anger suggests the collusion of patriarchal 
terrestial and celestial justice in preventing her from continuing to care for others and 
the fact that this is most pointedly exhibited in her relationship to Ruth is significant 
for feminist readings of the book. She is the only woman who brings her case to God
Fewell and Gunn consider Naomi's response indicative of her conventionality, p. 104
As Jolui H. Otwell argues in And Sarah Laughed: The Status o f  Women in the Old 
Testament (Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster Press, 1977), p. 125: “ A widow was a ‘silent one’ (almana - 
to be silent) a person often denied participation in the economic and legal life of a community because 
she lacked identification witli a family.”
“ Ruether here is speaking about Christian women but the same can be said in tire Hebrew 
context of socialization , in Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1983), p. 186
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without a mediator and without being punished for doing so and as such she joins the 
rallies of Abraham and Moses. It is not necessary for Naomi to display “leadership 
qualities” in order to prove she is a mother with a difference” . She is not only angry 
at this injustice but at the same time, her anger at a textual level is shown to be 
justified since she is not punished for its expression.
Finally, Naomi, regains her sense of self worth and with it the ability to care 
through the passing of time and the nurturing care of Ruth. In the text, this is 
signalled through her effort to help Ruth; “My daughter, should I not seek a home for 
you, that it may be well with you?” (3: 1), and her eventual re-entrance in the sphere 
of human relations. As for her tliird silence in not informing Ruth of the presence of 
her kinsman Boaz” this is keeping with her mourning. Not only has she withdrawn 
from the public sphere to heal her wounds with the help of the one person/woman 
who has unconditionally offered it but also she has indicated her loss of faith in the 
workings of men, and by extension, of God - for how is she to believe that any one 
man may help her when “the Lord had afflicted/testified against her” (1: 21), for some 
unlmown reason? Thus, the only serious accusation” against Naomi's character has 
been found to be wanting in its superficial denouncement of the morality of her 
actions.
So it is in the character of Naomi where the effects of patriarchal injustice 
(because of God and loss of male protection) are most evident. Equally, the problem 
of ascertaining her moral goodness cannot be divorced from her response to extreme 
loss since it is this loss that curtails her ability to care and respond to others in need.
”  I am disagreeing here with J. Cheryl Exum in ‘Mother in Israel’: A Familiar Figure 
Reconsidered’, pp. 73-85, in (ed.), Adela Yarbo Collins, Feminist Interpretation o f  the Bible (Scholars 
Press: Chico, California, 1985), p. 84-85 where she discusses Deborah.
“ Fewell and Gumi, pp. 104-105 express confusion at why Naomi stays home while Ruth goes 
to the fields. It seems obvious to me that this is because of practical considerations - the many 
household chores women were responsible for and also because of Naomi's lack of interest in the 
outside world. See the Carol L. Meyers's discussion on women's domestic responsibilities in 'Everyday 
life: Women in the period of the Hebrew Bible', pp. 244-251 in Newsom and Ringe.
“ There is also, of course, the exposition by James T. Cleland, in The Interpeter’s Bible, esp.
pp. 836-8
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As Carol Gilligan writes, what is perceived as “women's moral weakness,..is 
inseparable from women's moral strength, an oveniding concern with relationships 
and responsibility”” . It is as if Naomi is asking how she can continue to be caring 
when the effects of this seemingly 'impersonal' justice render her emotionally scarred.
The problem is further exacerbated by a false dichotomy between 
selfislmess/selflessness where on the one hand, the possibility of motivation which is 
not in some way selfish is umealistic and on the other hand, selfishness has, ironically 
the effect of emphasising the s e lf .  This explains the response of Fewell and Gunn 
who fail to take into consideration that if  it is the good who are giving then when they 
are prevented from doing so the consequences can only be withdrawal. To expect the 
giving to continue unaffected would be to assume a lack of need in the givers 
themselves to equally receive care and nurturance. In the context of relationship, - 
and especially in friendship where mutual affection is willingly offered - to continue 
'dutifully' to care does not automatically render the subject morally superior. The 
expectation that one should endlessly give to the point of self-annihilation is not the 
ideal of goodness to strive for, since it further betrays an androcentric bias by 
burdening women to respond to such um'ealistic expectations. To investigate then 
further what ideal of goodness constitutes a pre-requisite in ideal friendship which is 
also compatible with a feminist critique, I will have to focus on Ruth.
ii Ruth's ‘Sacrifice’
Ruth is presented as the epitome of the virtuous woman for a variety of reasons not all 
of which necessarily are desirable from a feminist point of view"’. That most
“ G illigan,/D g pp. 16-17
"'Edward Collins Vacek,‘Love, Christian and Diverse: A Response to Colin Grant’, p. 33, in 
Journal o f  Religious Ethics, 24.1, spring 1996. Vacek discusses this irony in relation to self-sacrifice - 
a concept I will be dealing with later in this chapter.
"’Amy Jill Levine, pp. 78-84, 'Ruth', in Newsom and Ringe, p. 79
66
commentators commend her for the 'sacrifice' of eveiything dear to her for the sake of 
her mother-in-law is at the very least suspicious in its unconditionality. As with 
Naomi, the confusion of what is 'good' (selfless) and what is not 'good' (sellish), is 
dependent upon the emotional context and the acknowledgement that these women 
define themselves in relationship and their actions stem from the responsibility to 
each other which this entails. Thus if Ruth is 'good' she is so not only to Naomi but 
because she is also 'good' to others and her relationship to Naomi is an extension and 
amplification of this. From the point of view of friendship, the pre-requisite of 
equality of goodness seems to be satisfied at least on one level (where neither woman 
is harming the other) but there is also the issue of selfless vs. selfish motivation which 
needs to be addressed.
I would also like to argue here that the establislnnent of Ruth's 'goodness' 
should not be discussed in terms of a strict dichotomy between 'selfless' and 'selfish' 
and that, to do so would be to subvert the tenets of ideal friendship but also of any 
relationship. For in friendship there is an absence of a clear separation between each 
agent’s interests so that in acting for the good of one’s friend one is not sacrificing 
something of interest to him/herself k In friendship the common good is of the utmost 
importance so by neglecting one party, the other is also affected and thus the 
relationship suffers. Consequently, these terms will be re-interpreted from the point 
of view of friendship conducive to a feminist re-appraisal of the book of Ruth. 
(Ultimately, of course, it is in Naomi and Ruth's actions toward each other which 
establish the moral virtue of both their characters and their friendship but this will be 
discussed in the next chapter).
Ruth's pledge - to remain together- despite Naomi's plea to separate must be 
seen in the context of emotional need and caring response. I will argue that in the 
scene of departure the conflict that is being negotiated is how the common good can 
be attained without the need for great sacrifice on the part of either woman. If in the
Lawrence Blum, ‘Friendship as a Moral Phenomenon’, pp. 192-210 in Badhwar, p. 202
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traditional interpretative framework Naomi is selfish because she will not take the 
other women with her, then Ruth is selfless for wanting to remain with Naomi and in 
the process forsake everything that is laiown to her. The first proposition was shown 
to be wrong in its assumption of detachment and separation. In Ruth's case, as well, 
how can she be exalted as selfless when the result of such self-effacement would 
defeat the purpose of her responding to Naomi's need? There is a contradiction here 
on a psychological level which cannot be reconciled in these temis. Put in another 
way, in order to continue giving to others Ruth is exalted for giving up herself, so care 
in this light is seen “to connote exclusion of the self whereas selfrslmess comiotes 
exclusion of others""k If  by including Naomi, Ruth excludes herself then this model 
of goodness has at its centre an equally pernicious dichotomy of 'self and 'other' 
which betrays its reliance on masculinist notions of separateness and autonomy.
These notions expose another false dichotomy which was discussed in the 
previous section - between emotion and reason. If on the other hand the conflict in 
this scene is interpreted in the framework of care and responsibility then the 
conjunction of the emotional and the rational must be employed. Otheiwise the 
recourse to only the one or the other in order to reach a solution would entail either 
the dissolution of the relationship or the dissolution of the self. By analysing what 
motivates them to be good to each other we see in their behaviour the seeds of their 
ethical status. Thus what I will characterise as their friendship is an expression of that 
goodness to the ultimate degree.
But as I have said before, to define oneself in terms of relationship collapses 
these dichotomies in favour of a solution that would not require any great 'sacrifice'. 
Naomi, under the weight of despair, attempts to care for the others by proposing what 
'logically' would secure the best future for the others but would leave her physically 
and emotionally alone. Ruth, carrying less pain and recognising the greater need of
'^Gilligan, ‘RMD’, p. 250
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Naomi, proposes a solution that derives from the successful fusion of emotion and 
reason and according to which both need and desire can be satisfied. To re-define 
then the notion of 'good' or more specifically 'a good woman', from a feminist 
perspective means to re-define the notion of the 'self in favour of the dissolution of 
the myth of the autonomous self. And it is in the context of friendship that the 
collapse of the categories of selfisli/selfless is best illustrated.
Ruth, then, according to the traditional model is also 'selfish' since her desire 
to remain in relationship would also be satisfying a need of her own and not merely 
'selflessly' disregarding herself for the sake of Naomi. If what she is seen to renounce 
is too great I would say - as Ruth herself does by pledging such an oath (1:17) - that to 
have parted with Naomi would have entailed a greater loss; for this is what I take her 
pledge to signify, i.e. a kind of ‘till death do us part’. So reason can only effectively 
resolve conflict if employed in relation to emotion but in times of crisis it is easy to 
lose track of the proper balance. It would be fallacious then to judge Ruth as either 
selfish or selfless when what she is concerned with is providing the right solution to a 
problem which concerns the life and well-being of both.
Before I go on to discuss how the magnanimity of Ruth’s goodness is best 
characterised within the context of friendship I will add that 'goodness' can neither be 
articulated in a relational void, nor separated from emotion or 'selfish' motivations. 
Naomi and Ruth are both selfish to the extent that what they desire for themselves is 
inseparable from what is best for the other; and they are both 'selfless' because the 
good of the other is as equally important as their own good. As such their story 
provides yet another subversive element against the interpretations that would have 
Ruth wanting nothing for herself nor Naomi caring for the others.
The solution these women amve at reveal on a practical level the inadequacy 
of a theoiy of friendship (discussed in the previous chapter) which omits the 
emotional sphere from the discussion of virtue and focuses on the 'good' only in 
relation to reason. This is nowhere more apparent than in the next section where the
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mutual care Naomi and Ruth reveal to each other challenges the notion that friendship 
is best developed between the 'self-sufficient’.
Chapter 3
Good Friends
The first chapter in the book of Ruth is an important one in that it establishes the 
special quality of Naomi and Ruth's relationship as one qualitatively different from 
the one Naomi shares with Oipah. Since Aristotle distinguishes between friendships 
based on virtue, pleasure and utility' it is necessaiy to show that Orpall’s is not based 
on the first but that Ruth’s is. The issue that needs to be dealt with is how Orpah is as 
equally good as Ruth by 'obeying' Naomi whereas Ruth is 'good' because she disobeys 
hef. By shifting the focus of the relationship from kinship to friendship I will show 
how this contradiction can only be resolved by interpreting these acts in teiins of 
different degrees of friendship and that it is in this way that both are 'good' - only that 
the requirements of ideal friendship 'impose' a different set of loyalties. As Aristotle 
saysk
The claims of justice differ...Hence the wrongs committed against these several 
types of friend differ too; and are aggravated in proportion to the degree of 
intimacy...It is natural that the claims of justice should increase with the intensity 
of friendship.
In our case, Ruth and Orpah both can be good and loyal only if they differ in 
their relationship to Naomi on a friendly level since neither can be more or less a 
daughter-in-law'' . On the level of friendship however, “loyalties are relational and 
partial because they arise out of certain ties to which outsiders camiot claim equal 
treatment with those who are objects of loyal attaclimenf’k From Naomi's point of
261
^Aristotle; “For there is in each case a kind of mutual affection, known to both parties”, p. 
^Campbell, p. 82
^Aristotle, p. 273
^Another level on which Ruth proves to be a better friend will be discussed in chapter four.
^George P. Fletcher, Loyalty: An Essay on the Morality o f  Relationships (New York and 
Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1993), p.8. Fletcher is also influenced by Aristotle's writing on 
friendship.
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view then, Orpah is not betraying her but only acting in accordance with the demands 
of their relationship. This is why Ruth and Orpah cannot be compared with the same 
set of criteria i.e. those based on familial ties because Ruth then will always be found 
to be acting ‘in excess’.
In an effort to characterise Orpah as good commentators have laboriously 
developed a line of argument that considers Orpah's decision equally justifiable, only 
less inspired compared to Ruth's^. There is an inconsistency here that derives from 
the emphasis on kinship rather than friendship. If both Orpah and Ruth's duty to their 
mother-in-law only involves obedience then Ruth is illogically admired as loyal since 
Naomi repeatedly asks both of them to return to 'their mother's house' (1:8-13). If  on 
the other hand their duty is to remain with Naomi then Orpah cannot be good. What 
seems to be going on here is that a separate set of criteria are set up so that both 
women are regarded praiseworthy. But this is umiecessary if the point of view shifts 
to friendship as the defining characteristic. Aristotle allows for a variety friendships 
all of which are both qualitatively and quantitatively different^. The 'obligations' are 
then different according to the degree of friendship and it is 'ideal' friendship that 
requires the utmost loyalty. Thus, although Orpah's decision is the opposite of Ruth's 
it is simply indicative of the lesser loyalty she 'owes' Naomi. Ruth, on the other hand, 
in her response to the maximal demand of loyalty, stresses her on-going identification 
with Naomi’s interests as her own^.
Furthermore, because of the voluntary nature of friendship, good friends are 
also willing to do all they can for a friend so that the good they desire for the other is 
also what they are bound by duty to do. Aiistotle distinguishes the friendship based
 ^Campbell, p. 82, Cf. Ozick, p. 202, where Oipah is “normal” and Ruth’s act is “singular’ 
because she makes restitution for her husband’s abandomnent. Why is the value of their actions 
judged in relation to their husbands?
’ Aristotle, p. 261-263
® According to Fletcher, “...the duty of loyalty vacillates between minimal and maximal 
demands. It is in the latter that the negative act of non-betrayal expands to include affirmative 
attention and devotion...”, p. 40
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on goodness as one in which each party is eager to benefit the other^. This equal 
emphasis on desire is important to counter accusations against Ruth that by staying 
with Naomi she is remaining faithful to her husband's family^^ and therefore to 
patriarchal order. If her motivations are based on her friendship to Naomi then 
Chilion, her husband, becomes if not secondary then altogether irrelevant. In any case, 
as widows, Naomi and Ruth are not bound to male authority in the vows they make^\
I am not assuming here that Naomi and Ruth are good friends in order to then 
prove that their actions are good. What I am interested in doing is twofold. First, to 
break down the dichotomy between duty and desire in which one is morally good only 
if one obeys one's duty (against, or irrespective of one’s desire)'^. This Kantian view 
is in keeping with the false dichotomy between reason and emotion fi'om which 
emotions are not considered moral phenomena^^. Second, and as a consequence of the 
first, I would like to show that Ruth is good because of what she wants - and what she 
wants is to stay with Naomi. As such she is a unique example in the Hebrew Bible 
where a woman's voice is expressed in support of another woman. Since friendship is 
the relationship par excellence where duty and desire coincide, a good friend cannot 
divorce his/her feelings/desires from his/her obligations*'* and Ruth is not only staying
Aristotle, p. 281
See Georg Fohier, (ti.), David Green, Introduction to the Old Testament ( London: SPCK, 
1974, orig. published 1968), p. 251; Cf. Esther Fuchs, ‘The Literary Characterization of Mothers and 
Sexual Politics in the Hebrew Bible’, pp. 117-136. Fuchs considers the projection unto women of what 
men most want - male offspring a “powerful ideological strategy”, p. 130. This may be the case in 
some instances, but there is no mention of children by Rutli.
' ‘ Paula S. Hiebert, ‘Whence Shall Help Come to Me? The Biblical Widow’, pp. 125-141, in 
Day, p. 130. See also Numbers 30: 9: “But any vow of a widow or of a divorced woman, anything by 
which she has bound herself, shall stand against her.” Hiebert also points out the adverse, for women, 
consequences of the lack of supporting kinship ties.
Kant, in Paton, pp. 60-63, passim
See Lawrence A. Blum for a critique of this Kantian view, in Friendship, Altruism and 
Mora/iiy (London and Boston: Routledge, 1980), pp. 169-207
Blum aptly points out that, “concepts of egoism and altruism are misleading in the context 
of cooperative behaviour” such as friendship, p. 202 in Badhwar
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with Naomi out of a sense of duty to her mother-in-law but also from a clear sense of 
her own needs.
At the very start of the book (1:8) Ruth and Orpah are commended by Naomi 
for the kindness they have shown 'the living and the dead'. Later, in 2:11 she is 
praised by Boaz with reference to the past, and in 3:10 by Boaz concerning the 
present. The word used is hesed and it connotes a mutual kindness characteristic of 
the closest of human bonds - including friendship - which cannot be defined in temis 
of legal obligations*^. The important instances of hesed for this section is the first and 
second since the first is uttered by a person who has intimate Imowledge of another 
over a time span of ten years (Naomi and Ruth) and the second relies on the 
loiowledge of the first reference (Boaz and Ruth). An important nuance in the 
meaning of hesed is that it implies “goodness or kindness...beyond what is expected 
or deserved, based soley on ready magnanimity toward others”*^ . In this case, what is 
“expected” of Ruth, the daughter-in-law, is to act as Orpah has, in accordance with 
Naomi’s wishes. That she does not act as a daughter-in-law should is the cause of 
what commentators see as “excess” and subsequently attempt to justify, as they have 
(unsuccessfully), within the parameters of kinship obligations. It is only when seen 
within the parameters of friendship that Ruth’s action is not excessive for in ideal 
friendship the active expession of goodwill (and not only its feeling) is an essential 
component, for otherwise one would not help the other or go to any trouble for their 
sake*^. In this extreme case, Ruth’s action is an expression of her desire to remain 
with Naomi as much as it is an ‘obligation’ of friendship.
Zobel, p. 44-64 passim, in Theological Dictionary o f  the Old Testament, vol. V (Grand 
Rapids, Michigan; William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1986), (h.), David E Green. This concept is 
primarily secular but its extension and application to the religious sphere will be discussed in the 
conclusion.
Zobel is quoting Stoebe, in the Theological Dictionary o f  the Old Testament, p. 52 
Aristotle, p. 296
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Such a conflation between duty and desire is not only a component of ideal 
friendship, it is also a factor which becomes most evident in such moments of 
emotional crisis. Against the injunction to act on the basis of what is most rational, 
Ruth responds to what is most needed in this context and as such her action seems 
‘iiTationaf. This is another example of the inadequacy of the male model of ‘ideal’ 
friendship which restricts this relationship to those who have no need for it (!)* .^ Like 
Naomi, Ruth is acting for the sake of her friend but unlike her, for the sake of their 
friendship as well. Where Naomi reaches the conclusion that they must pait so that at 
least one benefits, Ruth, prioritises the relationship so that her decision will satisfy her 
own desires as well as Naomi’s. Thus, the falsity of acting from the assumption of 
autonomy is exposed for its limitations in dealing with such emotional crises (perhaps 
because it cannot accoimnodate such considerations)*^. In this way the violence of 
separation is avoided and the decision to remain together is not only the comect one 
but also the most rational (!), in that both Naomi’s and Ruth’s emotional needs are 
satisfied.
So it is in this crisis where what Ruth desires for herself coincides with what 
she must do for Naomi’s sake. What makes her ‘good’ is that she balances her care 
for Naomi with the care of herself i.e., her interest for Naomi’s welfare is not 
compomised by her choice to remain together. Equally, what is done for the sake of 
the relationship contributes to what is best for both. What emerges then is the 
primacy of inter-dependence in ideal friendship in the course of decision making 
which malces this relationship exceptional. Ruth reliance on such a notion leads her to 
act wisely and thus do justice to the ideal. The intricacies of this act and how they 
further support the characterisation of ideal friendship will now be the focus of the 
following section.
As Cicero insists, see chapter 1.
See Gilligaii, IDV, p. 172
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ii Naomi and Ruth
How can we discover then that both these women are good to each other? One crucial 
factor lies in that which each wishes and does for the other. For Aristotle it is not 
sufficient that each wishes well of each other - though this may later lead to 
friendship^**. It is important that one must wish his/her friend's good for his/her own 
sake and that this well-wishing is mutual and each is aware of the other's feelings^*. 
This is an important argument in determining in what way Naomi and Ruth's actions 
can be better understood as deriving from friendship rather than kinship.
At the beginning of tbe story we learn that Naomi had spent ten years in Maob 
- part, or all of these together with Ruth and her other daughter-in-law Orpah. So 
when the time comes for Naomi to return to the land of Judah it seems natural that her 
two daughters-in-law are loathe to part from her and their distress at hearing they must 
part (1: 9,14) indicates a harmonious co-habitation. For her part, Naomi stresses the 
practical benefits in their parting ways by repeating in tlnee different versions the 
importance that they find new husbands: (my emphasis)
The Lord grant that you find a home each of you in the house of your 
husband!...Turn back, my daughters, why will you go with me? Have I yet sons 
in my womb that they may become your husbands? Turn back my daughters go 
your way,..Even if  I should have a husband this night and should bear sons, 
would you therefore wait till they were grown? Would you refrain from 
marrying? (1:8-13)
Since the two young women are also widows like Naomi it seems rather 
superfluous to focus on this fact. Why then does she insist? If we take all these 
utterances at face value then Naomi appears to be interested in Ruth and Orpah’s 
welfare despite the fact that she herself is still suffering from the loss of her two sons 
and husband. There is nothing to make the reader suspect that all this is disguised 
self-interest^^, and that Naomi is lying out of concern for her own well being and
Aristotle, p. 261 
"  Ibid., p. 261
Fewell and Guim, JSOT, p. 181. This argument is supported with reference to five 
instances where Naomi remains silent in the text. But silence is not necessarily taken to mean 
repressed anger of fmstration. It could equally mean acquiescence or approval.
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cloaks this selfîslmess in an overflow of emotion. Furthemiore, if Naomi truly saw 
Ruth as a liability, her position as mother-in-law gives her the power and authority to 
insist on distancing herself from a foreign woman who is also a childless widow. On 
the contrary, Naomi would not openly request Ruth's company which would require 
her to 'sacrifice' her gods and her community because that is not something good 
friends do:
...unless he is exceptionally insensitive (a friend) cannot stand the thought of 
causing them (his friends) pain.
The best time to call friends to one’s aid is when they seem likely to do one a 
great service with little trouble to themselves. Conversely it is probably the 
proper course to visit friends in misfortrune readily, and without waiting to be 
invited.^^
Clearly, Naomi sees in this situation that for Ruth and Orpah to partake in her 
grief would result in too great an sacrifice in practical terms. This is not to say that 
Aristotle opposes the sharing of grief between friends, on the contrary, he 
acknowledges that grief is lightened when shared because of one's Imowledge of a 
friend's needs. But in these matters it is the duty of the other to approach the grieving 
friend, "without waiting to be invited, for it is the part of a friend to do kindness, 
particularly to those who are in need, and have not asked for it; because such a 
kindness is more creditable and more pleasurable to both parties" '^*. This is precisely 
how Ruth reacts. In her response she ignores Naomi's triple insistence on their lack of 
husbands and settles the issue of familiar gods and relatives by readily renouncing her 
own. The weight of her emotional reaction falls on the last few lines which are, in 
fact, an answer to the one question of Naomi's that becomes lost in the plethora of 
complaints: 'Why will you go with me?' (1:11). There are, however, more complicated 
issues at stake here than this and in order to elucidate them I must turn to Ruth’s react 
Ruth answers Naomi’s questions with an unequivocal pledge to stay with her 
no matter what difficulties arise: (1:16-17)
Aristotle, p. 309 and 310 
Ibid., p. 310
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Entreat me not to leave you or to return from following you; for where you go 
I will go, and where you lodge I will lodge; and your people shall be my 
people, and your God my God; where you die I will die, and there will I be 
buried. May the Lord do so to me and more also if even death parts me from 
you.
The last utterance is, in fact, another way of saying that life would be meaningless 
without Naomi, that without her she would die. Faced with such an extreme situation 
where Ruth must choose between returning to all that is familiar to her (the easier 
choice) yet losing Naomi as a consequence, or losing everything else but remaining 
with her friend, she makes the only decision she can live with. To decide on any 
other course of action would be to deny the anguish of separation which is what 
Naomi has done inadvertently. Ruth has held up a mirror to Naomi’s words and 
shown them to be a suppression of that which torments her most, and all of Naomi’s 
questions deflect attention from the one that she refuses to answer herself. Ruth’s last 
sentence then is a reminder of that which Naomi, in her attempt to be ‘conventionally’ 
good and overwhelmed by the weight of her pain has neglected by delivering a blow
that could do more harm than ‘good’. Naomi is, in short, acting in ‘bad faith’ by
denying her own needs, misleadingly believing this will benefit the common good - as 
if  their separation would benefit their relationship!
Their dilemma therefore is an existential one - one which Ruth resolves finally 
by acting in 'good faith'^^. It is an interesting irony that to act in a way that is integral 
to one’s being is also one that fulfils one’s duty to God. This is why Ruth reminds 
Naomi of her obligation for honest self-reflection by invoking God - in whose name it 
would be unacceptable to lie. But even if she had not she is still forcing Naomi to 
focus on the main issue at hand. So although it may seem very noble to think of Ruth
Rene Lafarge, Jean-Paul Sartre: His Philosophy (tr.) Marina Smyth-Kok (Dublin: Gill and 
Macmillan. 1970) p. 61 Lafarge points out that the “first act of bad faith is to flee what one cannot flee, 
to flee what one is. And it is this refusal (or our condition, of the freedom and the anguish which 
constitute us), which constantly imperils our relations with others.” Le Doeuff exposes the sexism of 
Sartre's argument by pointing out that in all the examples he sites "the revelation of the lie to oneself 
always comes about tluough a dramatization...which is far from neuhal and refers back to social 
relations of domination, hierarchy, or the great ascendancy of one character over another", p. 70-71.
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as 'sacrificing' her future for the salce of Naomi's needs she is actually satisfying a 
fundamental need of her own. From a point of view of traditional ideas of what is 
good Ruth appears dangerously selfish but as I have already discussed this label is 
biased in its assumptions of individuality and autonomy. This act secures the future 
good of both women since by staying together they are Mfilling another requirement 
of friendship which is that of living together.
According to Aristotle: "when at a distance from each other (people) are not 
acting as friends and this distance destroys not only the manifestation of friendship 
but ultimately the friendship itse lf This is especially true for an age which does 
not have the means of communication available today. So although Naomi, as we 
have mentioned, is adhering to one requirement of friendship at the same time she is 
denying the basic principles that sustain it and without which all other actions become 
meaningless. This omission on her part is justifiable not only in the light of all the 
losses she has suffered but also in human condition of denying that which pains us the 
most. Naomi herself admits the range and depth of her anguish by not wanting to 
impart any to her friend and by being torn at the same time by conflicting voices - in 
such circumstances it is easy to lose contact with the voice that matters the m ost.
They are both then stating to each other the absolute need to remain together 
and such a choice made - in ‘good faith’ - is later shown to produce positive 
repercussions in every area of life as they are rewarded not only by the community but 
also by God. Furthermore, it would be misleading to assume that Ruth had already 
renounced her old identity or future possibility of marriage and children^^ because 
there was no need to make such a choice before this moment in time. When faced
Here I am using F. H. Peters’s translation of The Nicomachean Ethics o f  Aristotle (London: 
Kegan Paul, 1893), p. 261 because the language in Thomson’s is less sti'iking, Cf.: ’’...because distance 
does not break off a friendship absolutely but only in its active realisation. However, if  the absence 
lasts for a long time it does seem to cause forgetfullness even of the friendship”, p. 266. Cf. Greek: “oi
'  » 9  r .  t  . .  '  '  '  '  )  )  '  \  C »  Iyap TOTcoi ou o iax u o u a i rpv^cpiAiav aiiAms, aX ka  Tpv svspyeiav. sav  5e xpovios r\ a n o u a ia  
yivriTai, icai Tps (|)Aiocs b o ic e i A .ti0 t|v  t to ib iv ."
Ilona Rashkaw, 'Ruth: The discourse of power and the power of discourse', pp. 26-41, in 
Brenner, p. 31-2
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with the possibility of a life without the Naomi she readily decides to relegate those 
factors which are ultimately replaceable to a secondary position.
So it is Ruth and not (only) Naomi who 'has no choice'^^ in deciding to remain 
together and this is because of the nature of 'freedom' that she exercises. It is not the 
male defined freedom of the 'lonely will'^^ (based on a ‘dispassionate’reason 
dissociated from concrete reality) which motivates Ruth but a freedom exercised 
within the context of the reality she perceives^** i.e. the extreme need Naomi 
experiences. In the first chapter's 'no-man's land' where the women are not subject to 
patriarchal rules, they are 'free' to act as they will. Were they to act out of duty to 
their respective husbands how is it that both Orpah and Ruth act properly by talcing 
opposite decisions? Again they are acting/reacting not only to the circumstances that 
befall them but also with regard to the relationships that these decisions will affect. 
As Murdoch says: "We act rightly 'when the time comes'...out of the quality of our 
usual attachments and with the kind of energy and discernment which we have 
available"^*. This is especially true in ideal friendship where time has cemented the 
ties so that “in crucial moments of choice most of the business of choosing is already 
over”^^ . In this respect, choosing freely coincides with choosing out of necessity^^
Many commentators assume this is the case, see for example, Jack M. Sasson, ‘Ruth’, pp. 
320-327, in (eds.), Robet Alter and Franlc Kermode, The Literary Guide to the Bible (London: Collins, 
1987), p. 323
Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty o f  Good (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 36 
Murdoch criticises this existentialist idea as well as the concept of 'total determinism'.
Ibid., p. 38. Murdoch stressed that this kind of freedom is a moral concept. Thus, this adds 
another element to the virtue of the protagonists,
Murdoch adds: "The moral life is something tliat goes on continually not something that is 
switched off in between the occurrence of explicit moral choices”. Ruth then is acting consistently 
with her moral goodness and with the nature of her closer - compared to Oipah - relationship to Naomi, 
p. 92.
Ibid., p. 37
”  Ibid., p. 39, for Murdoch this is the ideal situation. She goes on to say that this is "a notion 
of the will as obedience to reality, an obedience which ideally reaches a position where there is no 
choice", p. 41. I would like to add that this is more pointed in extieme situations and more frequent 
with respect to more intimate relations.
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and once again the opposition between duty and desire collapses. What Ruth decides 
to do out o f friendship is also the only thing she can do. Again here we have Naomi 
and Ruth's relationship shown as compatible with the demands of friendship but at the 
same time the constituent parts of tliis friendship are re-defined from a women's 
perspective which posits inter-dependency and response to emotional need as the 
determining factors when taking action. Thus it is their friendship which fulfills the 
ideal because of the moral excellence expressed by both in the deep and genuine 
regard each shows for the other’s good '^*.
But there is another point to stress in establishing Naomi's virtue. For 
Aristotle the friendship in which each loves one another for himself/herself is only 
possible between good people^^. In other words Ruth - who is universally accepted as 
'good' by traditional interpreters but also as I have shown from a feminist perspective - 
could not possibly incur losing eveiything she has laiown or hopes to have for 
someone who is not as equally virtuous as herself. Her previous co-existence with 
Naomi has provided her with enough evidence to base such a recognition on.
I am not asserting that her maiiying again is not a concern but only that these 
issues are not of immediate concern to her. Again, to applaud such an attitude and to 
say as one commentator does, that in this decision and all further decisions, "Ruth, 
even in the sphere of her most private desires has subordinated everything to her 
husband's f a m i l y " i s  to be presumptuous. Even supposing we knew what Ruth's 
most private desires were her words at the beginning of the narrative focus only on her 
desire to remain with Naomi. This is where I locate Ruth's uniqueness - in her clarity 
of purpose and the potency of her desire.
Blum goes on to say that “...the deeper and stronger the concern for the friend - the stronger 
the desire and willingness to act on behalf o f the friend’s good - the greater the degree of moral worth”, 
in Badhwar, p. 192
Aristotle, p. 263 and 267
McKane, p. 22
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Where modem views reject such a positive interpretation it is because they 
place the emphasis again on the mother-in-law to daughter-in-law relationship as one 
on whose success the man's household depends^^. In fact David Jobling considers the 
message of Ruth to be just that^^. The assumption here is that the two women's 
actions are only adhering to laws that benefit the perpetuation of patriarchal order 
without allowing the possibility of a woman's voice. But Naomi is not obliged to take 
Ruth with her. Her age and status supply her with the power to enforce her will if 
only on another woman. If on the other hand Naomi is responding to a friend (as I 
will further discuss in the next chapter) then her age and status are not factors that 
contribute to inequality. In other words, Naomi's decision signifies a respect for Ruth 
that transcends the differences in these two respects.
iii Equality
This brings us to another cmcial factor in establishing Naomi and Ruth's relationship 
as an ideal friendship and that is the issue of'equality in giving' because this is another 
factor Aiistotle stresses as a necessary condition of friendship^**. In this case also, I 
will show that the equality and reciprocity that characterises their relationship is one 
qualitatively different to the one Aristotle refers to. On the surface, there are two 
obstacles against Ruth (I will consider her foreignness as a factor in the next chapter): 
she is younger, and childless. Of the two, only the first seems to be a real obstacle in 
that it is a factor that cannot be altered. Though she is a daughter-in-law, she is still 
not a daughter (that Naomi addresses her as such I will suggest in the next chapter is 
a tenn of endeannent) which in Aristotle's terms would require a whole different set 
of obligations. He states that what each gives to the other cannot he the same and
David Jobling, 'Ruth finds a Home: Canon, Politics, Method', pp. 125-139 in Brenner, p.
133
Ibid., p. 134 "The virilocal system, summarised in the triangle of the head of household, his 
wife and his surviving mother, is more important than mere fertility, which any system achieves".
Aristotle, pp. 269-70. Cicero does not agree on this point because he supports a more 
generous expression of beneficience between friends, p. 55
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should not be because parents have given their children the gift of life'***. 
Nevertheless, there is a possibility for a lasting friendship as long as the child/younger 
person returns the love received. In this case, as I mentioned in the begimiing, 
Naomi's gift to Ruth - even though she has not given birth to her - is nevertheless the 
gift of life, a child, and a gift which Ruth must repay if equality (of giving) is to be re­
established. But Aristotle is quick to point out that the love returned in relationships 
based on inequality should be proportional in terms of 'quantity' i.e. the more needy 
one should give more than he/she has received'**. This means that Ruth would have to 
give even more than what she had received which, in this case, is impossible. Wliat is 
possible however, is a re-defining of 'equality' so that the realisation of reciprocity is 
possible.
In this scheme, Naomi seems to be the superior one to whom Ruth must 
perpetually 'give'. As their action in deciding to remain together shows, this is not the 
case, nor is it in the rest of the stoiy. Ruth's generosity as we have seen is linked to 
caring for Naomi in her state of mourning, which, once over, results in Naomi's re­
appearance in public space. But it is also linlced with the need to equally show the 
kindness that Naomi - despite her distraught state - has shown to Ruth. This would 
also explain the constant emphasis on Ruth's generosity towards Naomi (2:18, 3:17 - 
both examples of nourisliment, not only for the body but also for the mind!) she is 
eager to bridge the gap created at the beginning of the book. If Naomi were actually 
the superior one in the relationship this could never be accomplished. Interestingly 
enough Aristotle singles out parents and the gods as instances where one can never 
repay all that is due and so should only strive for what “lies in his power”'*^ . In Ruth's
Ibid., p. 270 
"  Ibid., p. 272 
Ibid., p. 28842
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case what transpires is the possibility of finally 'repaying' her debt in full because of 
her ambiguous (official) position as daughter-in-law.
Her first step in this direction is when she decides to go and glean in Boaz's 
field and asks Naomi: "Let me go to the field and glean among the ears o f grain after 
him in whose sight I shall find favour" (2:2). She returns to Naomi with the gift of 
food and news of what transpired. To belittle the practical nature of their exchanges 
until the final success of their plan is to underestimate not only the difficulty in 
carrying out such a plot but also the intelligence of the women who devised it. The 
scene where Ruth approaches Boaz on the threshing floor could have easily gone 
wrong if  it were not for Naomi's Imowledge of decorum and Ruth's ability to carry out 
directions. So whereas Naomi supplies the necessary knowledge Ruth exhibits 
resourcefullness in canying out directions so that the wisdom of both women is 
pooled to the best effect. That they are not part of the dominant male order is a reality 
they Imow all too well. If they were not subordinate there would be no need to go 
about manoeuvring in the dark in order to secure their place in its hierarchy'*^. The 
significance of their combined effort at the theoretical and practical level is that is 
“goes beyond the eudeumonia of a single, isolated, individual”'*'*. In this way, Naomi 
and Ruth’s actions express the supreme commitment of ideal friendship which at the 
same time stresses the importance of inter-dependence that makes its realisation 
possible.
Friends are considered to be of one mind where practical matters are involved, 
meaning that solutions are not only “made in agreement but are produced under the 
same conditions” and as Aristotle concludes “friends wish what is just and for the 
common interest, and make united efforts to obtain it”'*^ . What they both want in this
Maria Varsamopoulou, 'Women in the Old Testament and the Language of Subordination' 
unpublished essay, University of Lancaster, 1991
Sherman, in Badhwar, p. 99
Aristotle, p. 298
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case is a secure, shared future which can only be accomplished if Boaz agrees to 
marry Ruth and this cannot be accomplished by Ruth alone. Whether or not the 
custom of levirate marriage was linlced with redemption'*^ and this was the motive 
behind the actions of either one would mean that the friendship was based on profit 
and would end as soon as one ceased to be useful for the other'* .^
As for Ruth’s offering of food to Naomi, it has nothing to do with Boaz being 
a suitable redeemer'*^ because her main priority is to remain with Naomi - everything 
else - husband, children or land is important but secondary, and only a means to an 
end. Wlien Ruth reports to Naomi the night after her ‘encounter’ with Boaz and 
states: “These six measures of barley he gave to me, for he said, ‘You should not go 
back empty-handed to your mother-in-law’”(3:17), she is mainly interested in caring 
for Naomi’s needs. Whether Boaz himself actually meant this'*** or Ruth made it up, it 
still remains an indication that their common welfare is at the uppemiost of her 
mind^ **. Naomi’s priority also is to remain for if  she did not want this ‘attaclmient’ to 
Ruth, she need not have sent her to a kinsman of her own. Where Naomi facilitates 
Ruth’s acquiring a husband then, Ruth delivers Naomi her lost property - an equal 
exchange is accomplished.
Commentators are in disagreement over this. For example, McKane sees this issue as a 
“centi'al one”. See also Mieke Bal in ‘Heroism and Proper Names, or the Fruits o f Analogy’ p. 42-69 
in Brenner, p. 59: “The tension between the two laws is inlierent in the two domains they cover, which 
are not unrelated : the law of the possession of land; levirate law concerns posterity. These two aspects 
constitute history. That they do is exactly one of the messages that the Book of Ruth, where they are 
constantly mixed, delivers”.
Aristotle, p. 262. He calls these friendships ‘accidental’.
Sasson, ‘Ruth’, in (eds.), Robert Alter and Frank Kermode, The Literaiy Guide to the Bible 
(London: Collins, 1987) p. 326. Sasson seems to think she does.
Ibid., p. 326
Cf. Esther Fuchs in ‘Who is Hiding the Truth? Deceptive Women and Biblical 
Androcentiism’, ppl 137-144, in Collins, who argues that “...women in the Old Testament are not 
punished for their deceptive acts as long as they are shown to enhance male power”, pp. 141-2. This 
assumes however that Ruth’s motivation is to remain faithful to Naomi - the representative of her late 
husband rather than Naomi the woman/friend, herself.
85
To say that these changes of initiative and role are not adequately grounded in 
the narrative^* relies again on the assumption that their relationship is primarily a 
familial one. It does not matter that Naomi “never praises her”^^  because this is not of 
much consequence. What matters - and is of consequence - is that one helps another 
for the other’s sake^^. Nor is it problematic for Naomi herself that Ruth is a 
Maobitess - she is merely aware that it could be a hindrance if they settled in Judah. It 
is the other characters in the story and the commentators of today that project this 
complication unto the two women’s relationship^'*. Nowhere in Bethlehem does 
Naomi herself refer to Ruth’s foreigness and it is mostly within theological 
intei-pretations that this concern surfaces as one which has to be explained^^. As I will 
discuss in the next chapter, Ruth’s identity is to be considered within her relationship 
to Naomi.
As the narrative moves towards resolution we see that Ruth is universally 
accepted as a virtuous woman and worthy of becoming ‘officially’ part of the 
community. Wlien she produces a son the last act in her efforts to remain with Naomi 
is complete. She has returned a ‘life’ (her own) for a ‘life’ (a child) in this final gift 
and has refunded in full her ‘debt’ to Naomi thus re-establishing equality in the 
relationship. The equality established is on two levels: first, the rebalancing of the 
inequality at the beginning of the narrative - but not the begimiing of their 
relationship. Second, it is also the equality established in the public sphere since Ruth 
is also now a mother. In this aspect the narrative is linear: a resolution is achieved
Atlialya Brenner ‘solves’ this ‘problem’ by supporting a folklorist theory which brings 
together two different women’s stories into one, in ‘Naomi and Ruth’, pp. 70-84, in Brenner, p. 74
Zefira Gitay, in ‘Naomi and Ruth’, p. 178-190, in Bremier. Gitay sees Ruth as trying to win 
the favour of Naomi and thus the title o f the book reflects a criticism of her inflexibility, p. 186
Aristotle, p. 293
Gitay, p. 180
Campbell, p. 82: “What makes Ruth a true Israelite is that she, like others in the story who 
are generically Israelites behaves like one (emphasis mine). Is this comment an attempt to ‘apologise’ 
for difference, or is loyalty, love and friendship a prerogative of certain races only?
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which changes both women’s status - both ‘become’ mothers - and security replaces 
insecurity, happiness replaces despair. At the same time, as Phyllis Trible has pointed 
out^^, the narrative is circular: these actions lead us to the beginning of the story, 
where Naomi and Ruth shared a household. According to Aristotle, this is another 
characteristic of friendship: “There is nothing more desirable than (friends) spending 
their lives together” *^*.
The fact that the child is given over to Naomi and proclaimed as hers has been 
seen by many as problematic. Athalya Brenner asks the appropriate question: In what 
way do these women belong together, so much that one is nothing without the other? 
She answers it by applying Propp’s categories of frinctions in folklorist stories and 
thus concludes that Naomi and Ruth are two aspects of one person: The younger 
fertile woman and her aged, baiTen, comiterpart^^ However, in perfect friendship this 
degree of identification is not considered implausible but necessary: “The good 
man...extends to his friend the same relation that he has towards himself (for a friend 
is another self)” *^*. If what Naomi and Ruth desire most is a common life then it is 
hardly a point of contention whether the son belongs to the foimer or the latter, 
because in fact, it belongs to both; it is sui'ely an important issue for patrilineage^** but 
this is outside Naomi’s and Ruth’s immediate concerns.
For Trible this circular design “bespeaks a feminist content”, p. 180
Aristotle, p.310
Brenner, p. 73 In this exegesis Brenner is try mg to “smooth out the inconsistencies in the 
narrative”. Although I do not see such ‘hindrances’ even if they existed I do not agree with this effort 
to homogenise the narrative. She sees as chief difficulties in the joining process: (see p. 81) a) the 
exchange of roles and dominant positions, b) a tension underlying the motherhood of either of both, c) 
the redemption problem - who is being redeemed? I am not convinced by any of these since they are 
easily resolved by placing the emphasis on friendship.
Aristotle, p. 294
For example, Andre LaCocque in The Feminine Unconventional: Four Subversive Figures 
in Israel's Traditon, (Minneapolis; Fortress Press, 1990), on p. 85 he states that “Boaz's admiration for 
Ruth is based on her unselfish efforts to perpetuate the Israelite name even though she is a Moabitess”. 
How this is supposed to make Ruth a subversive figure is sadly unconvincing.
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Conclusion
That Naomi and Ruth are inter-dependent is evident where winning over Boaz 
is concerned. Without Ruth, Naomi could not put the plan into action and without 
Naomi there would be no kinsman to appeal to. It would be erroneous to see Naomi 
as putting Ruth at risk by sending her to the fields without warning because of a 
supposed personal prejudice towards foreigners or a hidden guilt at her sons marrying 
outside their culture^’. As a good woman and a good friend, Naomi would not 
consciously desire to harm Ruth. When Ruth arrives at the field Boaz is told how 
generously she has behaved towards her mother-in-law (2:11). Wlio could be the 
original source of such praise but Naomi herself? As Aiistotle points out: “...it is only 
the friendship of the good that is proof against slander”**^. Would Ruth venture into 
foreign territory if she suspected her actions to be undermined by Naomi? If so, this 
would be equating Ruth’s goodness with an equal lack of intelligence** .^ And even if 
Naomi were mostly concerned with ‘keeping up’ appearances why would she then 
fuilher support a plan that would ultimately and permanently bring their lives together 
once again in a common household? These questions can only be satisfactorily and 
consistently answered if Naomi and Ruth are motivated by their friendship.
As I have shown, this is a women's model of friendship which questions and 
re-defmes the qualities of rational action by autonomous beings which an androcentric 
perspective advocates by asssuming, instead, connection and inter-dependence and 
proposing the inclusion of emotional need when decision making is called for. Wliat 
is left is to discuss what this entails at the level of identity and how Naomi and Ruth’s 
friendship redefines Aristotle’s notion of the friend as ‘another self.
Fewell and Gimn, pp. 103-4 passim 
Aristotle, p. 265
63 D.F. Rauber, ‘Literary Values in the Bible: The Book of Ruth’, pp. 27-37 in Journal o f  
Biblical Literature, vol. LXXXIX, 1970. Rauber seems to believe this: “Ruth, in her enormous and 
touching innocence has understood very little”, p. 32
Chapter 4
The friend as 'another self 
(aXXos  aoTos)
I would like to discuss in this chapter Aristotle's notion of the friend as 'another se lf . 
As I have already suggested the concept o f'se lf is one that differs not only in relation 
to present definitions but especially in relation to women's experiencek When I use 
the words 'self and 'identity' I am not thinldng of an essential, rational, or universal 
(male-neutral) concept but a non-essential, emotional as well as rational, constructed 
entity which in the context of friendship finds its fullest expression, I am going to 
begin by foregrounding the line of reasoning behind Aristotle's phrase with particular 
emphasis on its implications for women's identity within relationships. The question 
of what is 'like' among friends and keeps them together is linlced to what is 'different' 
and therefore allows for two people to remain in a close friendship without losing 
their own uniqueness. This is particularly important for accusations concerning 
Ruth's renouncing her ‘identity’ for her mother-in-law's sake.^ I will argue that since 
Ruth's relationship to Naomi is an integral part of her 'self i.e. her life, she would be 
giving up more were she to sever this tie. Furthennore, I will be referring to Carol 
Gilligan's work on moral development to illustrate that friendship - one that 
encompasses equality, mutuality, and a common life - is the ideal topos for these 
characteristics to find full fmition. Finally, I will develop a link between 'ideal 
friendship' and the 'relational self which provide a model for a non-violent, non-
* Bacon uses the same pluase, p. 144; Montaigne re-phiases: “The unique, highest friendship 
loosens all other bonds...he is me”, p. 215
T o r a clear summary and feminist critique of tlie history of the 'male, autonomous, modernist’ 
subject, see Susan J. Heclcman, Moral Voices Moral Selves, Carol Gilligan and Feminist Moral Theoiy 
(Polity Press: Cambridge, 1995), pp. 71-112
^Esther Fuchs accuses Ruth of sacrificing “her own freedom and identity in order to 
peipetuate the identity of her late husband and father-in-law”, p. 118, footnote 4, in ‘The Literary 
Characterization of Mothers and Sexual Politics m the Hebrew Bible,’ pp. 117-136 in Collins. I have 
already discussed why Ruth is acting on her own free will, I will also argue against the claim that she is 
giving up her identity.
89
biased conuminity where responsibility and care for others is not obstructed by 
individual differences.
?i p \Aristotle's 'aA.À,os auxos' is first mentioned in Book Nine of the Nichomachean 
Ethics when he compares a man's relation to his friend with his relation to himself:
...(for it is the mark of a good man to direct his energies to what is 
good) and he does so for his own sake (for he does it on account of the 
intellectual part of him, which is held to be the self of the individual).
Also he desires his own life and safety, especially that o f his rational 
part;...And it would seem that the thinking part is or most nearly is, the 
individual self...Thus it is because the good man has these several 
feelings towards himself, and extends to his friend the same relation 
that he has towards himslf (for a friend is another self/saxi yap o 
(})iA,os aA.A.os aoxos), that friendship is regarded as one of the said 
feelings, and friends as those to whom these feelings apply.^
This summary encompasses two considerations: the theoretical and the 
practical. On the one hand, Aristotle sees the “essential human self as noetic”'^ and to 
be fully oneself human beings must fulfil their rational capabilities, i.e. they are to 
identify with their nous\ It is in recognising another person as equally fully rational 
that two friends are alike. Failure in this area means that one cannot be loved in 
himself. We have already seen why this is problematic for women k Since Aiistotle 
considers the rational/ thinking faculty as the ‘essential part’ of oneself, i.e. the part
''Aristotle p. 293-4
^Cicero disagrees with this pronouncement because he explains that Üiere are times when one 
does not treat himself well but is capable of treating his friend rationally, p. 55. Nevertheless, he 
agrees with Aristotle that “...a true friend...is...another self’, p. 65
"Gillet, p. 35
’ibid., p. 41
®It is not enough to say as Nancy Chodorow does, that “because the self is constructed in a 
relational matrix and mcludes aspects o f the other, it can better recognise the other as a self, and, 
ultimately attain the inter-subjectivity that creates society”. It is necessary to delineate under what 
conditions this is promoted and what 'self it is to be recognised. See ‘Toward a Relational 
Individualism’ p. 204 in (eds.) Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna and David E. Wellbery, 
Reconstructing Individualism, Autonomy, Individuality and the S elf in Western Thought (Stanford, Ca.: 
Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 197-207
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one identifies with, then women - defined by emotion, and their friendships fall short 
of this requirement. Also, if Aristotle employs the teim 'another self in order to 
further support his belief in self-sufficiency, i.e. if  by “internalising what appears to be 
the in educible alterity of the friend” he buttresses the idea of the virtuous person's lack 
of dependence on external factors^ then this plirase camiot represent friendship as a 
relationship in which two separate but different 'selves' come together. If love and 
Imowledge are bound together in friendship then “to overlook differences is ultimately 
to obscure an awareness of self"" as well as the other. If  the defining characteristic of 
identity ceases to be limited to reason alone then actions deriving from friendship can 
be revalued from a more holistic perspective where differences of opinion on 
intellectual matters do not necessarily warrant a dissolution of the relationship.
Furthermore, the idea of the 'other' as a mirror to one's own virtue implies, as 
Carol Gilligan writes, “a self defined in terms of separation although it is placed in a 
context of relationships”". This formulation of a 'separate self is, according to 
Gilligan, not only foreign to most women's concept of relationships, it is also, in my 
opinion, in contrast to the demands of a feminist conceptualisation of ideal friendship 
in which inclusion of difference is paramount. As Gilligan points out, the central 
framework within which identity is foimed is dialogue rather than minroring: “the self 
is defined by gaining perspective, and known by experiencing engangement with 
others” '’. Thus the configuration of identity, relationship and moral action brings us to 
the second of Aiistotle's claims in relation to his 'friend as another self.
With regard to practical matters, Aiistotle states;
’Gillet, p. 15
10>Nancy Sherman, ‘Aristotle on 'The Shared Life” , in Badhwar, p. 107. The idea that 'love is 
Imowledge of the individual' is Iris Murdoch's, see The Sovereignty o f  Good (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul,1970), p. 28. Murdoch does not talk about friendship but her example is of the 
relationship between a mother-in-law to her daughter-in-law (!).
"Gilligan, p. 240, 'RMD'
'’Ibid., p. 250
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Thus concord is concerned with practical ends, and among these only 
with such as are important, and can be achieved by both parties, or by 
the whole body of citizens....For the fact tliat they have the same 
thought does not mean that tlie two parties are in concord no matter 
what it is; the thought must be in relation to the same object...
This sort of concord is found among good men, because they are in 
accord both with themselves and with one another, having (broadly 
speaking) the same outlook...and they wish for what is just and 
advantageous, and also pursue these objects in common.'’
This second condition has important consequences for moral action. The choice of a 
friend - not only at first instance but as an ongoing choice - is primarily moral in its 
formation and then in its cultivation'\ So then friendship is a relationship which two 
people jointly 'become each other's self by each other's example and practice of doing 
good - not only for each other but to all. That is, the recognition - on an emotional 
level and not merely rational - that another person is also involved in friendships 
entails deferential treatment towards everyone - whether friends or not. And this is a 
process accomplished by example. If the emphasis is on practice, and apprehension 
of the other's particular virtue is seen to include emotion as well as reason only then 
can it be said that ideal friendship meets the conditions of intimacy, mutuality and 
equality of virtue like no other human bond. It also means that ideal friendship is the 
privileged topos for treating the other always as an end and never only as a means 
Furthermore, it is not only on the basis of reason that this is enacted, on the contrary, 
Imowledge of the potential emotional hami one can cause - and its widespread 
consequences - is equally important 'data' to consider'\
There is a responsibility here for one to respond to another's need that attends 
to the other's particularity in a way that Aristotle’s identifying the self solely with the
' ’Aristotle p. 297 and 298
'‘'Gillet, p. 57. Giliet sees this as a “signal of concordance between reason, passion and 
desire”. I can agree with the first and third but camiot see how equal importance is given to passion in 
Aristotle's view of friendship.
'^Immanuel Kant, The Moral Law (h.) H.J. Paton, (London: Routledge, 1948), p. 91
'^Lawrence Blum eonsiders the “level o f caring itself which primarily determines the level of 
moral value in the friendship,” p. 199, “Friendship as a Moral Phenomenon” pp. 192-210 in Badhwar.
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rational renders inadequate'\ One loves one's friend because one laiows hiin/her in a 
way strangers or lesser friends do not and this enables him/her to respond more 
effectively in different situations. Wlien this kind of care is mutual then “the process 
of coming to know others...imp lies the possibility of generating new knowledge and 
transforming the self in the experience of relationship”'®. Needless to say, the sole 
identification with another’s ‘rational’ self is inadequate for such a process''’. 
Comiection on an emotional level is equally important if positive identification is to 
take place. The point of reference for judging and acting then becomes the 
relationship between the two friends. It is within this context of mutual development 
that I would like to look at the relationship between Naomi and Rutfr°.
ii
What needs to be established then is the grounds on which Naomi and Ruth are each 
other’s ‘self without however, subjecting them exlusively to Aristotle’s sole criterion 
of rationality. In teims of practical matters I have already shown how Naomi and 
Ruth prove that they are capable of acting both rationally and in response to their own 
as well as each other’s emotional needs. To carefully plan and execute a course of 
action which would end their poverty and secure them with a place in society is not a 
simple matter considering the precautions needed to ensure that they do not appear to 
be acting 'out of bounds'. In this respect alone, Naomi and Ruth provide an example 
of rational behaviour which would easily ‘pass’ the test of its practical applicability.
'^He is not alone in doing so. In terms of friendship, Kant also agreed that: “the most 
fundamental, and the most precious element in friendship - the very core of friendship - is the free 
intercourse of mind with mind.” This does not however imply the inclusion of emotional matters. See 
H.J. Paton, ‘Kant on Friendship’, p. 133-149 in Badhwar, p. 142
'"Gilligan, ‘RMD’ p. 240
'"For a critique of the notion of reason which is opposed to “desire, affectivity and need” as 
well as its consequences for the notion of alterity see Young, pp. 60-63
’"it appears here that I am privileging the practical application of reason - albeit in a revised 
form - to the first, more contemplative definition. As it is beyond the scope of my thesis to elaborate 
on the nuances of Aristotle’s thought in this area, see Jonathan Barnes’s discussion in his Introduction 
to Aristotle’s NE, pp. 9-43, esp. pp. 38-39
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Wliat remains to be seen is whether the maxim ‘the friend is another self can 
be applied to Naomi and Ruth despite their differences in age, etlmicity and religion. 
My aim is to show that it is possible for a friend to be ‘another self without this ‘self 
being limited to the ‘like’ heings Aristotle supports. I will also show that the 
concepts of ‘similarities’ and ‘differences’ must also be reconsidered so that they are 
not limited to disembodied intellectual exchanges. What Naomi and Ruth share, 
beyond a combined, rational/practical effort to achieve what they desire, is also an 
awareness of the similar societal/patriarchal forces that have acted upon them and 
have contributed to their identification at an emotional level. They share a 
commitment to a weh of relationships - including their own, special friendship - 
which they prioritise and refuse to compromise. Finally, the differences they bring to 
their relationship and to the society they find themselves in, are utilised for the
common good, as a source of strength rather than division.
If friends are brought together by similarity of virtue and interests then what 
can be said of Naomi and Ruth’s ‘differences’ seem to outweigh the similarities they 
share? At the same time, one of the most important similarities of ideal friendship - 
moral virtue - has been shown to be a common trait but can this be enough to claim
that one is ‘another se lf to the other? I will first claim that not only are these
differences not marked in the text but neither would be they be in a contemporary 
context” . Second, I will show that even greater similarities lie in an area usually 
overlooked - that of gender. What binds them at the level of gender I will show is 
more significant than any ‘differences’ they may have. Yet, as I will suggest, even the 
differences themselves are part of an ongoing dialogue characterised by equality, 
equity and care.
” l am saying that it is again necessary to refrain from imposing our contemporary 
assumptions on the text since in the case of women’s past lives the data are incomplete. See Carol 
Meyers, ‘Everyday life; Women in the Period of the Hebrew Bible,’ pp. 244-251 in The Women's 
Bible Commentary.
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First, the difference in age between Naomi and Ruth is not shown to hinder the 
women in any way - in fact it is a complementary factoF’ both at a practical level and 
an emotional one. Since Naomi is not only older but also in mourning, Ruth takes 
upon herself the initiative of offering to work in the fields; “Let me go to the field, 
and glean among the ears of grain”(2: 2). Thus, Naomi is left in the security of their 
home while Ruth ventures into the outside world of strangers, without, nevertheless 
being told to do so by Naomi but out of concern for the older woman’s well-being. In 
this case it is quite possible that the age difference is not more than fifteen years and 
the domestic skills required of both are more similar than different” . Yet what could 
have become a serious ‘difference’ and a source of conflict in the division of labour is 
used positively so that their friendship profits rather than suffers from it. In the text 
itself, there is no mention of Ruth’s ignorance of working in the fields, in fact, in 2:17, 
she seems to know exactly what is involved: “So she gleaned in the fields until 
evening; then she beat out what she had gleaned, and it was ah out an ephah of barley”. 
She is able thus to help Naomi with the harder, outdoor work while the domestic 
duties are earned out by the older woman.
The status factor - that Naomi has been a mother - which accompanies the 
difference in age, is equally less a hindrance and more an aid” as Naomi better 
understands the codes of behaviour particular to that society. Because of Naomi’s 
greater wisdom and Imowledge of her society, she is able to function as a valuable 
advisor to Ruth’s youth and ignorance of that particular community. In particular, as
’’Campbell estimates between 10 to 15 years difference, p. 67
’’Historically, because of the age limit o f marriage the differences in terms of domestic duties 
in the wider area of Palestine are minimal. See Meyers, m The Women's Bible Commentary, pp. 244- 
251. She adds that “many more female tasks involved skill, experience and plamiing” p. 248. In any 
case these factors are extrinsic to the text. On the issue of women’s history, see Jo Aim Hackett, Tn 
the Days of Jael: Reclaiming the History of Women in Ancient Israel’, pp. 17-22 in Clarissa W. 
Atkinson, Constance H. Buchanan and Margaret R. Miles, (eds.), Immaculate and Powerful: The 
Female in Sacred Image and Social Reality (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985)
’‘'This stands as an exception to the paradox Cheryl Exum points out for women who play 
crucial roles in the Bible but are rarely major characters in ‘Mother in Israel: A Familiar Figure 
Reconsidered’ pp. 73-85, in Russell, p. 85
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a woman of greater experience, she is in a position to advise Ruth on how to prepare 
for her visit at the threshing floor: (3:3-4)
Wash...anoint yourself, and put on your best clothes and go down to 
the tlneshing floor; but do not make yourself known to the man until he 
has finished eating and drinldng. But when he lies down, observe the 
place where he lies; then, go and uncover his feet and he down;
It is advice Ruth readily accepts and by understanding the necessity of such 
tactics she is not only aclaiowledging Naomi’s greater wisdom but also their common 
subordinate position within patriarchal society. For if they were not clearly 
subordinate as women, they would have no need of conducting their affairs 
suiTeptitiously. As Dale Spender explains, women are required to Imow the reality of 
the dominant group and how to operate within it since “in patriarchal order male 
reality has usually been posited as the only reality”” . In this way, Naomi and Ruth 
not only use their rational faculties to improve their situation, they use reason to 
undermine the rules they did not set but are obliged to follow in order to manipulate 
reality to their own advantage. Where age and status then might be seen as too great a 
difference in the Aristotelian model, here, in the example of Naomi and Ruth, it is an 
asset which contributes to the common good.
This brings me to a consideration of the women's common 'outsider' status and 
on the possibility of their sharing a common 'truth' as C. S. Lewis defines it” . Lewis 
plu’ases the question of "Do you see the same truth" or "Do you care about the same 
truth?" as an important one to consider in the case of similarities in ideal friendship. 
What I would like to propose is that Naomi and Ruth share a condition which, 
although related to gender, is defined by their common status as foreigners. Ruth is 
not alone in being the only foreigner in Judah - Naomi herself has become an outsider 
and this is partly signalled by the reactions of others and partly by her own actions.
” Dale Spender, Man-Made Language (London: Pandora, 1990, first published by Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, London, 1980), p. 90
” Lewis, p. 82
96
Wlien the women of Judah first see her and ask "Is this Naomi?" (1:19) the reasons 
are not made explicit though I would suggest that the lack of recognition on their part 
is partly motivated by Naomi's state of mourning but also partly because of her 
acquired ‘foreigness’. Equally, Naomi's retreat into the private sphere - only to 
emerge again for the important occasion of Ruth's giving birth to a child - has to do 
with her mourning and her alienation from a society she has not been a part of for at 
least ten years. Her ten year residence in Moab has placed her in the unique position 
of comprehending Ruth's status in a way no one else can.
Notwithstanding the fact that not all women can be said to have their connnon 
gender as a source of identification and resistance there remains the possibility of 
individual instances where this is made explicit since gender is also a construction 
whose common denominator is patriarchal oppression. In the 'no-man’s' land of the 
scene of departure Naomi and Ruth's decision to rely on each other for a source of 
strength and nurturance is an instance of female bonding unparalleled in the Hebrew 
Bible. Just as Naomi has lived as a foreigner in Moah, so will Ruth now become a 
foreigner in Judah. The answer to the question "do we share the same truth" is yes - to 
the primacy of their friendship above all other relationships. This mutual voluntary 
positioning on the periphery of society gives the two women a common point of 
reference which only they fully apprehend” . Again, Ruth’s foreigness is not an 
obstacle in her friendship with Naomi, it is only constituted as such by contemporaiy 
interpreters’® as well as the other characters in the text who are the real ‘outsiders’ - to 
the women’s friendship.
To illustrate this point textually I will need to point out the juxtaposition 
between Naomi and Ruth's behaviour in the public and private sphere. In both public
’’According to Paula S. Hiebert, the Hebrew widow, ‘almana,’ like the ‘ger’ (sojourner, 
sUanger, resident alien) existed on the fringes of society.: “Unlike the ‘ger,’ the ‘almana’ lived in this 
liminal zone as a woman. Not only was she bereft o f kin, but she was also without a male who 
ordinarily provided a woman with access to the public sphere”, in Day, p. 130
’®Amy-Jill Levine, ‘Ruth’ p. 79 in The Women’s Bible Commentary, p. 78-84. Levine calls 
Ruth’s background a ‘stigma’.
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appearances Naomi does not address herself to Ruth - thus pre-empting the biased 
response of the community she Imows well and wisely waits until Ruth herself wins 
their favour, (perhaps in the same manner Naomi herself was obliged to do in Moab?). 
Furthermore, in all cases of private exchanges, Naomi addresses herself to Ruth by 
saying 'my daughter' - for a total of six times!” Wliy such secrecy? Because in a 
world where both are designated 'other' making their alliance to each other public 
would be foolish and catastrophic” . And just as Ruth remains till the end 'the 
Moabitess' Naomi refuses to engage in dialogue with any man publicly - her 
complaints are restricted to the women who inhabit the same social space. The 
suppression of their alliance from the public eye - until they have achieved all they 
have planned - parallels the suppression of their story at the narrative level. Once in 
Judah, the public sphere of work and male justice take precedence over their lives 
(especially in chapters tlrree and four) ending with a genealogy which is not directly 
relevant at a textual level since it does not further the plot in any way.
As to the other characters identifying Ruth consistently as a Moabitess (in 2:2, 
2:6, 2:21, 4;5, and 4:10) a feminist position needs to be consistent. We cannot lament 
the 'loss' of Ruth's identity and at the same time find fault with her 'failure' at total 
integration. Nor can we support difference without allowing integration because 
integration does not automatically imply assimilation” . Ruth cannot be called 
anything other than 'Moabitess' because despite 'converting' to Judaism, she has not 
erased all that has contributed to the formation of her own identity from one day to the
’"Beattie points out that the number six was said to have prophetic significance and that 
Jewish exegetes agree that “Ruth was to be the ancestiess of six men who would each be blessed with 
six blessings...the spirit of wisdom and discermnent, counsel and might, the spirit of Imowledge and 
the fear o f the Lord” . Unfortunately, this consensus refers to the six measures of grains Boaz gives to 
Rutli and Ruth then gives to Naomi, overlooking the six clandestine pronouncements of endearment. I 
propose this is another instance where the praise is proper but the emphasis is misplaced. Here again 
Ruth and Naomi provide hints of their real alliance against interpreters who want them only concerned 
with marriage and property, p. 182
” Such mutual trust is, according to Lawrence Thomas, one of the three salient features of 
‘companion’ friendship: “because the bond is cemented by equal se lf  disclosure and as such, a sign of 
special regard each has for each other”, in ‘Friendship and Other Loves’, pp. 48-64 in Badhwar, p. 49
” Cf. Levine, p. 79 and Fuchs, p. 118 as aforementioned.
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next. Ruth herself signals this when she identifies herself as a foreigner in 2:10: 
“Why have I found favour in your eyes, that you should take notice of me, when I am 
a foreigner?” The important point is that Ruth’s different ethnic origin does not stand 
as an obstacle to her friendship with Naomi and as such sets the example to the rest of 
the community for a harmonious accommodation/acceptance of difference.
If Ruth has not 'given up' her identity then it follows that the scene of 
departure did not require any 'sacrifice' on her part and she is able to remain both a 
Moabitess and a friend to Naomi. In any case, Naomi and Ruth could not be friends if 
this kind of ‘sacrifice’ had transpired. Although Aristotle attempts to reconcile the 
idea of sacrifice with the nobility of 'ideal' friendship by saying that the sacrifice of 
one's life is justified if it contributes to a greater good I would ask, "Whose greater 
good?” In the case of women’s friendship the inevitable conflict between the 
commitment to one’s friend and the greater patriarchal good leads only to a less than 
noble sacrifice of the fornier. But if the immediate result was the dissolution of the 
friendship this would go against the basic tenant of friends' continued shared life.
In the book of ‘Ruth’ what is at issue is not the sacrifice of one’s life but the 
'lesser' case of the sacrifice of identity. Notwithstanding that I have already argued 
why Ruth’s fidelity does not constitute a sacrifice, another point that must be raised is 
that it stands against reason - as well as the common good - to subject a friend to an 
act that would change the friend in such a way that one could no longer remain 
friends; for even if the intention was virtuous (i.e. to save one’s life) the result would 
once again be separation. This is because, as Aristotle has pointed out, when a friend 
changes beyond recognition one can no longer be expected to maintain that 
friendship” . In Naomi and Ruth’s case, the intention (renouncing one’s identity for 
another’s well-being) may be construed as virtuous but if it were realised within 
friendship the result would once again (as in the case of sacrificing one’s life) prevent 
an ensuing common life.
’’Aristotle insists on this even if the change does not involve a compromise of one’s 
goodness, pp. 292-3 passim.
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There are several more aspects which support an interpretation against 
‘sacrifice’. If in order to remain together Ruth forgoes that which constitutes her 
uniqueness vis-à-vis Naomi then this would constitute an immoral demand on 
Naomi's part which would then require Ruth to separate from her. At the same time, 
should Ruth still desire to remain with Naomi, she would not be the ‘same’ Ruth and 
this also would require separation. What has been successfully negotiated then in the 
departure scene is the terms in which what is valued as the same (goodness, outsider 
status,) and different (religion, etlmicity, age) in each woman will continue to remain 
valued as such in the future.
In relation to religious faith, in light of the fact that Naomi is the only one who 
utters the name of YHWH - in an effort to regain her faith in Him - and Ruth not even 
once” , the strategic wording of Ruth's oath eludes the need for any sacrifice. This 
allows the women to continue in Judah as they had been living in Moab - in the 
company of each other, practising those common interests they possess as women and 
with the virtue that defines them and their friendship in order to satisfy the rest of 
their needs. And this takes place - at least initially - independently of their 
surroundings. If the rest of society does not accept them they still retain the 
community of each other’s company - they are in fact, each other’s only country” .
iii
It is in the last scene of child birth that is important for the argument that gender 
construction is a significant factor in these women's identification with each other. 
The child is part of ‘giving’ that is not biological but social, as in carrying out the task 
of caiing and nurturing. The life given to Ruth by Naomi - a new home - is returned
’’According to medieval, Jewish exegete, Salmon Ben Yeroliam, “...for if they were not going 
with her (Naomi) for the sake of great love of religion she would not allow them to go with her”, in 
Beattie, p. 54
’T disagree with Trible who sees Ruth as “standing alone” and possessing nothing. However, 
inuiiediately afterwards she praises Ruth’s conunitting herself “to another female in a world where life 
depends upon men. There is no more radical decision in all the memories of Israel”, p. 173, This is in 
agreement with my own thesis.
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by Ruth as a new life in the procuring of a child” . In a subversive twist in plot 
development Naomi and Ruth express to each other their commitment to their 
friendship which, once in Bethlehem, camiot be expressed explicitly in words, not 
only because of their presence in public patriarchal space but also because of their 
exclusion from “man-made language”” . The only language they share - to the 
exclusion of men - is that of their maternal bodies and the women's chorus 
acknowledges this in their proclamation: (4:15-16)
Then the women said to Naomi...for your daughter-in-law who loves 
you, who is more to you than seven sons has borne him. Then Naomi 
took the child and laid him in her bosom, and became his nurse.
In the book of Ruth, the only 'text' (as means of communication) Naomi and 
Ruth can share in the public sphere is their maternal bodies and by extension the only 
'text' they possess is Ruth's child” . As such, it is a ‘text’ they are to share, thereby 
resisting its - and their own - traditional inscription in patriarchal order as signs of 
credit which, as Claude-Levi Strauss says, constitute “the ultimate gift”” . Here they 
are changing the rules on their own terms so that structure of gift ‘exchange’ is 
transformed into gift ‘sharing’ in order to match the ethic of care by which they
■” As the Hebrew word illustrates, ‘redeemer’ is used in both instances. So just as Naomi 
helped Ruth in procuring Boaz as a ‘next o f kin’, (3: 12), Ruth has provided a ‘next o f kin’ for Naomi 
in Obed (4:15). In each case, the men are to ‘take care’ of tire women but they are also the means by 
which the women are ‘officially’ bound together! There is not only mutual care at work here, but also, 
equality, logic, daring and intelligence. See Jan de Waard and Eugene A. Nida, A Translator’s 
Handbook o f  Ruth (London: United Bible Societies, 1973), p. 4.15
’"For Spender men have had the monopoly of ‘naming’ the reality they experience because of 
their position as the dominant group whereas women have been excluded from this process. Thus 
“without a name it is difficult to accept the existence of an object, an event, a feeling...by assignmg 
names we impose a pattern and a meaning which allows us to manipulate the world”, p. 163. In view 
of this context it is remarkable that Naomi attempts to ‘name’ herself, p. 183
” My line of argument is indebted to Lorna Hutson's thesis on 16th century male friendship 
but I will reverse the terms so that it applies to women's friendship. It then serves as an radical 
subversion of the domination of the narrative upon Naomi and Ruth's story and of society on their 
bodies. In Hutson's thesis, women (in maniage) and literary texts (in reading) are part of the gift 
exchanging which form alliances, otherwise known as friendships, see pp. 6-7.
38 ^Claude-Levi Strauss, The Elementary Structures o f  Kinship (London: Eyre and
Spottiswoode, 1969, orig. published, 1949), p. 65
101
function. The child then becomes an extension and illumination of their own 
positioning as subjects, i.e. a sign of resistance to the male economy of ‘exchange’ 
and division. By claiming the child as their own they are refusing to submit to the 
patrilinear emphasis of the ending which ironically, but aptly, omits the man in whose 
name all this was ostensibly carried out - Chilion.
The language then that they both understand and to which the men do not have 
access”  is one characterised by equality, nurturance and care. In this public setting, it 
is a language which can only be expressed physically and in silence since the 
language of laws and rights is shown to be the domain of men (chapter four). That 
Naomi “laid him in her bosom” instead of speaking does not signify her disinterest in 
Rutfr" but her final justification in the case of a woman wronged early in the book. 
Only in this case it not an economy of exchange which is being enacted but the 
equality and equity of sharing. And against the legality of marriage they juxtapose - 
outside the space of formal rules and regulations - the justice of caring and taking 
mutual responsibility for the young. There can be no issue of 'whose' child this is 
since this is a concern of patrilineage - the women Imow that all children are a 
common responsibility. Again, Naomi’s and Ruth’s relationship re-interprets the 
notion of ideal friendship so that different values are assigned to notions of mutual 
beneflcience and benevolence.
In an unexpected final appearance Naomi re-appears to signal the end of her 
mourning of death in order to partake in the celebration of new life. She does not 
need to speak because the language of equality, nurturance and care can only be 
expressed via their bodies - in silence - since it is o f  their bodies and as such without
’"Because of what Spender names ‘tunnel vision’, p. 96: “Men inhabit a monodimensional 
reality characterised by tunnel vision whereas women have had to develop skills which are an inherent 
part o f multi-dimensional reality”. The same analogy could be drawn between masters and slaves.
'"’As Fewell and Gunn further argue: “(the women of the city) gently chide her by reminding 
her about the baby’s mother”, p. 102 in ‘A Son is Born to Naomi! ’. Fewell and Gunn consistently 
posit an either/or question between selfishness and altruism because of their assumption of animosity 
between the two women. Thus the possibility of ambivalence inherent in intense emotional states is 
absent for them.
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representation in the patriarchal narrative. In keeping with ideal friendship: “Friends 
have all things in common”'" and the issue of whether Naomi 'legally' adopts the child 
or 'merely' cares for it is a non-question. Since the women's identity is bound up and 
inseparable from their relationship the sustained effort to procure a common life 
continues with the birth of the next generation. The choms of women provide a hint 
of Naomi's state of mind by linldng her happiness to her relationship with Ruth and to 
her specific accomplishment in creating a new life i.e. Naomi is not happy merely 
because she now has a child/grandchild but precisely because it is due to Ruth that 
this child comes into existence: “He shall be a restorer of life to you and a nourisher 
of your old age; for you daughter-in-law who loves you, who is more to you than 
seven sons has borne him” (4:15).
Finally, Naomi and Ruth are not the only silent onlookers in the final scene, 
Boaz also has become a part of their community. In the scene on the tlireshing floor, 
what Boaz praises Ruth for is allowing him to partake in the model of relationship 
established between the two women and he is willing to negotiate on the part of all of 
them so that it is secured on a 'legal' basis. This would give a satisfactory answer to 
the commentators who agonise over the meaning of “...you have made this last 
kindness greater than the first in that you have not gone after young men whether rich 
or poor” (3:10)''\ In the context of ideal friendship the virtuous would only seek out 
the company of the equally virtuous and for Naomi and Ruth to accept Boaz he would 
first have to prove worthy of his name - pillar of society.
'"Aristotle, p. 273
'’^ Following Hutson's argument, p. 78, Boaz shows that “the instrumental value of what is 
shared tends to be identified with its confidentiality as a knowledge transaction”. In other words, 
Naomi and Ruth's narrative secrecy is opened to include Boaz who immediately understands the need 
for equally surreptitious behaviour. He then is awarded with the inclusion of his name in the 
genealogy.
Chapter 5
Naomi and Ruth: Role Models?
In order for Naomi and Ruth to be role models both for women and for the whole of 
community and for this model of community to be based on friendship I will examine 
how Ruth's relationship to Boaz, to her 'foremothers' (Rachel, Leah and Tamar), and 
to God functions when related to this concern. What I would like to explore is how 
the feminist model of friendship produced through the interaction of Aiistotelian 
theories and the book of Ruth can serve not only as a subversive basis of women's 
resistance against patriarchal structures but also as an alternative model of society 
which is transformative of those patriarchal structures.
i Leah, Rachel and Tamar
When the elders of Bethlehem gather at the gate and convey their wishes to Ruth they 
also mention in praise the names of three other women, Rachel, Leah and Tamar. On 
one level these women do not seem to have much in common with Ruth except that 
one - Tamar - also was a foreigner and the others are the first women in Israel to 
inhabit Bethlehem:"May the Lord make the woman, who is coming into your house, 
like Rachel and Leah, who together built up the house of Israel...may you 
prosper...may your house be like the house of Perez whom Tamar bore to Judah.” 
(4:11-12).
But as the stories of these women illuminate, there are more points in 
common. Tamar (Gen: 38) and the sisters Rachel and Leah (Gen: 29-31) also used 
deceit to secure sons for themselves. As such they all form examples of bearers of 
wisdom that the men in the stories do not have access to or comprehension of - despite 
their high ranking in God's eyes. Like them, Ruth and Naomi inliabit what Elaine 
Showalter calls the 'wild zone" of female experience/consciousness to which the male
^Elaine Showalter, 'Feminist Criticism in the Wilderness', pp. 331-353, in David Lodge, (ed.), 
Modern Criticism and Theory: A Reader, (London and New York: Longman, 1988), p. 347. Like Dale 
Spender, Showalter is also influenced by Ardener's theory of dominant and muted groups.
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point o f view is off limits. So Jacob may be able to converse with God Him self 
(Gen.28: 13-15 and Gen. 35: 10-12) but he is easily manipulated by both Rachel and 
Leah in sexual matters (Gen. 30:3-4,9,16). Tamar on the other hand, m ust disguise 
herself as a harlot in order to trick Judali into fulfilling his duty towards her as a 
childless widow.
But the resemblance ends here. Where Rachel and Leah utilise this knowledge 
clearly for the purpose of gaining Jacob’s favour and Tamar to regain her standing in 
society as a mother, Ruth has a different agenda^ . She puts this wisdom - with the 
help o f Naomi - to use in order to secure hers and Naomi's common good which is 
based on a sense o f their relationship as a priority. Even when Ruth secures a promise 
from Boaz that he “will do the part o f the next o f kin” (Ruth 3: 13) Ruth's concern is 
still with Naomi. When she returns the next moiiiing with the six measures o f barley 
she gives them to Naomi saying that Boaz insisted she “should not go back empty- 
handed” to her mother-in-law (Ruth 3:17) when in fact he had only given the food to 
her. This is yet another sign of Ruth's emphasis on her relationship to Naomi and her 
well-being as a priority - one that is reciprocated by Naomi in her immediate response 
which signifies an equal emphasis on the Ruth’s well-being: “Wait my daughter, until 
you learn how the matter turns out” (Ruth 3:18).
But there is more to the sharing o f the six measures o f barley than this 'white 
lie'. W hat is Naomi asking her to 'wait' for when Ruth offers her the barley and before 
Boaz officially settles the matter? It is the celebration - the sharing o f food - o f their 
accomplishment, a private celebration which immediately precedes the public 
negotiation o f Naomi's land and Ruth's hand in marriage. Though Ruth seems secure 
in the knowledge that their plans have been successful, Naomi, as an insider to the
^Bal, Lethal Love, p. 85-87, passim. Bal also considers the link between Ruth, Leah, Rachel 
and Tamar one o f common subversive - o f female sexuality against male fear - and also presents Ruth 
as going further than the other women in this respect. Though I agree here, I am more interested in 
going beyond the confines o f the perpetuation o f the 'story o f Israel' - since this has the wonaen acting 
for patriarchy's interests as well as their own - to another level o f subversion which transgresses the 
patriarchal status quo and has the women acting for themselves and each other's interests.
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ways of her society, cautions for one last pause before they can begin to partake in 
'common food' once again - food of course which has been made available by a man 
but which officially secures their life-long cohabitation, which is as I mentioned, most 
desired by friends.
The fact that Ruth and Naomi show such solidarity for each other is not only 
unique in the Hebrew Bible for the representation of relationships between women it 
is also important for the function of women's friendship in society. According to 
Aristotle, and unlike Cicero’, the demands of friendship do not come into conflict with 
the demands of community since the analogy he uses is that of democracy^ This is 
understandable in the context of male friendship when loyalty to male power is only 
an extension of their loyalty to each other. Ruth and Naomi set the example for a 
woman’s voice in friendship which posits its own rules for agency to which 
patriarchal order must comply - since it is society which is based on the notion and 
practice of friendship and not vice versa. If they are to respond to the demands of 
their friendship it is inevitable that this will bring them into conflict with patriarchal 
demands since these posit loyalty to men first and foremost. And this is exactly what 
Naomi and Ruth do by focusing on each other's well-being regardless of the 
consequences that may follow as a result. But from beginning to end, neither woman 
does this alone - she has the other to rely oiF.
^Cicero: "It is a bad and unacceptable excuse for any sort of wrongdoing but particularly if a 
man says he has acted against the interests of the state for the sake of his friend", p. 47. How much 
more 'unacceptable' if  it is women's friendship which does so.
"^Aristotle, p. 277
^In this respect I disagree with Daphne Hampson's assertion that: "Ruth is rewarded for the 
faithfulness of her behaviour within this patiiarchal context. But the story in no way questions that 
context or the rights of men". Hampson too quickly dismisses Ruth as acting shictly out of duty to 
Naomi whom she sees merely as a representative of her dead husband's world. But if Ruth had also 
returned to her people would she not then have been seen as faithful to the patriarchal world of her 
father? It seems that there is no 'right' action that would absolve the women in this text for Hampson. 
See Theology: and Feminism, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 103
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and Aristotle himself points out that: “Between friends there is no need for justice, but 
people who are just still need the quality of friendship; and indeed friendliness is 
considered to be justice in the fullest sense”®.
By justice of course, Aristotle has in mind the written law with its rules and 
regulations" but as I have shown, the obligations o f friendship are not obligations in 
the strict sense of this word. And since ideal friendship also encompasses moral 
excellence and equality o f beneflcience such a model for society is one compatible 
with feminism's ideals for an egalitarian society. In such a society there would be no 
need for sacrifice since there would be no conflict between the values which bind 
people together and the society which is an extension o f these values on a larger scale.
But since both ideal friendship and its counterpart as a vision o f community is 
to be constantly striven for neither can be seen as static i.e. as a once and for all 
accomplished state o f being or even one which cannot be accomplished in the present. 
On the personal level o f friendship, the mutual beneflcience which stems from moral 
excellence must be constantly exhibited and on the societal level this must be 
accomplished for the majority o f citizens if  it is to be an effective alternative o f 
community. But first, it must be acknowledged as a value to be respected and 
prioritised as a relationship to be developed” . Instead o f marriage as the cornerstone 
o f society, which, given the time and place o f the Biblical world remains an unequal
freely grants; it brings about that harmony in which violation ot mutual rights no longer occors and so 
there is so longer any occason even to think o f justice", p. 963
^Aristotle, p. 259
^As Derrida writes on Aristotle's democracry: "one can see a form o f  friendship which is 
coextensive with relationships o f justice. One would have to specify that justice has two dimensions, 
one not written and the other codified by law", p. 383. Derrida is echoing Aristotle, p. 282
‘^ As Mary Daly asserts in Pure Lust (London: Women's Press, 1984): "...the work o f  be­
friending can be shared by all, and all can benefit from this Metamorphospheric activity. Be-friending 
involves W eaving a context in which women can Realize our Self-transforming, m etapattem ing 
participation in Be-ing...Every woman who contributes to the creation o f this atmosphere functions as 
catalyst for the evolution of other women and for the forming and unfolding o f genuine friendships". 
In this redemptive potential I would like to include all humanity.
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basis on which to form a society, friendship would prioritise equality in a practical, 
realisable manner accessible to all who cultivate it.
In the book of Ruth, this is shown to be endorsed when, in the last scene, Ruth 
gives birth to Obed, and the women (following the praise of the elders but with an 
altogether different emphasis) posit friendship above kinship;"...your daughter-in-law 
who loves you, who is more to you than seven sons, has borne him” (4:15). How is it 
that Ruth's relationship to Naomi is more than that of a son? Officially, Ruth is 
'related' to Naomi, but she is not a blood relation and in the precarious position of 
daughter-in-law she could easily have married someone else and lost all contact with 
Naomi. So again there is excess in the relationship which, like the pledge at the 
begimiing of the story goes beyond the call of duty characteristic of kinship 
relationships to that of the voluntary nature of friendship. Where the duty of familial 
relations ends - and does not suffice - there is the desire to develop and maintain 
friendship which, as a model, is a better guarantee of prosperity - for Ruth is more 
worthy than seven sons, not merely one.
For those who see Ruth as negative role model - or not one at all - because she 
portrays all those “feminine qualities of docility and submission, of obedience and 
devotion to wifely and maternal duties”" is to disregard the strategic manipulation of 
the feminine role Ruth employs to ends that are not traditionally 'feminine'. At the 
same time, the qualities of kindness and strength, intelligence and co-operation 
developed within the context of friendship should not be seen as secondary virtues or 
as useless for the feminist project. They are the qualities with which an equally
' T e lia  Leah Bromier, ‘A Thematic Approach to Ruth in Rabbinic Literature’ p. 169 in 
Brenner p. 146-169. It is Bronner who points out that non-raidrashic sources such as the Syriac 
Targum as well as modern scholars working from etymological evidence, consider Ruth’s name to 
derive from the root re 'ut or ‘friendship’ or ‘female’ companion’ (quoted on p. 150 from BDB, p.
946). Sasson, on the other hand, in ‘Ruth’ p. 322 prefers to agree with the other argument that says 
this is an edifying inteipretation because for them, the name ‘Ruth’ is related to a Semitic root meaning 
‘to be soaked, irrigated’. Since all the other names have clear symbolic meanings, I fail to see why 
translators prefer this more opaque rendition (do they find it potentially subversive?). In any case, it 
seems suspicious that, although known, the former etymology did not influence their readings of Ruth.
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radical revolution may be forged, provided, as shown here, that the priorities and aims 
such qualities are made to serve are not androcentric/exclusivist.
And as I have shown, the qualities women 'possess' as defined by androcentric 
discourse need revaluating in the context they are shown to function in and the 
pui*poses they serve. Ruth is shown to be submissive to Boaz when she first meets 
him (Ruth 2:10) but not at all when she visits him on the threshing floor! (Ruth 3:9). 
And she is never 'dutiful' to Naomi. Naomi is also equally assertive when she refuses 
to engage in dialogue with any men and addresses her complaints directly to God 
without any male intermediary. It is only within the background of patriarchal power 
that this masquerade of subservience and docility takes place for the purpose of 
attending to these women's desires. And unlike so many other women in the Hebrew 
Bible who do not voice their desires let alone fulfil them, Naomi and Ruth speak of, 
demand and fulfil the many goals they pursue. The potential however for alternative 
society does not only rest in the 'methods' Naomi and Ruth utilise in order to secure a 
better life for themselves within patriarchal structures, it lies in exemplifying the 
values of women's friendship which subvert those structures.
Could it have been possible for an independent, autonomous Ruth to have 
survived? To have these women openly defy male control would have rendered them 
foolish since the exclusion of one fi'om the community would well have made the 
dissolution of their friendship inevitable. In bringing attention to what the book itself 
denotes - a unique example of friendship” - one finds the most significant - for the 
puiposes of a feminist vision of society - image of the book. For instance, why is it 
'allowed', in the context of the Hebrew Bible, to be forged between two women? It 
could be that like slaves, women as a social group which does not have direct access 
to power, have no need to be involved in the kind of conflict that men are inevitably 
drawn into. Therefore, they are often left to argue over who secures which man or
'^Aristotle, p. 264 “That such friendships are rare is natural, because men of this kind are 
few”. This comment is borne out by the (lack of ) examples in the Bible.
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whose son will become king (Rachel and Leah, in Genesis 30) These less that noble 
pursuits though perfectly justifiable given the conditions under which women lived, 
are nowhere in the book of Ruth. Not only do Naomi and Ruth function in complete 
harmony but the whole community of men and women follow their example. Though 
the hint of danger and scandal exists (in Ruth 2:9, 3:14 - and these are the true 
outsiders) there are no jealousies, no pettiness, no wrath of God. Could the book of 
Ruth then be a Biblical Utopia?
In the potential it presents on the model of friendship, Naomi and Ruth’s 
relationship is a concrete realisation of the kind of relationships that - were everyone 
to aspire to - would result in a truly egalitarian, non-violent and harmonious society. 
In its feminist reappropriation of a model friendship which is both emotional and 
rational, pleasurable and responding to need, it frmctions as a basis of a society which 
celebrates life in all its forms and difference in all its varieties. In its reinterpretation 
of the notions of duty and freedom, desire and sacrifice, it privileges the sustaining of 
non-violent relationships over the demands of a society that is ultimately dystopic 
were it to prohibit or attempt to sever such ties. But in this book it is not only the 
onlookers who seem to condone and support Ruth and Naomi's friendship, it is also a 
text whose imagery suggests the approval of God.
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Most commentators interested in a theological interpretation of the book of Ruth go to 
lengths to ‘prove’ that it is God’s providence at work in the story of common people. I 
would like to argue that in the examples of the use of the word hesed lies a clue as to 
what kind of behaviour is ultimately condoned. Since hesed is a term to be 
understood primarily as a human manifestation which then has theological 
implications” it should be examined within the context of Ruth, Naomi and Boaz's 
utterances in order to draw any theological significance.
'T -  62 ill Theological Dictionary o f  the Old Testament
I l l
An important aspect of hesed is its mutuality even where it is not explicitly 
shown” . It is also often explained as doing more than one’s duty. Both of these 
instances are compatible with the notion of friendship as re-interpreted in this thesis. 
Since Ruth is commended for showing hesed three times in the text this implies a 
reciprocity in hesed which singles out the ‘space’ between Ruth and Naomi and Boaz 
as one o f mutual care and responsibility which is voluntarily given.
The first instance (1:8) as I have already mentioned is establishing a linlc with 
the past which establishes Ruth as already good since she is commended for the 
kindness she has shown to her husband and to Naomi: "May the Lord deal kindly with 
you as you have dealt with the dead and with me". This is uttered by Naomi, who, 
despite her distress at losing her sons, praises Ruth and Orpah by wishing them fiirther 
well-deserved happiness. Ruth is further praised by Boaz (3:10) when she approaches 
him on the tlneshing floor by comparing, rather ambiguously, Ruth's last 'kindness' 
with her present 'kindness'. Was the last kindness related to him or to Naomi? It 
seems that Ruth is so gifted that she is able to suitably respond to each need as it 
arises - but is she actually alone in possessing this gift?
According to the uses of hesed mutuality of benevolence is always implied and 
this seems to be another way of saying that this quality in Ruth is recognised hy 
Naomi and Boaz because they too are capable of hesed. According then to the logic 
of the text, Naomi's efforts in Ruth's securing a husband and Boaz's rising to this 
occasion are also examples of hesed - only it is not necessary for them to be 
commended for it because it is in Ruth's foreigmiess that possessing such an attribute 
is found to be extraordinary. Yet the whole text is penneated with the desire for 
goodwill as exemplified in the constant praising by the women at the beginning and 
end of the story, by Boaz's servant, Boaz himself and finally, God is called upon to 
bless Boaz since His Ntesei has not forsaken the living or the dead!”(2:20). But 
already, it has been the people themselves, Ruth, Naomi and Boaz who have not
'% id , p. 48
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forsaken each other and have responded to each other's needs; it has been their 
kindness to each other in the 'here and now' of the text that reflects what the Lord is 
asked to further endorse. To disregard this sense of urgency for mutual care in the 
present space/time of the protagonists by pointing to the final paragraph of genealogy 
is to impose a disproportionate emphasis on extra-textual matters which do not 
concern the protagonists of this story and should not concern the reader until at least 
the main protagonist in this list (David) is mentioned.
The genealogy however is seen to provide further proof to those who seek it 
that the book of Ruth is an example of God’s providence in the lives of connnon 
people, foreigners, and especially the Israelites. Although the Lord’s name is often 
mentioned tlnoughout, one must believe that His hand guides all the action, in such a 
way that a happy ending ensues for everyone” . In order to draw some theological 
meaning in this case nothing of the aforementioned need be cancelled since He would 
obviously approve of such a friendship - in the book of Ruth God is shown to be 
neither racist, ageist, nor misogynist and confers his blessing almost every step of the 
(narrative) way. Not only does Ruth become accepted in Bethlehem hut Naomi also 
had already been accepted in a foreign land. To see God’s providence as singled out 
for special use only by the Israelites is not useful even today or even worthy of a 
theological interpretation.
Here is a story where His involvement is minimal - yet Naomi and Ruth have 
what seem to be so many differences - in age, status, religion, ethnicity. How is it that 
Ruth as a foreign woman - who never once mentions YHWH after her oath - should 
be the one to act in ‘good faith’ when so many others have failed? Is it because as a 
foreigner, she is less constrained by what is considered to be ‘God’s will’? Is the 
radical message of the text that the Israelites - as a representative community - can
'^Murphy, Wisdom Literature, p. 87, sees Him as a “hidden God”, Campbell (p. 29), as “a 
primary actor in the drama”, while Sasson (p. 221) sees “a paucity of occasions in which God’s 
activities are of consequence to the narrative (2:3, 4:1) as distinguished from rhetorical impact” (1:6, 
4:3).
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become blinded to the meaning of their own actions by neglecting the value of human 
relationships and focusing instead on divine will? Could the ethical message be that 
we should all aspire to relationships such as that of Naomi’s with Ruth? The answer 
is yes - but with regard to ideal friendship.
Conclusion
It is safe to say that if it were not for David” the story of these two women would 
have never made it into the canon, but once there I propose it is not Naomi and Ruth 
who are made significant because of David but that David is who he is because of 
such women - after all, they did come first! Nor do I find it surprising that Jesus is 
part of this genealogy because perfect friendship not only assumes love but is 
synonymous with love. I mention these two men in particular because though they 
are extra-textual factors while reading 'Ruth', they are well known enough to 
'influence' a reading of this story in a way which diminishes the importance of the 
women's actions within their own context” . Naomi and Ruth's relationship needs to 
be read without anaclironistic interference from men's stories because as a women's 
story in an ancient text it has already been subjected to enough patriarchal bias in the 
history of interpretation” .
Wiry then has Naomi and Ruth's relationship not been interpreted and 
celebrated to a greater degree as friendship? Perhaps, because Naomi and Ruth’s 
relationship does not ‘fit’the androcentric theoretical model nor the one overt example 
of male friendship in the Hebrew Bible, it is assumed to be of an altogether different
'^On tlie other hand, if one wanted to read Ruth in relation to David's friendship with Jonathan 
- an altogether different project - one should be aware of the risk involved in for example, holding such 
a relationship as a model of community because of the imbalance in power between David and 
Jonathan. When there is already inequality inlierent in the relationship, friendship falls short of the 
ideal.
‘^ Even Alter, whose approach is literary, follows this line: “The alignment of Ruth’s story 
with the Pentateuchal betr othal scene becomes an intimation of her portentious future as progenihix of 
the divinely chosen house of David”, p. 59
'^See Fiorenza, p. 60
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nature. Or is is because, as Irigaray states, that “the existing norms of society and 
culture depend on separating women from each other?” '" - whereas to see Naomi and 
Ruth as friends challenges this separation? Perhaps also because to see these two 
women as friends is to aclmowledge their full humanity as female subjects who act 
and refuse to be acted upoiri". In view of the potential for a radical re-vision of society 
it poses, I can only explain this omission on the basis of fear - of what women's 
friendships put into question and offer as an alternative. Yet this is umiecessary, since 
the values it is based upon - inclusion of difference, inter-dependence and 
responsibility to emotional need - promote equality, equity and non-violence at a 
societal level which begins at an inter-personal level. As the quotes at the begimiing 
of this thesis illustrate this is not an ideal that is necessarily only realisable by 
women. As Ruether writes, it is in “wrong relationship that evil lies...and good lies in 
its limits, a balancing of our own drive for life with the life drives of all the others..., 
so that the whole remains a life-sustaining harmony...the life force...becomes ‘eviP 
when it is maximized at the expence of others” '^. The practice of friendship is such a 
life sustaining force, one in which ‘heaven’ need not be reserved to the afterlife, it can 
be experienced in the here and now, on eartlril Naomi and Ruth's story shows that if 
their example was followed there would be no need for divine complaint - or any 
other complaint. Though they may not have Imown it, in their struggle to find a place 
in society and stay together, Naomi and Ruth have provided an example of 
community based on friendship that still remains a largely unrealised vision.
'^Luce Irigaray, An Ethics o f  Sexual Difference, (tr.), Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill, 
(London: The Athlone Press, 1993), p. 104
^^Unlike the majority of women in the Bible, see Sharon H Ringe, ‘When Women Interpret 
the Bible’, pp. 1-9 in The Women's Bible Commentary, p.3
^Tuether, Gaia and God, p. 256
^Tugustine’s heavenly city, in its vision of peace and happiness, seems quite similar to the 
earthly utopia of friendship, see pp. 326-7, in The City o f  God, Book nineteentli XIX, (tr.), Marcus 
Dods, M.A., pp. 293-344, (Edinbrough: T&T Clark, 1871)
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